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ABSTRACT
Hatred Simmering in the Melting Pot: Hate Crime in New York City, 1995-2010
Colleen E. Mills
Advisor: Joshua D. Freilich, Ph.D.
Hate crime proves prevalent in American society, inflicting a variety of harms on victims
as well as society at large. Scholars have long sought to understand the motivations and
conditions behind hate crime offending. Green and his colleagues conducted the classic
neighborhood studies examining the conditions that foster hate crime (Green, Glaser, & Rich,
1998; Green, Strolovich, & Wong, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, Wong, & Bailey). Using data from
the New York Police Department’s Hate Crimes Task Force, the current study replicates and
extends Green's neighborhood studies by investigating hate crime in New York City from 1995
to 2010. This study investigates whether Green, Strolovitch, & Wong’s (1998) findings hold true
over an extended period of time in New York City, during which the city underwent major
demographic changes. Using a group conflict framework (Blalock, 1967; Tolnay & Beck, 1995),
the current study extends prior work by investigating the impact of various "threats, including
defended neighborhoods as well as economic, political, terrorist, and gay threat, on different
types of anti-minority hate crime, including those against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities
as well as anti-gay hate crime. The current study also integrates criminological frameworks,
testing social disorganization and strain to explain hate crime. Using negative binomial
regression analyses with a pooled cross-sectional design, the current study provides a thorough
analysis of hate crime in New York City as well as further insight into hate crime in the context
of defended neighborhoods.
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worked to better understand the violence of hatred and it seems appropriate to acknowledge
where this ongoing pursuit started, with the words of Anne Frank:
It's twice as hard for us young people to hold on to our opinions at a time when
ideals are being shattered and destroyed, when the worst side of human nature
predominates, when everyone has come to doubt truth, justice and God.
…
It’s difficult in times like these: ideals, dreams and cherished hopes rise within us,
only to be crushed by grim reality. It’s a wonder I haven't abandoned all my
ideals, they seem so absurd and impractical. Yet I cling to them because I still
believe, in spite of everything, that people are truly good at heart.
It's utterly impossible for me to build my life on a foundation of chaos, suffering
and death. I see the world being slowly transformed into a wilderness. I hear the
approaching thunder that, one day, will destroy us too, I feel the suffering of
millions. And yet, when I look up at the sky, I somehow feel that everything will
change for the better, that this cruelty too will end, that peace and tranquility will
return once more. In the meantime, I must hold on to my ideals. Perhaps the day
will come when I'll be able to realize them!
This dissertation is dedicated to the victims of hate crime and all those who face hatred every day
whether at the hands of an individual, a society, or a government.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The current study provides a detailed analysis of hate crimes in New York City, the
nation’s largest urban area, from 1995 to 20101. While the history of hate is long, in recent years
bias crimes have, unfortunately, continued to occur and have greatly damaged society. Levin
(2009) traces the origins of modern hate crime laws to the passage of postbellum legislation to
combat Ku Klux Klan violence. Developments continued to evolve through the Civil Rights era
to the creation of specialized bias units. In the late 20th century, federal and state legislation
mandated the collection of hate crime statistics and included provisions calling for penalty
enhancements for bias-motivated offenses. Hate crimes are more brutal than similar non-hate
hate crimes, create fear in targeted minority groups, and undermine community cohesiveness
(Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Lim, 2009;
McDevitt et al., 2001). Other consequences of hate crimes include suicides of youth bullied for
their sexual orientation, as well as mass casualties from shootings purposefully targeting racial
and religious minorities. Indeed, as recent events (i.e. Dylann Storm Roof's 2015 shooting of
black congregants at the Emmanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina) make clear,
deadly hate crimes continue to occur in the United States.
This dissertation replicates, updates, and extends Green and colleagues’ classic macrolevel (defended neighborhoods) study that used NYPD data. It is the product of a unique
collaborative relationship with the New York Police Department (NYPD). As a result, the
NYPD Hate Crimes Task Force (HCTF) provided the data and they will be briefed upon the
dissertation’s completion. Official and law enforcement hate crime data have been criticized
over validity and reliability issues. Hate crimes suffer from underreporting, being under-

New York’s hate crime legislation defines hate crimes as offenses motivated by biases, specifically those of “race, color, national origin,
ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation” (Fetzer & Fernandez-Lanier, 2009).
1
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investigated, as well as differential compliance across departments, cities, and states (King,
2007; King, Messner, & Baller, 2009). The NYPD HCTF data however is more resilient to such
criticisms. New York City established a police unit devoted to investigating hate crimes in 1980,
prior to the landmark Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (Martin, 1996). The HCTF is one of the
longest running and best trained bias crime units in the nation and it is therefore better equipped
to respond to and investigate reported hate crime. Thus, this dissertation’s first benefit is that it
utilizes hate crime data from one of the nation’s leading hate crime police units (Freilich &
Chermak, 2013).
Scholars have investigated the etiology of hate-motivated offenses across multiple units
of analysis, including what motivates individuals to commit hate crimes (Byers, Crider, &
Biggers, 1999; Franklin, 2000, McDevitt, Levin, & Bennett, 2002; Phillips, 2009). Scholars
have also examined the larger conditions that foster hate crimes, accounting for their variation
across neighborhoods, cities, and larger units such as states (Grattet, 2009; Green, Glaser, &
Rich, 1998; Green, Strolovich, & Wong, 1998; Green, Strolovitch, Wong, & Bailey, 2001;
Lyons, 2007). These works make important contributions, but gaps remain, especially in terms
of the context of hate crime offending. The classic neighborhood level studies on hate crimes
were conducted by Green and colleagues using data from the New York Police Department
(NYPD) Bias Crimes Unit (now the HCTF). Green published these results in a series of articles
in leading social science journals in the late 1990s (Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green,
Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Green et al., 2001). These studies are all now more than 15 years
old and used data from over 25 years ago.
The dissertation’s second contribution is that it investigates whether Green, Strolovitch,
& Wong’s (1998) neighborhood level findings hold true over an extended period of time in
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NYC, during which the city underwent major demographic changes. They found that increasing
minority populations in formerly all-white areas accounted for anti-Black, as well as anti-Asian
and anti-Latino, hate crimes. Significantly, the current study expands upon their study by
examining all bias intents (including religious and sexual orientation bias crimes), not just the
anti-racial minority crimes they studied. In addition, the dissertation investigates anti-white hate
crime to determine if changing demographics can also account for these crimes. The data
evidence considerable demographic change with growth in the Asian and Hispanic populations
over time in NYC (NYC Department of City Planning, Population Division, 2011). The
changing demographics of NYC, including interesting patterns related to gentrification, allow us
to determine whether increases in white populations in formerly minority districts are similarly
associated with anti-white hate crimes. The current study also demonstrates the importance of
disaggregating hate crimes by bias as certain predictors are shown to affect certain bias types
differently.
This dissertation’s third contribution is that it a theoretically driven study that tests
hypotheses drawn from sociology and criminology. It relies heavily on group conflict and threat
theories, including defended neighborhoods as well as economic, political, criminal, and sacred
traditions threat models. Further, group conflict and threat theories often overlap with
criminological strain and social disorganization theories, and the current study thus investigates
which theories best explain hate crime. It also examines how the inclusion of certain predictors
influence the threat models. There is a consistent overlap in the use of certain variables (i.e.
economic conditions) across the threat and criminological models, a recurring conceptual issue
in more political offenses such as terrorism and hate crimes (Freilich & LaFree, 2015). Research
also shows how interactions between certain variables are consequential in explaining bias-
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motivated incidents. The literature also demonstrates much inconsistency. While much of the
research regarding the impact of defended neighborhoods on bias-motivated behaviors is
consistent, there is mixed support for economic and political threat models due to
methodological inconsistency over how to best operationalize key conceptual predictors. Thus,
there is a need for more refined measures and thus, better operationalization of key predictors.
There is little work examining the criminal/terrorist threat model as well as the etiology of antigay hate crime. The current study contributes to each of these areas to provide a better
understanding of hate crime offending at the neighborhood level.
Lastly, the dissertation could impact policy and practice in the United States. The results
should interest scholars, law enforcement, intelligence analysts, practitioners, and the general
public. The project’s results could aid the NYPD’s (and other police departments’) strategies
and policies in preventing and responding to hate crime. Such strategies could serve as a model
for other bias crime units in the country. This study could also help community relations groups
in how to best remedy neighborhood conflicts. The study could aid the Community Relations
Service (CRS) of the U.S. Department of Justice, which handles "community conflicts and
tensions arising from differences of race, color, national origin, gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, religion, and disability" (U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service).
Other community stakeholders, such as schools, victims’ services, and other community and
mediating services stand to benefit from the study given their investment in better understanding,
and thus more ably responding, to hate crime.
This dissertation first reviews the theories (i.e., group conflict, strain and social
disorganization) it relied upon to better understand neighborhood variation in hate crimes in
NYC. The literature review highlights prior research on defended neighborhoods, economic
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conditions, political and the criminal/terrorist threat, and the threat to sacred traditions. The data
and methods section restates the hypotheses before describing the data, dependent and
independent variables, the data analysis plan, as well as outlining summary statistics. The results
section provides a thorough examination of hate crime by bias type using the several threat
models. Following the results presentation, the discussion section explains the dissertation’s
findings and its potential policy and practitioner implications.
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CHAPTER TWO: GROUP CONFLICT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This dissertation investigates the etiology of hate crime offending on the neighborhood
level using police data from the NYPD's HCTF. The following section reviews research across
psychology and criminology, with a particular emphasis on sociology. Based upon this review,
the dissertation devises a series of hypotheses to explain neighborhood level variation in hate
crime offending. The study relies primarily on group conflict theories. Blalock's (1967) Toward
a Theory of Minority Group Relations is a classic text on conflict between majority and minority
groups and hate crime scholars, including Green, Strolovitch, and Wong's (1998) "defended
neighborhoods" study which the current study seeks to replicate, often cite to it.
Prior to Blalock's important work, Blumer (1958) described racial prejudice as stemming
from a sense of group position. Articulating racial prejudice as a collective social process, he
argues that "the sense of group position is clearly formed by a running process in which the
dominant racial group is led to define and redefine the subordinate racial group and the relations
between them" (p. 5). Blumer (1958) further explains that the dominant group's perception of
threats to their power and privileges by the minority group spurs defensive prejudices and
behaviors by the dominant group (p. 5). Blalock (1967) frames minority group threat as a
function of competition for economic and political power. Blalock (1967) explains that the
majority reacts to minority presence differently when it comes to economic versus political
threats.
Whereas the political threat model hypothesizes a positive association with an increasing
slope between minority group size and discrimination, the economic threat model posits a
nonlinear positive association that weakens as the minority size grows (Blalock, 1967; Tolnay &
Beck, 1995; Tolnay, Deane, & Beck, 1996). Explaining how greater minority presence should
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increase the motivation to discriminate against minorities, Tolnay and Beck (1995) explain that
"although the relationship is predicted to be positive in both instances, the strength of the
association is expected to increase with the relative size of the minority where competition is
primarily political in nature, but to become progressively weaker when the basis for competition
is economic" (p. 168-169). Thus, Blalock argues that the relationship between minority presence
and discrimination is curvilinear in the economic threat context. Blalock (1967) asserts that
symbolic forms of violence are one form of discrimination used in response to such threats (p.
159). While bias-motivated violence is not new, hate crime exists as a modern example of
symbolic, discriminatory violence. In response to economic and political threat, minorities are
targeted for discrimination and aggression to reduce them (i.e., the minority group) as a
competitive threat in an environment where there are limited means to achieve goals (i.e.
economic stability or success). This also occurs when the minority is seen as being either the
source of, or aligned with the source of, the aggressors' frustration (p. 49). In the context of poor
economic conditions, hate crime serves as both an outlet for the offender's frustration and an
instrumental attempt to stop the competitive threat by the minority.
Previous literature examines intergroup conflict as an outcome of poor economic
conditions with the majority lashing out against minorities for their perceived threat to the
majority’s economic dominance. Disadvantaged members in the majority group (i.e. poor
whites) can be most frustrated by minority threat, which raises the question as to how they are
capable of quashing such perceived threats. These disadvantaged members prove most
susceptible to responding to the various threats with violence because of the strains, economic
and otherwise, they experience for which minorities are blamed. Blalock (1967) discusses how
those without resources may not be able to carry out actual discrimination in economic or
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political spheres. Hate crime, however, offers an opportunity for those without resources to still
target minorities in an instrumental manner. Mills et al. (2016) discuss how hate crimes are a
cost-effective route for extremists to achieve their socio-political objectives. This can be
extended to all hate crime offenders since they may commit these crimes to intimidate groups to
achieve their own goals (i.e. driving minorities out of the offender’s neighborhood). Hate crimes
often inflict deep psychological and emotional harms to both immediate victims and their larger
communities, thus reducing the threat posed by minorities.
Research (Barnes & Ephross, 1994; Iganski & Lagou, 2009; Lim, 2009; McDevitt et al.,
2001) shows that hate crime inflicts greater psychological and emotional damage (i.e. depression
and fear of victimization) compared to regular crime victimization. Studies (Iganski and Lagou,
2009; Lim, 2009) also reveal that minorities will avoid areas out of a fear of hate crime. In
addition, hate crime victims may flee their neighborhoods in favor of a new residence. Hate
crimes also act as message crimes, terrorizing the larger community to which hate crime victims
belong (Krueger and Malečková, 2002; 2003). Hate crimes symbolize an anti-“other” attitude to
be conveyed to larger targeted audiences. They also serve as menacing threats to the larger
community from “you do not belong here” to “we are coming after all of you.” Thus, hate crime
acts as an effective method of social control to combat minority threat.
Blalock's (1967) explanation of majority-minority relations exists in a larger context of
American society. Highlighting American society’s stark divisions, Perry (2001) offers a theory
of “doing difference,” citing the prevalence of “notions of difference that have been used to
justify and construct intersecting hierarchies along lines of sexuality, race, gender, and class” (p.
46). Perry (2001) finds that the constructions of difference underlie facets of American life,
specifically societal structures, labor, power, sexuality, and culture. Perry (2001) summarizes
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that “hate crime provides a context in which the perpetrator can reassert his/her hegemonic
identity and, at the same time, punish the victim(s) for their individual or collective performance
of identity…sustain[ing] the privilege of the dominant group, and to police the boundaries
between groups by reminding the Other of his/her ‘place’” (p.55). Hate crime reflects the larger
hierarchies along "difference" and their subsequent conflicts in American society by enforcing
majority supremacy, punishing minorities for perceived transgressions, and neutralizing threats
to dominant economic, political, and power interests. Having explained minority group threat
generally, the following section reviews the theoretical and empirical works to devise a series of
hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses centers on the impact of defended neighborhoods,
focusing on hate crime as an outcome of minority group size and changing demographics. The
second section presents hypotheses related to economic conditions. Third, the review
investigates the role of political factors and the economic and political nature of minority group
threat, both of which are prominent dimensions in the intergroup conflict literature. The fourth
set of hypotheses focuses on the "terrorist" threat. The last section presents hypotheses about
anti-gay hate crime in the context of the threat to "sacred traditions." The review concludes by
summarizing this body of research and outlines future directions for the current study.
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW
Defended Neighborhoods
The first set of hypotheses focus on community demographics and their impact on hate
crime:
H1: Communities with higher levels of majority presence will be associated with higher levels of
hate crime (static);
H2: Communities with increasing levels of minority presence will be associated with higher
levels of hate crime (dynamic);
H3: Predominantly majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents will experience
increases in hate crime (dynamic; using an interaction term of the majority population by
change in minority population); and
H4: Communities with more Jewish buildings (i.e. synagogues) will experience more anti-Jewish
hate crime (static).
Group conflict theories argue that social control is used to respond to the threat posed by
the presence of minorities to dominant interests (Blalock, 1967). Green, Strolovitch, and Wong's
(1998) classic study on hate crime tests the "defended neighborhoods thesis," a long-standing
perspective in sociological literature (De Sena, 1990; Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1967; Rieder,
1985; Suttles, 1972). Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998) theorize that increasing minority
populations represent a threat to the majority’s political and economic interests in a competition
for limited resources (p. 373). Such theories assert various conditions under which raciallymotivated attacks occur, including (1) areas with greater heterogeneity, (2) predominantly white
areas, and (3) areas experiencing demographic change with minorities moving into
predominantly white areas (p. 374-376). Green and colleagues (1998) test the third of these
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conditions by examining whether an influx of minorities into predominantly white
neighborhoods are associated with higher rates of hate crimes. They also investigated the impact
of economic conditions.
Much of the research on hate crime focuses on the level of minority populations as well
as demographic change. Several studies (Grattet, 2009; Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998; Green,
Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Green et al., 2001; Lyons, 2007; Stacey, Carbone-López, &
Rosenfeld, 2011) investigate the link between neighborhood conditions and hate crimes. These
studies used police data on bias incidents for their analyses. Green, Strolovitch, and Wong’s
(1998) major finding was that anti-minority hate crimes were more common in formerly allwhite neighborhoods that were experiencing increases in minority populations. They speculated
that white perpetrators committed hate crimes to “defend” their neighborhood from “outsiders.”
These findings thus highlight the need to disaggregate hate crimes.
Grattet (2009) corroborated Green’s findings on the relationship between hate crimes
(both generally and anti-black) and the influx of nonwhites into white neighborhoods in
Sacramento, California. Lyons (2007) examined Chicago neighborhoods and found an
interesting relationship between different bias types and neighborhood demographics. Anti-Black
crimes occurred in wealthier and white, socially organized areas seeing increases in the Black
population, indicating an attempt to push back against “invading” minorities. Meanwhile, antiwhite hate crimes were more likely to occur in disadvantaged and disorganized areas. These
findings also indicate the importance of disaggregating hate crimes. Lyons (2008) replicates
Grattet’s finding in a second study that confirms that anti-Black hate crimes occur in
predominantly white areas with higher levels of community attachment. The study also shows
that anti-white crimes are prevalent in communities with even levels of white and Black
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residents. Using a minority threat framework, Stacey et al. (2011) find that states experiencing
an influx of Hispanic immigrants saw a rise in anti-Hispanic hate crime rates. Lastly, Mills et al.
(2016) show that higher levels of nonwhite populations and growing nonwhite populations over
time are associated with increases in fatal hate crimes committed by far-right extremists.
In addition to recent hate crime studies using American police data, several studies
examine bias-motivated attitudes and behaviors across other periods and countries. Investigating
hate crime in Australia, Benier, Wickes, and Higginson (2015) show that speaking a language
other than English increases the odds of being a hate crime victim; however, they find no
association between neighborhoods experiencing an influx of ethnic persons and hate crime. In a
spatial study of Southern lynchings, Tolnay et al. (1996) find a positive association between the
percent Black and lynchings. Contrary to much of the intergroup conflict research, King and
Brustein (2006) find that Jewish population levels failed to account for anti-Semitic violence in
World War II era Germany. Brustein and King (2004) however find that the size of the Jewish
population was positively associated with anti-Semitism in Romania (but not in Bulgaria) prior
to the Holocaust. But this relationship was more complex and it is discussed more fully below in
the political threat section.
King and Weiner (2007) find that African-Americans along with persons exposed to
higher Jewish population levels (along with an interaction between these two predictors) are
more likely to express anti-Semitic attitudes. Such findings resonate with literature explaining
how the middleman status of Jews has led to the perception that they have benefitted
economically at the expense of African-Americans (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967; King and
Weiner, 2007; Levin & Nolan, 2011). Within this study's analyses, the findings suggest that
anti-Jewish sentiments were most prevalent among African Americans and individuals residing
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in places with larger per capita Jewish populations. Interaction models further suggest that
African Americans residing in areas with high concentrations of Jews were particularly likely to
harbor anti-Jewish sentiments. Lastly, Glaser, Dixit, and Green (2002) show that advocacy of
violence by participants in white racist internet chat rooms was strongest in response to personal
threats by Blacks, specifically the threat of interracial marriage and the influx of Blacks into
white neighborhoods.
Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain
The second set of hypotheses focus on the relationship between economic conditions and
hate crime. Broadly stated, the hypotheses are as follows:
H5: Poor economic conditions will be associated with higher levels of hate crime (static);
H6: Communities experiencing worsening economic conditions will be associated with higher
levels of hate crime (dynamic); and
H7: Socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime (static).
These hypotheses flow from the literature on economic competition as an explanation for
group conflict, specifically bias-motivated violence. Blalock (1967) explains that groups engage
in overt conflict when there is competition over limited economic resources and persons are
blocked from access to other resources (p. 78). Similar to Merton’s (1938) strain theory, Blalock
emphasizes that disadvantaged persons who lack the proper resources to achieve their goals
legitimately will be more likely to support discrimination against minorities and resort to
illegitimate means (i.e. aggression) to achieve their goals. In the face of a larger society that
disapproves of their illegitimate means, such persons will seek to cast their actions as legitimate
(p. 139-140). For example, while American society may not approve of overt racism or bias-
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motivated violence, offenders will explain why their actions are necessary, and thus legitimate,
given their perceived victimization by minorities.
In an economic competition threat model, Tolnay and Beck (1995) explain that the
economic success, however small, of Blacks in the South was portrayed as occurring at the
expense of poor whites fighting for the same jobs. They argue that poor whites distressed by
their economic situation were vulnerable to Klan influence in the South and that some
collectively lynched Blacks to remove them from the labor market (p. 70). Middle class whites
may similarly respond to economic downturns with hate crime against scapegoats that they view
as responsible for their economic failures (Jenness & Grattet, 1996; Lyons, 2007, p. 821). Thus,
economically-strained individuals use bias-motivated violence, which is instrumental in
combating the economic competition of minorities.
Criminological explanations also help explain hate crime in the context of economic
competition and group conflict. A number of hate crime studies use a social disorganization
theoretical framework, often integrating it with the defended neighborhoods and conflict
perspectives (Gladfelter, Lantz, & Ruback 2015; Lyons, 2007; Grattet, 2009). Focusing on
urban neighborhood effects on crime, Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1967) provide the basis of
social ecology theories with their concentric zone theory in which delinquency arises in socially
disorganized communities. Social disorganization theories posit that communities experiencing
poverty (or concentrated disadvantage), in concert with ethnic heterogeneity and residential
transience, lack the resources to establish community cohesiveness thus leaving them vulnerable
to crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Kornhauser, 1978). Ethnic heterogeneity and residential
transience are both said to contribute to social disorganization since they obstruct community
efforts to achieve common goals as well as maintain solid formal and informal social controls
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(Kornhauser, 1978; Grattet, 2009). As a result, higher levels of social disorganization lead to an
inability to prevent, or control, people from engaging in crime. Lyons (2007) explains that
"communities facing economic downturns and other social changes may be unable to exercise
control over the dislocated, who may act on their impulses and racial prejudices" (p. 819). As a
result, socially disorganized communities are unable to control these "strained" individuals from
engaging in bias-motivated crime.
Strain theories are also relevant within this framework. Merton (1938) explains that
people resort to illegitimate means (i.e. crime) when they are blocked from the legitimate means
to achieve success, usually of a financial nature. Hate crime is a response to both the economic
strains, as well as the presence of minorities, who amplify both economic and other strains.
Applying strain specifically to hate crimes, Hall (2005) asserts that “hate crime is a way of
responding to threats to the legitimate means of achieving society’s proscribed goals; minority
groups serve to increase the perception of strain that the majority population feel, and hate crime
is a product of, and a response to, that strain” (p. 75). Viewing hate crimes through the lens of
strain theory, bias-motivated acts account for illegitimate means for people to obtain their goals.
For example, unemployed offenders may seek to resolve their employment troubles by lashing
out at the influx of minorities in their community. This example typifies the defensive category
of hate crime offenders (see Levin and McDevitt, 2002; McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett, 2002),
who see themselves as “defending their turf.” This strain aspect is often associated with the
frustration caused by demographic change with the influx of minorities into formerly
homogenous neighborhoods, which motivates hate offenders by providing a target on which
offenders can thrust blame for their problems, real or perceived (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong,
1998; Levin and McDevitt, 2002).
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Perry (2001) takes issue with strain theories as an explanation for hate crime for the
reason that economically successful members of the powerful hegemonic groups are responsible
for a number of hate crimes. While there is a focus on the economically disadvantaged being
motivated to engage in bias-motivated violence against minorities, there exist several
explanations for higher class individuals to engage in such aggression. Walters (2010) unites
strain theories and Perry's (2001) "doing difference" theory to explain that dominant group
members commit hate crimes as a result of strain that manifests as either out of fear of the
“different” group or on behalf of the disadvantaged members of the dominant group (i.e. upper
class whites protecting lower class whites) as they experience their strain vicariously. For
example, the increasing status position of minority groups threatens a society structured in
dominance in which hierarchies (i.e. racial hierarchies) exist across political, economic, and
social institutions (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; 2014; Hall, 1980).
Dominant groups also stand to gain from hate crimes against minorities in other ways.
Examining the role of the white elite who profited from cheap Black labor, Tolnay and Beck
(1995) explain that lynchings benefitted the upper classes by both maintaining control over their
cheap labor as well as further keeping the working classes (both Black and white) divided
amongst themselves, thus preserving the position and power of the white elite (p. 72).
Nonwhite Majorities Reacting to Economic Threat
While the literature usually focuses on the threat posed by racial and ethnic minorities to
the white majority, it is an open question whether the reverse is also true. Does group conflict
also occur following an influx of whites into predominantly minority neighborhoods? Such an
influx may pose several threats to minorities regarding economic competition. Traditional
minority group threat explanations still hold in that ethno-racial minorities can similarly

16

experience competition for resources by the "invading" white minority. This competition can
manifest in a number of ways. First, growing white presence can draw businesses that threaten
minority-owned businesses (DeSena, 2012; DiFazio, 2012; Trekson, 2012). Second, growing
white presence and gentrification drive up living costs from home values and rental costs, thus
displacing heretofore well established families of lower socio-economic status, especially low
status ethno-racial minorities (DeSena, 2012; Gould & Louis, 2012; Mason, Morlock, & Pisano,
2012; Trekson, 2012). Further, these displaced minorities miss out on the benefits of
revitalization of neighborhoods that they once inhabited (i.e. better home values, increased
safety, cleaner environment, more services, et cetera) (Anderson, 2012; Gould & Lewis, 2012;
Trekson, 2012). Scholars note that economic stress similarly pushes ethno-racial minorities to
lash out against whites (Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007). Hate crime thus may serve as a
response to invading white minorities by neighborhoods where people of color are the majority.
Similarly, group conflict propositions remain relevant in situations where racial and
ethnic minorities conflict with one another, especially over resources. Just as white immigrant
groups conflicted with one another and with nonwhites for labor in the United States (Olzak,
1987; Shanahan & Olzak, 1999), contemporary racial and ethnic groups (i.e. Blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, et cetera) experience intergroup competition. Examples of inter-minority conflict
include the unrest in Crown Heights and in Los Angeles in 1991 and 1992 respectively (Levin &
McDevitt, 2002). During the unrest following the Rodney King verdict in 1992, racial tensions
exploded in Los Angeles with conflict between Blacks and Korean-Americans reaching a
breaking point. Some Blacks viewed Korean-Americans as an invading minority in "their"
communities, installing their own businesses at the expense of black-owned businesses (Levin &
McDevitt, 2002; Mydans, 1992). The Crown Heights unrest similarly illustrates the conflict
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between minority groups (Jewish and Black communities). In the Crown Heights incident, a
perceived Jewish-on-Black hate crime led to prolonged unrest and violence between Jewish and
Black residents. The incident demonstrated Black resentment at the influx of Jewish persons
into their communities, presenting an economic threat (Levin & McDevitt, 2002).
Bell (2013) also describes the heightened tensions between Hispanics and Blacks in some
Los Angeles neighborhoods, which has often led to move-in violence against Blacks by Hispanic
gangs. The Southern Poverty Law Center has documented the long-standing conflict between
Hispanics and Blacks, noting that anti-Black hate crimes by Hispanic perpetrators were most
prevalent in Los Angeles (Mock, 2007; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2008; 2009; Terry, 2013).
Importantly though, Tolnay and Beck's (1995) explanation that the dominant white elite benefits
from divisions between working class whites and Blacks can be extended to inter-minority
conflict because it also divides the working class. The same elite incentivize ethno-racial
minorities to blame other inter-changeable minority groups for their misfortune, economic or
otherwise, as opposed to blaming and the socio-racial class structure. Thus, the hierarchies
constructed along lines of difference (as described by Perry, 2001) remain intact.
Quantitative Findings
In addition to demographic indicators, economic predictors are perhaps the most
prominent in group conflict research, including hate crime studies. In competition for resources,
poor economic conditions can exacerbate group tensions, which can manifest with hate crime
offending. A wealth of research (Beck & Tolnay, 1990; Corzine, Huff-Corzine, & Creech, 1988;
Grattet, 2009; Hovland and Sears, 1940; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; Lyons, 2007; Olzak, 1989;
1990; Soule, 1992, Tolnay & Beck, 1995) demonstrates the impact of economic conditions on
intergroup conflict, including hate crime, interracial violence, and lynching. Maxwell and
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Maxwell (1995) write that “economic deprivations and social upheavals have often preceded
unusually riotous periods in history characterized by ethnic tensions and unrest. Similarly,
contemporary occurrences of hate crimes have often been preceded by declines in the availability
of blue-collar jobs and the increasing economic marginality of certain groups of the white
population” (p. 25). Quantitative research on poor economic conditions and hate crime is,
however, mixed.
Contrary to the tenets of group conflict and strain theories, Green, Strolovitch, and Wong
(1998) find no relationship between economic conditions, specifically the white unemployment
rate, and hate crime. In addition to finding research examining the relationship between
economic conditions and lynching to be weak, Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) also show there is
no association between poor economic conditions, measured by white unemployment, and racial,
religious, ethnic, and homophobic hate crimes in New York City (p. 86-87). Similarly, Stacey et
al. (2011) find no association between economic conditions (via the per capita GDP and
unemployment) and anti-Hispanic hate crime on the state-level. Lyons (2007) also finds no
relationship between white and black unemployment on anti-Black and anti-white hate crime
respectively. In an international context, Koopmans and Olzak (2004) find no support for
deprivation models, using radical right-wing violence in Germany as an outcome of poor
economic conditions, measured by GDP and unemployment. Comparing American and German
far-right extremist homicides, Parkin, Gruenewald, and Jandro (2017) find an increase in farright ideologically-motivated homicides during the Great Recession. They also reveal that such
violence peaked in Germany during reunification when “social dominance of White males was
severely threatened by an influx of immigrants and racial and ethnic minorities who were viewed
as competition for low-skill labor” (p. 17).
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While most studies find no relationship between economic conditions and hate crime, a
few studies find otherwise. Lyons (2007) finds that anti-Black hate crimes occur in wealthier
and socially organized areas (with higher levels of informal social control), while anti-white hate
crimes were more likely in disadvantaged and disorganized areas. Lyons states that “norms of
informal social control, rather than social cohesion, economic conditions, or racial composition,
facilitate hate crimes against blacks” (p.840). On the other hand, anti-white hate crime is
positively associated with concentrated disadvantage and residential instability. In another
study looking at Chicago and levels of community attachment, Lyons (2008) however finds no
evidence that economic conditions impact hate crime.
Unlike Green, Strolovitch and Wong’s (1998) NYC findings, Grattet’s (2009) study of
Sacramento communities reveals a relationship between concentrated disadvantage and hate
crime across analyses examining all hate crime, violent hate crime, and anti-Black hate crime.
He also finds a positive association between hate crime and residential instability; however, he
finds no significant association between such crimes and ethnic heterogeneity. Lastly, Mills et
al. (2016) find fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists are associated with higher levels of
unemployment as well as worsening poverty over time.
Regarding other types of bias-motivated and interracial violence, evidence shows
similarly inconsistent results. In a study of lynching between 1882 and 1929, Bailey, Tolnay,
Beck, and Laird (2011) show that lynched black men were less likely to be skilled workers, and
thus unlikely to be rooted in the economic sphere. This finding however could suggest that poor
whites could be frustrated by the presence of competitors for unskilled work. Indeed, research
shows the poor economic conditions associated with lynchings most often affected unskilled
white laborers (Beck & Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990). Focusing on the turn of the century, Olzak
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(1990) shows that rising wages led to a decrease in urban violence against Blacks, specifically in
Northern cities. Further, Olzak (1990) finds that declines in wages and periods of economic
depression were associated with urban violence against Blacks and lynchings. Studies (Beck &
Tolnay, 1990; Olzak, 1990; Tolnay & Beck, 1995) using measures related to the Southern cotton
economy similarly show that poor economic conditions were positively associated with
lynchings.
In the context of pre-WWII Germany, King and Brustein (2006) also find that economic
conditions, measured by Germany's gross domestic product, were not associated with violence
against Jewish persons. Examining interracial killings, Jacobs and Wood (1999) find that
increased economic competition was associated with an increase in white killings of Blacks.
While the total unemployment rate was not a significant predictor, they show the Black/white
unemployment ratio to be associated with interracial homicides, showing that as Black
unemployment approaches the white unemployment rate, interracial homicides increase as an
outcome of greater racial economic competition. Gladfelter et al. (2015) use data from the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission, as opposed to police data, on criminal and
noncriminal forms of bias-motivated conduct. Using a social disorganization framework,
Gladfelter et al. (2015) find residential instability to be the most consistent predictor of biasmotivated incidents. In addition to finding that anti-Black incidents are more frequent in
unstable, homogenous (white) areas, they corroborate much of the research showing that
homogenous and advantaged areas also see similar increases (p. 19). Similar to Lyons (2007),
they also show that anti-white incidents occur in unstable, disadvantaged communities. Further,
results show that anti-Hispanic incidents are associated with heterogeneity and instability
(negatively and positively respectively).
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Qualitative Findings
Qualitative research, however, generally supports the relationship between economic
conditions and hate crime, providing insights into poor whites' resentment of minorities.
Deutsch (1962) conducted interviews with a sample of perpetrators in a series of anti-Semitic
property crimes. He found that instead of anti-Semitic sentiment the prevailing prejudice
possessed by the poorer perpetrators was actually anti-Black (p. 115). Deutsch (1962)
speculated that lower class white youths were thus responding to the influx of Blacks into their
"turf" which disrupted their neighborhoods (p. 115-116). He further explains that such social
disruptions put pressure on such youth, fueling "feelings of insecurity and inadequacy, their
boredom and their search for thrills. Such an atmosphere of frustration, threat, and uncertainty
must lead to hostility, which can be funneled into juvenile delinquency, prejudice and intergroup
hate" (p. 116). Further, Stein and Martin (1962) found that these "swastika offenders" in New
York City lived in neighborhoods with higher proportions of Jewish residents. Therefore, while
offenders were primarily frustrated by Blacks, they found Jewish persons to be a suitable target
to vent their frustrations. Such evidence shows the interchangeability of minority targets in that
any minority can serve as an adequate target for white youth (and adults) no matter any bias
against a single particular group.
Discussing the Maxwell and Maxwell (1995) the summary of the Governor’s Task Force
on Bias Motivated Violence (1988) survey of high-schoolers revealed similar sentiments among
working class teens who blamed minorities for their poor economic standing (p. 29).
Pinderhughes' (1993) interviews with white youth in Brooklyn reveal that a declining economy
played a major role in racially-motivated violence with the youth claiming that the government
was giving all the jobs to blacks while whites suffered unemployment and homelessness.
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Pinderhughes (1993) further explains that white youths frame their attacks as merely a defense of
their turf. Similarly, Maxwell and Maxwell (1995) explain that white youth, particularly
skinheads, often see their bias-motivated actions against the minorities they perceive as
responsible for their economic misfortune as a way to “save” the white community.
Ray, Smith, and Wastell’s (2004) description of English perpetrators of racist violence
found that they cast themselves as victims neglected in favor of minorities. These offenders
viewed Asians especially as taking over their country by stealing all of the good jobs, taking
successful economic opportunities from whites, and “as having obtained their success
illegitimately” (Ray et al., 2004, p. 263). Such findings illustrate the motivations for hate crime
offenders to resort to illicit means to reach their goals. In perceiving the minorities illegitimately
successful, offenders justify their own acts in this battle of “us against them” in their own
attempts to reach success. Using focus group discussions with "ordinary people" in a
predominantly white English city with high rates of anti-minority violence, Gadd and Dixon
(2009) conclude that racist sentiment and support of violence toward minorities was often
connected to feelings of powerlessness and loss following the disintegration of economic
conditions (p. 91). Following a discussion of violent encounters with minorities, Gadd and
Dixon (2009) elaborate on the frustrations of the focus group participants, writing:
Common to all of these stories was the feeling that the police and the criminal justice
system were biased against white people, indifferent to "our" victimization and obsessed
with uncovering and punishing "our" racism. The health service, the benefits service, and
local agencies responsible for providing social housing had also been coerced into
favoring "them" as the only means of avoiding racism. While pensioners, ex-servicemen,
and hardworking mothers providing for their children on meager salaries struggled to
survive, lazy, good-for-nothing "Asians" and "asylum seekers" were given new homes
and money for cars, driving lessons, designer clothes, and cell phones (p. 85).
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The majority white group often casts itself as the hardworking victim of a system that they
perceive as privileging minority groups at their expense. Thus, qualitative research consistently
finds a strong relationship between poor economic conditions and hate crime.
Political Threat
The third set of hypotheses highlight the relationship between political indicators and
hate crime. The hypotheses are as follows:
H8: Communities with higher levels of Republican Party enrollment will experience higher
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static); and
H9: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Republican wins will experience lower
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
H10: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Democrat wins wills experience higher
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
Political competition by minorities also poses a problem for majority groups. The rise of
minority political power threatens the dominant majority's political power; thus the dominant
group resorts to a variety of formal or informal social control against minority group to reduce
the threat. Minority political power can lead to forms of social control, including violence
(Blalock, 1967; Jacobs and Wood, 1999; King & Brustein, 2006; Tolnay and Beck, 1995).
Blalock (1967) contends that such social control is used to prevent subordinate minority groups
from gaining power, thus posing a threat to dominant group interests. Power threat dictates that
the larger the minority population, the greater the motivation to act. In response to the minority
power threat, the majority group thus uses its political power, wielding their lawmaking abilities
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to discriminate against a growing minority population and maintain the majority's political
dominance. Uggen, Behrens, and Manza (2005) explain how law can be used to maintain
control over minorities; for example, they frame felon disenfranchisement laws as an outgrowth
of former racial discriminatory policies to combat the threat of an empowered minority electorate
(see also Behrens, Uggen, & Manza, 2003). Informal social control, such as violence, may also
be invoked in reaction to minority political threats. King and Brustein (2006) frame the political
threat model as one in which “violence is a reaction to either perceived loss of political clout by
majority groups to vent feelings of alienation and political powerlessness” (p. 870).
Blalock (1967) briefly notes that those who are more politically liberal-minded are
usually less favorable of discrimination against minorities. Liberal progressive policies favor
greater equality across lines of difference (i.e. affirmative action, civil rights policies, marriage
equality) (King, 2007; King, et al., 2009). Thus, the political threat could manifest in two
different ways. First, the political power of minorities generally poses a threat to the majority
interest (Behrens et al., 2003; King and Brustein, 2006; Jacobs & Wood, 1999; Olzak, 1990;
Tolnay and Beck, 1995; Uggen et al., 2005). For example, increasing Black political power
threatens the dominance of the white majority. Second, growing power among political factions
supportive of minorities (i.e. liberal parties) can also similarly threaten the white majority as it
advocates for progressive policies seen to benefit people of color over whites (Olzak, 1990;
Tolnay and Beck, 1995).
Political competition plays an integral role in intergroup conflict research. Blalock
(1967) theorizes that minority political power threatens the interests of the dominant majority.
Much of the research on political threat focuses on formal social control outcomes such as
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restrictive voting laws and hate crime reporting compliance as well as acts of informal social
control such as lynching, anti-Semitic attitudes and behaviors, and interracial victimization.
Formal Social Control and Political Threat
Research shows that formal social control is an outcome of minority political threat.
Behrens et al. (2003) show that states with larger nonwhite prison populations were more likely
to pass restrictive voting laws, disenfranchising felons, and less likely to repeal such measures.
King (2007) investigates compliance with hate crime laws in the context of minority group
threat, asserting that while minority group size is usually associated with greater social control, it
is also associated with a failure to enforce laws protective of minorities. Finding regionalized
compliance with hate crime laws, King (2007) attributes this difference to the Northeast and the
West being more Democrat and thus more supportive of protecting minority groups' civil rights.
He finds a strong negative association between black population size and compliance in the
South. Further, King et al. (2009) find that a history of lynching, in addition to a sizable black
population, reveals diminished compliance, reporting, and prosecution of hate crimes that target
African-Americans (p. 296).
Informal Social Control and Political Threat
Research on informal social control as an outcome of minority political threat is mixed.
Tolnay and Beck (1995) provide an overview of the literature examining the impact of Black
political power on lynchings (Beck, Massey, & Tolnay, 1989; Corzine et al, 1983; Olzak, 1990;
Phillips, 1987; Reed, 1972; Soule, 1992; Tolnay et al., 1989a), finding the evidence to be
inconclusive. Some studies (Corzine et al., 1983, Reed, 1972) testing Blalock's power threat
hypothesis (a positive nonlinear association with an increasing slope between the minority
population and lynching as proxies for political threat and social control) find that there is a
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positive relationship between the Black population and lynchings in the South. Tolnay, Beck,
and Massey (1989) however correct for methodological problems in these studies and find no
support for the power threat hypothesis. Investigating various aspects of political threat, Tolnay
and Beck (1995) find little support between political threat variables and lynchings. Instead of
using simply the Black population size, Tolnay and Beck (1995) operationalize political threat
using restrictive voting laws and political strength of parties supportive of Black interests.
Evidence shows that Black disenfranchisement had no impact on lynchings and that Republican
and Populist strength actually protected Blacks from lynchings, contrary to the predicted
relationship where such threats would increase lynchings (p. 198-199). On the other hand, Olzak
(1990) demonstrates a link between levels of Populist support, and its attendant challenge to
white supremacy in the Democrat South, and increases in lynchings nationwide.
Focusing on a political threat model, King and Brustein (2006) find that the political
success of leftist parties (often associated with the Jewish population) was associated with an
increase anti-Semitic violence. Brustein and King (2004) show that anti-Semitic acts increased
with worsening economic conditions in Romania. They also find that Jewish population levels
were only associated with anti-Semitism when there was larger support for left-wing parties;
therefore, they argue that population only mattered in the larger political context. Thus, King
and Brustein (2004) conclude that anti-Semitism increased due to these factors because the
Romanian Jewish population comprised a larger proportion of the middle class and were
associated with leftist (i.e. communist) parties whereas these results did not hold in Bulgaria
where such associations were not prevalent (p. 703-704). There also exist mixed findings
regarding political threat and interracial crimes. Using the black to white voting ratio as a
measure of political threat, D’Alessio, Eitle, & Stolzenberg (2002) find that there is no
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association between political threat and interracial and intraracial crimes, including white-onBlack crime. Examining interracial homicides as an outcome of political threat measured by
political success, Jacobs and Wood (1999) find that increased economic competition and
African-American political success (specifically with African-Americans occupying mayoral
offices) was associated with an increase in white killings of blacks. Further, Jacobs and Wood
(1999) reveal that Black killings of whites were less likely in cities with African-American
mayors.
Fear of the “Other” Terrorist Threat
The next set of hypotheses focus on the terrorist threat. The hypotheses are:
H11: Communities with higher numbers of Islam-associated buildings will see increases in antiArab/Muslim2 hate crime (static);
H12: There should be an increase in anti- Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000.
Scholars also focus on the criminal threat and related “terrorist” threat. Contemporary
American society perceives a terrorist threat from minorities, specifically those they perceive to
be associated with Islamic extremism (Disha et al., 2011). Terrorist threat has its roots in the
criminal threat literature. For example, Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg (2002) explain that the
fear of Black on white crime leads the majority to apply social control measures in response to a
growing Black population. Tolnay and Beck (1995) discuss such social control in a popular
justice model in the context of fear of perceived criminal threat posed by the minority. Blacks,
Tolnay and Beck (1995) assert that Southern lynchings were a violent form of social control used

2

The current study combines anti-Arab and anti-Muslim hate crime into one bias type. This obviously raises the
issue that many Arab persons are not Muslim and most American Muslims not of Arab ethnicity. Disha et al.
similarly raise this issue and argue that many Americans essentially equate Arabs and Muslims and that both group
have been “raced” as “terrorists (p. 28). Thus, such hate crimes would be seen as attacking both groups as one. The
current study also must conflate the two bias types because there are no separate indicators for anti-Arab and antiMuslim hate crime in the data. The current study uses a measure of all hate crimes recording as anti-other, otherreligion, and other-ethnicity (as well as anti-American Indian). There is a further discussion of this measure below.
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to both (1) dole out justice against Blacks for their social and/or criminal violations, and (2) send
a message to the larger Black community that such behaviors would not be tolerated (p. 61).
While the popular justice model applies criminal violations, it proves just as salient in
explaining violent social control in response to economic or political threats by minorities, which
are seen as violations of societal norms. For example, minorities are seen as “stealing” jobs from
the white majority, thus it is just punishment to attack the minorities held responsible for the
economic misfortune of whites. In fact, such a model extends to the use of social control as an
expression of frustration and grievance generally. Black (1983) explains crime as an exercise of
both "self-help" and social control to express a grievance. Black maintains that crime may be
used against a subgroup of people to express another group’s grievance that results from the
actions of one of the subgroup’s members. Thus, hate crime offenders express their frustration
and aggression and reinforce their control by sending a message to, and instilling fear in, the
minority victim’s community.
In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, there was a rise in anti-Islamic
and -Arab hate crimes (Disha et al., 2011). After the attacks on September 11th and the Boston
Marathon bombing, retaliatory violence against perceived Middle Easterners was committed by
some perpetrators who held the entire Muslim population accountable for those terrorist attacks
even though these victims were clearly not personally involved in the strikes (Disha et al., 2011;
Gray, 2013; Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2013). Lickel et al. (2006)
examine vicarious retribution which occurs when “a member of a group commits an act of
aggression toward members of an out-group for an assault or provocation that had no personal
consequences for him or her, but did harm a fellow ingroup member” (p. 372-373). This type of
"retaliatory" hate crimes could be seen as a response to a "criminal" or "terrorist" threat. These
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offenders blame and target individuals who belong to the same group as the criminal/terrorists.
Attacks targeting perceived Middle Easterners following high-profile events (September 11th,
Boston Marathon bombing, the Iran Hostage Crisis) are also "a micro level manifestation of
broader conflicts on the international scale" (Mills et al., 2016, p. 11).
Research has explored how majority groups use informal social control methods to
neutralize the “criminal” or “terrorist” threat posed by minorities. Tolnay and Beck (1995)
explain that lynch mobs acted both to punish accused Blacks, but also accomplish broader goals
such as vengeance, sending a message to the Black community, as well as respond to the
noncriminal threat posed by the Black community (p. 112-113). Meanwhile, King and Sutton
(2013) show that anti-white and anti-Black hate crimes spiked after the Rodney King and OJ
Simpson verdicts respectively. Many scholars focus on hate crimes as a response to the "terrorist
threat" (Byers & Jones, 2007; Deloughery, King, & Asal, 2012; Disha, Cavendish, & King,
2011; King & Sutton, 2013). While the majority of these studies look at the effect of September
11th on anti- Arab/Muslim attacks, Deloughery et. al (2012) find a statistically significant
increase in anti-minority hate crimes in the wake of non-right-wing terrorist attacks in general.
Further, Mills et al. (2016) show that counties experiencing increases in non-right-wing terrorism
also see increases in fatal hate crimes by far-right extremists. Disha et al. (2011) also show that
counties with higher levels of Arab and Muslim populations are likely to see higher levels of
anti-Arab/Muslim crimes; however, they note that such victimizations occur in counties where
the Arab/Muslim populations constitute a minority.
Group Conflict and the Threat to "Sacred Traditions"
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Much of the previously discussed theoretical propositions might also explain other types
of bias-motivated aggression. The last set of hypotheses focus on gay presence and visibility and
anti-gay hate crime. The hypotheses include:
H13: Communities with higher gay populations are associated with increases in anti-gay hate
crime (static);
H14: Communities experiencing an increase in gay populations are associated with increases in
anti-gay hate crime (dynamic); and
H15: Communities with poor economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay hate
crime (static).
H16: Communities with worsening economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay
hate crime (dynamic).
Blalock (1967) discusses how the visibility of minority deviance can lead to aggression
against the minority. Aggression results because the dominant group sees the minority deviance
as "a threat to sacred traditions" which in turn allows the dominant group to rationalize their
behavior in the context of a society that ignores the problems faced by the minority group, thus
leaving them vulnerable to future victimization (p. 49-50). While Blalock was referring to racial
and ethnic minorities, such assertions can be extended to anti-gay hate crime. Offenders may
perceive their victim’s sexual orientation as "deviant" as well as an affront to their sacred
traditions derived from gender role and heterosexist ideologies (i.e. marriage, heterosexuality,
masculinity). Herek (1992) defines heterosexism as an "ideological system that denies,
denigrates and stigmatizes any non-heterosexual form of behavior, identity, relationship or
community...[and it manifests] both in societal customs and institutions’’ (p. 89). Thus, anti-gay
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hate crime is instrumental in sustaining heterosexist social norms in the face of transgressive
threats to these sacred traditions.
Guittar (2013) relies upon Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of neutralization that
explain how offenders excuse their behavior by using crime to socially control transgressors.
Guittar writes that "such assailants may even see themselves as a sort of sexuality-based Robin
Hood: robbing sexual minorities to feed the appeasement of the heterosexual majority." (p. 168).
Blalock (1967) adds that the violence against minorities manifests when there is no powerful
third party (i.e. the government) with an interest in protecting the minority group. This is
particularly relevant in examining American anti-gay violence as the government until recently
discriminated against LGBT persons in a variety of ways (for e.g., "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
marriage, and failure to include LGBT persons as protected classes in hate crime and
discrimination legislation). Anti-gay hate crime may express the majority sentiment against
sexual minorities, punishing those who transgress against heterosexist social norms.
Franklin (2000) reveals that common anti-gay offender motivations include amusement
and social norms enforcement. These offenders seek to stop “different” expressions of sexuality.
People utilize "difference" as a way to demonize the less powerful group as abnormal. Such
behaviors allow people to blame the less powerful group for society’s problems. In the case of
LGBT persons, biased individuals blame them for a variety of social problems, including the
breakdown of the "traditional" family, sexual promiscuity, the spread of AIDS and other
diseases, and drugs. Some extremist Christians and others even blame the LGBT community for
natural and man-made disasters, ranging from hurricanes and tsunamis to September 11th and
economic collapses (Garcia, 2012; McMurry, 2014). Further, some segments of society still cast
homosexuality as a threat to the "sanctity of marriage" as well as traditional notions of sexuality,
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masculinity, and femininity. Franklin (2000) finds that offenders designate homosexuals as a
threat to their own sexuality. These offenders thus lash out to prove their heterosexuality.
In the context of responding to threats to traditional masculinity, poor economic
conditions might also explain anti-gay hate crime. Perry (2001) discusses Goffman's (1963)
picture of masculinity that: "identified the ideal - or 'hegemonic' - masculinity as a 'young,
married, white, urban, northern, heterosexual Protestant father, of college education, fully
employed....Any male who fails to qualify in any of these ways is likely to view himself - during
moments at least - as an unworthy, incomplete and inferior'" (Goffman, 1963 as cited in Perry,
2001, p. 106). Thus, personal economic failures (i.e. unemployment) can adversely affect selfesteem. Men in particular may see such failures as a threat to their masculinity in that they
cannot provide for themselves or families (Gibson, 1994). Such individuals may feel a
compound threat to their masculinity by the presence of LGBT persons in the context of poor
economic conditions. Anti-gay hate is used to reassert one's masculinity and "[demonstrate] the
most salient features of manliness: aggression, domination, and heterosexuality" (p. 108).
Similarly, Alden and Parker (2005) explain how homophobia is linked to ideologies about
gender roles. Anti-gay hate crime not only allows offenders to assert their masculinity, but also
maintain the dominant gender role norms that establish "normal" masculinity and femininity (p.
324). Thus, anti-gay hate crime sustains the heterosexist patriarchy and punishes sexual
minorities for their transgressions against such norms.
Anti-gay violence also can be used instrumentally to keep sexual minorities out of the
perpetrators' neighborhoods (Berk, Boyd, & Hammer, 1992). Herek, Cogan, and Gillis (2002)
highlight the negative consequences of anti-gay victimization, including fear of future
victimization as well as psychological distress that is exacerbated by not only surviving an anti-
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gay attack, but also the stigma associated with being gay. Relatedly, scholars (Herek & Berrill,
1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1992; Swank, Fahs, & Frost, 2013) explain that sexual minorities
experience employment discrimination and gay hate crime victims run the risk of being "outed"
and thus are exposed to further secondary victimization, including possibly losing their jobs and
housing. Herek and Berrill (1990a) also emphasize that the very law enforcement institutions
charged with investigating anti-gay hate crime also operate with heterosexist bias, which can
affect their response to such crimes (p. 418-419). Herek and Berrill (1990c) explain that law
enforcement response as a form of secondary victimization so much so that the majority of gay
and lesbian hate crime victims refrain from reporting their victimization to the police for reasons
ranging from distrust of the police to fear that the police would harm them as well.
There is a paucity of research examining determinants of anti-gay hate crime; however,
existing research shows interesting findings regarding economic conditions, demographics,
attitudes, and marriage equality victories. Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) also found no
association between economic conditions, via the white unemployment rate, and homophobic
hate crimes in New York City (p. 86-87). Similarly, Alden and Parker (2005) find a negative
relationship between poverty and anti-gay hate crime. In a state level analysis however, Van
Dyke, Soule, and Widom (2001) find that economic strain, measured by per capita income and
unemployment, is associated with increases in anti-gay hate crime. Unlike anti-racial/ethnic
minority hate crimes (where dynamic changes were at play, i.e., increasing minority populations
over time), Green et al. (2001) determine that (the static finding of) population density of
homosexuals is strongly linked to anti-homosexual hate crimes in New York City. Relatedly,
Comstock's (1991) descriptive study shows that the gay and lesbian hate crime victims were
most frequently targeted in “gay areas,” such as gay bars and known “gay” neighborhoods. He
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also finds that victims were also targeted at their homes as well as in predominantly “straight”
neighborhoods. Examining anti-gay hate crime in response to civil rights victories, King and
Sutton (2013) find no temporal association between appellate court victories for marriage
equality and anti-gay hate crime. They note however a few limitations, including that their data
is from Massachusetts, a well-known liberal state. On the other hand, Van Dyke et al. (2001)
show that states where the LGBTQ community has made political gains experience higher levels
of anti-gay hate crime. Linking attitudinal data from the General Social Survey to macro-level
hate crime, Alden and Parker (2005) find that homophobic attitudes, as well as greater levels of
gender equality, percent white, and religiosity, are positively associated with anti-gay and antilesbian hate crime in U.S. cities. They explain that greater levels of gender inequality prevent
heterosexual men from needing to assert their masculinity through anti-gay offending.
Interestingly, they find positive associations between college education and support for gay civil
rights and anti-gay hate crime. They refer to Green et al.'s (2001) study showing a link between
gay population density and anti-gay crime, thus gay population levels, which would also be
associated with support for gay rights, would be positively associated with anti-gay crime (p.
337). In an exploratory study investigating a "noncriminal" population, Franklin (2000)
uncovers the motivations behind harassment and violence toward sexual minorities. She finds
that assailants used anti-gay harassment and violence to enforce anti-gay social norms, pursue
thrills, and defend themselves against perceived attacks on their masculinity and heterosexuality.
Aside from hate crime research, several studies investigate the links between anti-gay
attitudes and behaviors. Cowan et al. (2005) uncover positive correlations between both oldfashioned and modern heterosexism and approval of hate crimes against sexual minorities;
however, they find that only old-fashioned heterosexism predicted hate crime approval in
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regression models. Investigating anti-gay attitudes and behaviors, Lottes and Grollman (2010)
show that there are significant gender differences with men engaging in more hostile anti-gay
behaviors. Further, their results evidence that there is a positive, yet weak, association between
anti-gay and anti-lesbian attitudes and harmful anti-gay and anti-lesbian behaviors. Examining
heterosexist discrimination, Swank, Fahs, and Frost (2013) show that rural and small town
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) persons experience more discrimination, including property
damage and intimidation (being chased by strangers) respectively, than urban sexual minorities.
They also show that white LGBs are less likely to be the victim of violent heterosexist
victimization.
Conclusions and Directions for the Current Study
The research on minority group threat and its various threat models provides interesting
insights on group conflict, but also demonstrates the need for further research. In sum, there
appears to be a consensus that increasing minority presence impacts anti-minority hate crime.
The defended neighborhoods thesis in particular receives much support in American
neighborhood level studies. Mixed support exists for the economic threat model; however, the
qualitative evidence largely validates notions of white frustration at minorities in the context of
poor economic conditions. While the quantitative evidence remains inconsistent, this could be
due to disagreement over how to measure economic conditions.
It also must be noted that these similar threat models may involve multiple causes at play
and some of these threat indicators could be "owned" by multiple frameworks (Freilich et al.,
2015; Freilich & LaFree, 2015; Tolnay & Beck, 1995). For example, the level of minority
presence is an integral predictor across all of the threat models; however, its effects could work
in different ways. In their discussion of Blalock's minority group threat models, Tolnay and
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Beck (1995) acknowledge that it is difficult to determine which threats motivate offenders to
engage in bias motivated violence. While threat models hypothesize positive associations
between minority presence and hate crime, these associations however prove more nuanced.
When discussing economic or criminal threats, the positive relationship between minority
presence and hate crime may begin to decline as the minority presence reaches high
concentrations.
On the other hand, hate crimes motivated by political threat are anticipated to continue to
increase as these minorities reach high concentrations. The influence of minority presence may
also be most important when it involves the interaction between the white population and the
subsequent growth in minority populations though as the influx of minorities into formerly white
neighborhoods appears to be a more important predictor than simply the level of minority
presence. While this predictor may be relevant across the threat models, it may prove most
powerful in explaining the defended neighborhoods perspective. Whereas minority presence
crosses all the threat models, predictors like Republican enrollment and political success, the
number of mosques, and gay population indicators should correspond with only the political,
terrorist, and gay threat models respectively. The dissertation's results should provide for an
interesting discussion to expand upon how these different predictors influence threat models and
their impact on hate crime.
This dissertation extends the literature, particularly Green and colleagues' studies to
examine all hate crimes in NYC between 1995 and 2010, not just racially motivated offenses.
The current study will test the relationship between hate crime and a variety of macro-level
demographic and visibility indicators as well as economic, political, and crime variables. Green
previously found this association with anti-minority hate crimes in formerly all-white
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neighborhoods; the current study will test if this association persisted through time. The
changing demographics of New York City present an interesting case for study as the city
experienced growth in minority populations over time. The trend of gentrification in certain
areas, however, will allow us to study if increases in white populations in formerly minority
districts are also associated with anti-white hate crimes. Further, it is important to see how
macro-level factors impact other types of bias crime (i.e. anti-gay and anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crimes).
While Green focused on defended neighborhoods and economic threat, the current study
will extend Green's studies to account for other types of threats, including political, terrorist, and
transgressive threats. The political threat evidence also is inconsistent. One reason is that it too
could be due to the varied measurement of the independent variable: political threat. In the
current study, it will be interesting to see whether political threat holds much weight in New
York City, a known liberal stronghold. The extant research on modern hate crime offending
often does not account for political threat (Disha et al., 2011 uses political context measures with
few significant results), something the current study investigates.
The terrorist threat evidence appears fairly consistent as well. The current study extends
the literature on anti-Islamic hate crime by investigating such crimes in the NYC context,
including examining the impact of 9/11 on such crimes. Lastly, the evidence on anti-gay hate
crime is also limited. Using a minority group threat framework, the current study extends
previous work examining anti-gay hate crime as an outcome of neighborhood level factors,
taking advantage of better measures to capture the gay population.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA AND METHODS
Hypotheses
This dissertation seeks to provide a portrait of hate crime in New York City by testing a
number of hypotheses. The following restates the hypotheses to be tested (Please see Appendix
One for a longer listing of this dissertation’s hypotheses).
Defended Neighborhoods
H1: Communities with higher levels of majority presence will be associated with higher levels of
hate crime (static).
H2: Communities with increasing levels of minority presence will be associated with higher
levels of hate crime (dynamic).
H3: Predominantly majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents will experience
increases in hate crime (dynamic).
H4: Communities with more synagogues will experience more anti-Jewish hate crime (static).
Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain
H5: Poor economic conditions will be associated with higher levels of hate crime (static).
H6: Communities experiencing worsening economic conditions will be associated with higher
levels of hate crime (dynamic).
H7: Socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime (static).
Political Threat
H8: Communities with higher levels of Republican party enrollment will experience higher
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
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H9: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Republican wins will experience lower
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
H10: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Democrat wins wills experience higher
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
"Other" "Criminal/Terrorist" Threat
H11: Communities with higher numbers of Islam-associated buildings will see increases in antiArab/Muslim hate crime (static).
H12: There should be an increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000.
"Gay Threat"
H13: Communities with higher gay populations are associated with increases in anti-gay hate
crime (static).
H14: Communities experiencing an increase in gay populations are associated with increases in
anti-gay hate crime (dynamic).
H15: Communities with poor economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay hate
crime (static).
H16: Communities with worsening economic conditions will experience higher levels of antigay hate crime (dynamic).
Data
Dependent Variables
The current study innovatively examines hate crimes in New York City from 1995 to
2010 using data from the New York City Police Department’s Hate Crimes Task Force (HCTF).
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The NYPD first formed a dedicated bias crime unit (first known as the Bias Incident
Investigating Unit or BIIU) in December 1980, a detective unit focusing on responding to,
following up on and solving hate crimes as opposed to more community-oriented policing
activities (Martin, 1996). When investigating bias-motivated offenses (even if the offense is
motivated "in part" by bias), Martin (1996) explains that responding officers notify their superior
when they suspect a bias motivation with the BIIU taking on the case. The BIIU must also
complete a review if they determine that the crime was not bias-motivated. Martin (1996) also
outlines the NYPD's guidelines in determining bias motivation:
(1) the perpetrator's motivation; (2) the absence of any other motive; (3) the perception of
the victim(s); (4) the display of offensive symbols, words, or acts; (5) the date and time of
occurrence (corresponding to a significant holiday such as Hanukkah or Martin Luther
King's birthday)l (6) statements made by the perpetrator; and (7) a commonsense review
of the circumstances surrounding the incident (p. 460-461).
In an older study examining 1987-1988, Martin (1996) found that the BIIU detectives were more
likely to complete follow-up reports on hate crimes compared to non-bias incidents and that
arrests for certain crimes (i.e. property crimes or harassment) were more likely if they were biasmotivated (p. 471-473). Providing an overview of the HCTF's history, Levin and Amster (2007)
explain that the unit evolved from BIIU detectives working with respective precinct detectives to
the HCTF unit taking sole responsibility for suspected bias crimes that is subject to intense
supervision. They write that all NYPD officers are "trained to recognize that he or she had
responsibility of initial notification, investigation, and response through academy training, inservice training, and headquarters’ advisories" (p. 337). While there were only 18 BIIU
detectives during Martin's (1996) study, Levin and Amster (2007) reveal that the unit grew by
over 30% by the year 2000, writing:
funding and staffing of the unit was increased, a monitoring database was created, a new
24-hour hotline was created, and an increased concentration on internal department

41

training and special investigations was established....by the summer of 2001, it consisted
of an inspector, a captain, three sergeants, and 24 detectives (p. 337).
Further, the HCTF works with victim, advocacy and community outreach groups. Levin and
Amster (2007) report that not only does the HCTF validate reported hate crimes at a greater rate
than police nationally, but it also clears a greater percentage of hate crimes by arrest compared to
the national-level statistics.
Turning to the data, the HCTF identified 6,219 hate crimes that occurred in NYC
between 1995 and 2010, recording the year, precincts, boroughs, bias type, and types of criminal
activities for such crimes. The NYPD HCTF is widely acknowledged to be one of the best in the
nation in terms of its response to hate crimes and to the seriousness with which it treats these
crimes (Freilich and Chermak, 2013). The NYPD provided these data for the purpose of this
dissertation. This neighborhood level analysis will replicate Green’s (1998) study of racially
motivated anti-minority hate crimes which used the NYPD’s Bias Crime Unit’s incident reports
from 1987 to 1995. He obtained the precinct location of offenses and aggregated the data to the
community district level (59 in NYC). Expanding upon Green’s study, this study, however, will
examine all hate crimes between 1995 and 2010, not just racially motivated offenses. The HCTF
data for all hate crimes in this time period includes incident data indicating the precinct of bias
incidents, the year of occurrence, and the bias motivation. Like Green’s earlier study, the
current study uses these HCTF data on the location of hate crimes to aggregate each to the
community district level (N= 59) to test the relationship between hate crime and macro-level
factors including economic and demographic variables.
The dependent variables for this study include: hate crime against nonwhites generally as
well as anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-white, anti-Jewish, anti-Arab/Muslim, and anti-gay,
specifically. Each of these outcome variables will be measured as a count; the number of crimes
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in that precinct (please see Table 1). Due to a recording issue regarding anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime, the categories of "anti-Religion," "anti-Other," and "anti-Ethnic" will be collapsed into a
proxy measure for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. 3 Disha et al. (2011) similarly use this strategy
to capture such hate crimes.
Variable
DV: Hate Crime
• Anti-Nonwhite
• Anti-Black
• Anti-Hispanic
• Anti-Asian
• Anti-Arab/Muslim
• Anti-Jewish
• Anti-White
• Anti-Gay

Table 1.1: Variables of Interest
Coding
Counts per Precinct
aggregated to community
district (n-= 59)

IV: Defended Neighborhoods
• Levels of Majority Presence
• Change in Levels of Minority Presence
Over Time
• Predominantly Majority Communities
Seeing an Influx of Minority Residents
Jewish Buildings - Synagogues

•
•

Percent Majority4
Absolute Change (Y2 –
Y1)
• Percent Majority in
Y1*Change in Minority
Count of Synagogues

Data Source
NYPD

U.S. Census
Bureau

Mavensearch:
Jewish Web
Directory
IV: Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain
• Unemployment
• Percent unemployed 7
•

Poverty

•

•

Worsening Change in Economic
Conditions (Unemployment & Poverty)
Over Time
Social disorganization
• Concentrated disadvantage

•

Percent below Poverty
Level
Absolute Change (Y2Y1)

•

Index (0 to 1)

•

o
o
o
o

Number of Female-Headed
households5
Unemployed Persons
Non-Hispanic Blacks
Persons below the Poverty Level

o

Count

o
o
o
o

Percent Unemployed
Percent Black
Percent below Poverty Level
Count

U.S. Census
Bureau

3

Anti-American Indian hate crime is also included in the proxy and this inclusion is discussed in more detail in the Limitations section.
In this case, majority refers to the group of interest for particular analyses (including non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, nonHispanic Asian, and nonwhite). For example, the majority presence indicator in analyses examining the outcome of anti-Black hate crime is the
percent non-Hispanic white. In analyses investigating anti-white hate crime, the majority presence predictor is the percent non-Hispanic Black.
5
The component excludes single female-headed households. Given current times, it seems inappropriate to consider female-headed households
with no children as a marker of disadvantage as it seems more indicative of success than disadvantage (as it indicates the ability to own/rent a
residence in the expensive housing market of New York City without the help of a spouse or a roommate).
4
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•
•

Index (0 to 1)
Percent of New
Residents by Year of
Move

IV: Political Threat
• Republican Party Enrollment
• Political Threat

•
•

Percent Republican
Republican Enrollment
*Percent Democratic
Vote (Mayoral/
Presidential) Election

NYC Election
Atlas; NYC BOE;
NY State BOE
(PUMA)

IV: "Other" Terrorist Threat
• Islam-associated Buildings

•

Count of Islamic
Buildings

Hartford Institute
for Religious
Research

•

•

Models Before and
After 2001

•

Same-Sex Couple
Households
Absolute Change (Y2Y1)

o Males under the Age of 17.
• Diversity6
Residential Instability

Post-2000

IV: "Gay Threat"
• Gay Population
• Change in Gay Population Over Time

•

U.S Census
Bureau

Independent Variables 8
A variety of predictors will be used across the different threat models for the dependent
variables of hate crimes by bias type. Census tract and NYPD precinct data will be aggregated to
the community district level where necessary. Table 1 shows a complete listing of the predictor
variables and their respective data source. The first set of independent variables include
defended neighborhoods (demographics or minority visibility). Levels of majority presence
(across all major race/ethnic groups) will be used from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the change
in minority presence over time will be calculated. An interaction term to capture predominantly

7

This is calculated using the percent unemployed out of the labor force population, 16 years old and above, and the unemployed include "people
are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work"
(U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015).
6
Diversity was calculated in a similar fashion used by the U.S. Census Bureau (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). The diversity index is expressed
as a ratio and includes the following groups: (1) non-Hispanic White, (2) Black or African-American alone, (3) American Indian or Alaskan
Native alone, (4) Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (NHOPI) alone, (5) Non-Hispanic Some other race, or Two or more races, and (6)
Hispanic (which includes only Hispanic White and Hispanic Other Race or Two or More Races and not those who identify as Black/AfricanAmerican, American Indian or Alaskan Native, or Asian/NHOPI as they are included in their race group alone). Due to data availability, these
six groups were used instead of the eight outlined in the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2001) calculation. Using these six groups’ percent presence as a
ratio, the ratios for each group were (1) squared, (2) with the squares summed, and (3) the sum of squares subtracted from 1.
8
All independent variables listed as coming from the U.S. Census Bureau were downloaded from the IPUMS National Historical Geo graphic
Information System (NHGIS) via https://www.nhgis.org.
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majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents over time will also be calculated
from this data. As the study uses a long form dataset with community district hate crime data
divided into three time periods (1995-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010), the static majority
population levels are drawn from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial Census with a midpoint average
calculated to capture 1995. 9 Thus, the static population levels for 1990, 1995, and 2000
correspond to the community district time periods of 1995-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010
respectively. The change variables are calculated using five-year time periods, which also
necessitated the use of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey for 2008 to 2012 as an
indicator for 2010 population levels to calculate a 2005 midpoint for the appropriate change
variable. The change variables for the three time periods are thus calculated as 1995-1990,
2000-1995, and 2005-2000 respectively. The change indicators take place before the start of the
hate crime data time period (i.e. Community District 1, 1995-2000 uses a static majority
presence from 1990, the minority change over time from 1990 to 1995). The presence of Jewish
buildings (i.e. synagogues) is drawn from Mavensearch.com: Jewish Web Directory (and
supplemented with Google Maps data).
All variables that capture economic threat, social disorganization, and strain are taken
from the U.S. Census Bureau. Static variables are drawn from the 1990 and 2000 Decennial
Census with a calculated midpoint for 1995. These predictors include unemployment, poverty,
and the change in time in these variables is calculated to account for worsening economic
conditions.10 Concentrated disadvantage, diversity, and residential instability will account for
social disorganization. Concentrated disadvantage is an index score based on the following
variables: number of female-headed households, unemployed persons, non-Hispanic blacks,
9

All 1995 variables computed as 1995=(1990+2000)/2
Worsening economic conditions require change variables just as used with demographic change variables. Thus, the 2000 to 2005 change
variable is calculated using unemployment and poverty data from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 2008-2012, so a 2005
midpoint can be calculated.
10

45

persons below the poverty level, and males under the age of 17 (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls,
1997 as cited in Grattet, 2009, p. 139). Diversity is calculated using a method similar to the U.S.
Census Bureau’s (2001) method. Residential instability is measured by using the percent of
residents who did not live in their residence five year prior.
The third set of variables includes political threat. The New York City Board of
Elections (BOE) provides community-level data on party enrollment as well as the general
election results for Presidential and mayoral races. Given the data is not available at the
community district level, theses analyses will be done at the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA)
level. While there are 59 community districts, there are 55 PUMAs in New York City, with a
few districts being consolidated into the same PUMA; however, the PUMA boundaries largely
correspond with the community district boundaries (Center for Urban Research, 2016; New York
City, Department of City Planning, 2010). At this time, data is only available for the 2012 party
enrollment, and the 2009 mayoral and the 2012 Presidential elections; thus the analysis will be
limited to a shorter time period. The 2012 election occurs after the study's time frame; however,
it is assumed that voting patterns in the 2012 general election would mirror the results in the
2008 general election. 11
The fourth set of predictors capture the "terrorist" threat, including Islam-associated
buildings. The Hartford Institute for Religious Research has a list compiled in 2013 of all
masjids, mosques, and Islamic centers in New York City, which will be used to serve as an
indicator of Islam-associated buildings. As there was a growth in the number of mosques from
2000 to 2010, the analyses using the independent variable indicating the number of mosques will
be limited to 2005-2010 (Carnes, 2010). Given the importance of triggering events (see
11

The following statistics demonstrate the slight county-level changes in the percentage voting for Barack Obama in 2008 versus 2012: Bronx:
88.2% v. 91.2%; Brooklyn: 78.9% v. 81.4%; New York: 85.1% v. 84.2%; Queens: 74.4% v. 78.8%; Richmond: 47.2% v. 49.9% (Barack Obama
did take Richmond county in 2012 whereas McCain took the county in 2008) (The New York Times, 2012; Politico, 2012). It is assumed that the
districts did not change much overall in the city regarding their voting patterns.
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McDevitt et al., 2002), it is important to investigate the impact of the September 11th terrorist
attacks on hate crime in New York City. Studies (Byers & Jones, 2007; Disha et al., 2011;
Gerstenfeld, 2002; King & Sutton 2013) have shown that 9/11 had a substantial impact on antiArab/Muslim hate crime. Thus, analyses will also investigate whether anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crimes increased after 2000 (to account for post-9/11 hate crimes occurring in 2001).
The last set of independent variables relies on "gay threat". The U.S. Census Bureau
uses a measure to capture households with same-sex couples. While this measure fails to
account for single gay and lesbian householders, it is the best available measure for the gay
population that currently exists. It is also an improvement over the previously-used Census
tabulation that estimated same-sex couples by using households with two unrelated males, or two
unrelated, nonstudent females, living together over the age of 30 (Green et al., 2001, p. 284-285).
The change in the population of households with same-sex couples is calculated.12
Data Analysis Plan
This dissertation's neighborhood analysis replicates Green, Strolovitch, and Wong's
(1998) analyses from the 1980s, but expands upon it to examine all bias motivations by using
data on all hate crime incidents from 1995-2010 (n= 6,219).
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis for this study is the community district (n= 59) (except for the
political threat models which will use Public-Use Microdata Areas (n=55)). It must be noted that
the NYC community districts are often comprised of multiple sub-neighborhoods (i.e. while
Community District 10 contains only Central Harlem, others contain many smaller
neighborhoods) (NYC Department of City Planning, 2016). Green et al. (1998) note that the

12

As these analyses are restricted to the 2006-2010 time period, the static gay population variable is drawn from the 2000 Decennial Census and
the change variable is calculated by using the calculated midpoint for 2005 (using the 2000 and 2010 Decennial Census).
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community districts are meant to be similar in population size (p. 384). Similarly, Lyons (2007;
2008) followed this strategy and mapped police beat hate crimes data to the 77 community areas
in Chicago. While it may have been preferable to analyze hate crime at the sub-neighborhood
level, the NYPD data is not available at this smaller level. We thus follow Green, Lyons and
others and aggregate the precinct-level data to the community district level. Importantly though,
the community district level is smaller than counties and states that many others (aside from
Green and his colleagues) have used to operationalize “community-level” measures.
Since there are only 59 community districts in New York City I used a post-hoc power
analysis to calculate the minimum effect size that these analyses can detect using this sample
size. Power analysis tests the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when the
alternative hypothesis is true. Based on an analysis using the Optimal Design Software (see
Spybrook et al., 2011), Figure 1 shows that with a power of 0.80, the minimum detectable effect
size (MDES) for n=59 is 0.80.
Figure 1: Power Analysis for n=59

Based on these results, the analysis has enough power to detect large effects, but not
medium or small effects. To remedy this, the data was stacked into a long form dataset to
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multiply the sample size (i.e. Community District 1 1995-2000, Community District 1 20012005, Community District 1 2006-2010, thus multiplying the 59 community districts by three for these three time periods - in a single model). The final sample size for all models (aside from
the Political Threat and Gay Threat models) is 177 community districts. Using n=177, Figure 2
shows a power analysis that demonstrates that the analyses can detect a medium effect size with
a power of 0.90 as well as a small effect size with a power 0.50.
Figure 2: Power Analysis for n=177 and n=55

This significantly improves upon the use of a sample size of 59. Due to limited data
availability, the Political Threat models are limited to 2006 to 2010 and are thus limited to
sample size of 55 PUMAs. Figure 2 shows a power analysis that demonstrates that with a power
of 0.80, the minimum detectable effect size (MDES) for n=55 is 0.80. Thus, the analysis only
has the power to detect large effects. Due to data availability, the Gay Threat models use hate
crime data from 2006-2010, so they are confined to using an n=59, meaning that it can only
detect large effects.
Analytic Approach
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics (N=177)
Mean

Standard Deviation

Anti-Black

5.44

6.09

Anti-Hispanic

1.42

2.83

Anti-Nonwhite

14.06

10.71

Anti-Asian

1.01

1.44

Anti-Jewish

13.22

13.64

Anti-Arab/Muslim

6.19

4.78

Anti-White

1.72

2.35

Anti-Gay

6.01

8.25

Percent (Non-Hispanic) White

38.37

28.72

Percent Non(Non-Hispanic) White

61.63

28.72

Percent (Non-Hispanic) Black

25.19

25.56

Percent Hispanic

26.61

20.06

Percent (Non-Hispanic) Asian

7.72

7.82

Change in White Population

-2.79

4.13

Change in Nonwhite Population

2.79

4.13

Change in Black Population

-0.59

2.54

Change in Hispanic Population

1.12

2.12

Change in Asian Population

1.41

1.72

Jewish Buildings

6.05

6.16

Percent Gay Households

0.86

0.55

Change in Gay Households

-0.06

0.16

Concentrated Disadvantage

0.40

0.24

Residential Instability

40.81

5.54

Diversity

0.52

0.15

Unemployment Rate

10.47

5.02

Change in Unemployment

0.24

1.17

Poverty Rate

21.56

12.53

Change in Poverty

0.26

1.71

Dependent Variables: Hate Crime By Bias Type

13

Independent Variables
Defended Neighborhoods

Gay Presence

Social Disorganization

Economic Threat, Strain

13

Analyses showed a number of outliers across the dependent variables; however, there was no compelling reason to remove them from the
negative binomial regression analyses.
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Population (unlogged)14
Total Population

129694.30

43810.18

Table 1.3: Summary Statistics for Political Threat Models (N=55)
Mean

Standard Deviation

Anti-Black

3.18

3.31

Anti-Hispanic

0.98

2.90

Anti-Nonwhite

9.47

8.26

Anti-Asian

0.71

1.52

Anti-Arab/Muslim

4.60

3.77

Anti-Gay

5.31

5.76

Percent (Non-Hispanic) White

34.39

26.76

Change in Nonwhite Population

0.69

3.41

Change in Black Population

-0.99

2.28

Change in Hispanic Population

0.82

1.93

Change in Asian Population

1.48

1.70

Percent Gay Households

0.81

0.44

Change in Gay Households

-0.07

0.15

Republican Party Enrollment

13.63

7.92

Percent Vote Democrat (Mayoral)

49.42

19.49

Percent Vote Democrat (Presidential)

80.80

16.39

145372.40

36868.02

Dependent Variables: Hate Crime By Bias Type

Independent Variables
Defended Neighborhoods

Gay Presence

Political Threat

Population (unlogged)
Total Population

14

Analyses determined that the unlogged population, rather than the logged population, was the appropriate indicator.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Gay Threat Models (N=59)
Mean

Standard Deviation

4.95

4.37

Percent Gay Households

0.86

0.55

Change in Gay Households

-0.06

0.16

Concentrated Disadvantage

0.42

0.24

Residential Instability

43.37

5.15

Diversity

0.53

0.14

Unemployment Rate

10.90

5.53

Change in Unemployment

-0.15

1.63

Poverty Rate

22.36

11.75

Change in Poverty

-0.81

1.30

135516.61

45855.71

Dependent Variables: Anti-Gay Hate Crime
Anti-Gay
Independent Variables
Gay Presence

Social Disorganization

Economic Threat, Strain

Population (unlogged)
Total Population

The current study tests a series of theoretically-driven hypotheses ( see Appendix One).
These hypotheses stem from both intergroup conflict and criminological theories, examining the
relationship between hate crime and neighborhood characteristics. Again, the dependent variable
is the count of hate crimes that occurred in a community district for each of the three time
periods. Similar to Green, the location of each hate crime is aggregated from the precinct to the
community district level. The independent variables (detailed in the above Data section) are
coded to measure each of these hypotheses' predictors on the community district level. 15 All
variables were consolidated into a dataset and exported into SPSS for data management and
15

For those precincts and census tracts that overlapped on community district boundaries, the centroid method was used in QGIS to determine
where the majority of each precinct/tract fell and they were assigned to the appropriate census tract. Using NYC government lists, every
precinct/tract was also verified that it was correctly sorted into the correct community district.
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descriptive analyses and into STATA for negative binomial regression analyses. I conducted
descriptive analyses for the dependent variables (by bias type, year, and precinct) as well as for
the predictors. Descriptive analyses are presented in Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4.
As previously stated, the data were stacked into a long-form dataset to avoid issues with
power, thus expanding the sample size from n=59 to n=177. In doing so, the analysis relies on a
data structure called pooled cross-sectional design (Dielman, 1983; Wooldridge, 2015). Dielman
(1983) describes pooled data as “any data base describing each of a number of individuals across
a sequence of time periods” (p. 111). He further elaborates that “a pooled data base thus blends
characteristics of both cross-sectional and time series data. Like cross-sectional data, it describes
each of a number of individuals. Like time series data, it describes each single individual through
time. Pooled data are important to the analyst because they contain the information necessary to
deal with both the intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of the entities being
investigated” (p. 111). Scholars have previously used pooled cross-sectional design to study
suicide rates (Phillips, 2012; Piatkowska, Raffalovich, & Messner, 2016), the impact of
economic conditions on robbery and property crime (Rosenfeld & Fornango, 2007), and the
relationship between immigration and violent crime (Stowell, Messner, McGeever, &
Raffalovich, 2009). Previous work (Miller, Azrael, & Hemenway, 2000; Robison, Crenshaw, &
Jenkins, 2006; Schatzman, 2005) also uses pooled cross-sectional design when conducting
negative binomial regression analyses. Much of these works structure their data similar to the
current study by using a unit of analysis like metropolitan area/year, state /year, or country /year
to expand their sample size.
Using pooled cross-sectional design, the current study structures the data in this format
by using each community district for three different time periods (using 1995-2000, 2001-2005,
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and 2006-2010) with hate crime counts by community district/time period. Each unit includes
time-specific predictors with a number of models using predictors that specifically accounts for
change over time. While the current study does not control for time period, the inclusion of
time-specific predictors controls for structural variations that may have occurred over time. To
investigate if there were any differences between models with and without controlling for time,
additional models were run with dummy variables for the three time period and these analyses
showed fairly similar results across all of the models. 16
The current study also tests for the presence of multicollinearity. In Appendix Three,
Table 8.1 presents the bivariate correlations for the predictor variables with the correlations for
the political threat models presented separately in Table 8.2. The bivariate correlations show
some significantly high correlations between a few variables, so the models were tested for
multicollinearity and all analyses of Tolerance and VIF statistics showed no issues. All models
were run as OLS regressions with accompanying VIF and Tolerance scores. With the exception
of the political threat models, all models returned VIF scores below 10 and Tolerance scores
above 0.1, thus evidencing no issues with multicollinearity for models in the first four chapters
of results. As for the political threat models, tests show that some models that included both
defended neighborhoods and political threat predictors had VIF scores above 10 and Tolerance
scores below 0.1, indicating issues with multicollinearity; however, these models include
interaction terms between defended neighborhoods and political threat indicators and may
account for the higher VIF and lower Tolerance scores.
Since the dependent variables are event count data, negative binomial regression is the
appropriate multivariate technique to investigate “spaces of hate” (Disha et al., 2011). Scholars
16

For the most part, results were similar when models included dummy variables to control for time; however, the current study presents the
results without controlling for time as the significance of results is somewhat stronger in a small number of models (i.e. p≤0.05 versus p≤0.1).
The most significant difference between the models with and without controlling for time is that models controlling for time show that residential
instability completely loses significance (p>0.1) in a number of models.
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regularly use negative binomial regression analyses to investigate hate crime on the county and
neighborhood levels (Disha et al. 2009; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Grattet, 2009; Lyons,
2007; 2008). Negative binomial regression relaxes the assumptions of Poisson regression, which
models “event count processes but presupposes the statistical independence of distinct events, an
assumption that would be violated if [hate crime] incidents trigger reprisals or if our model omits
causative features of community districts” (Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, pp. 384-385).
Table 1.5 provides the hate crime counts by bias type for 1995-2010.
Table 1.5: Hate Crime Counts by
Bias Type17
Bias Type

Count

Anti-Black

962

Anti-Hispanic

252

Anti-Asian

179

Anti-Arab/Muslim
Anti-Nonwhite

18

1096
2489

Anti-Jewish

2340

Anti-White

304

Anti-Gay

1063

Analyses confirm that negative binomial regression is appropriate for the models as
opposed to the alternative Poisson method. First, histograms evidence Poisson distributions
across the different bias types. Second, analyses ran the Stata ‘estat gof’ goodness of fit tests,
showing significant results across all models for both Pearson and Deviance goodness of fit tests,
indicating negative binomial regression analyses are more appropriate. Lastly, all models were
first run without robust standard errors to check Likelihood-ratio test of alpha, which were all
significant, confirming overdispersion in the dependent variables and thus better suited to

17

This includes all hate crime included in the negative binomial regression analyses. A miniscule number of hate crimes were excluded because
they could not be assigned to a community district. This analysis also excludes the nine hate crimes committed against disabled persons.
18
This includes the sum of the anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, and –Arab/Muslim hate crimes.
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negative binomial regression modeling technique. The current study presents all models with
robust standard errors. Each of the following chapters discusses these models by hate crime
outcomes by theoretical model and by bias type.1920

19

All models presented control for the unlogged Total Population, but are not included in the tables.
The models do not include indicators for time period. Analyses demonstrated similar results when time period indicators were included in the
models; however, the models were not as strong when such indicators were included. Even when excluding the time period indicators, the
models still account for changes over time by including time-specific static and dynamic predictors.
20
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CHAPTER FIVE: DEFENDED NEIGHBORHOODS RESULTS
The first Results chapter investigates the impact of defended neighborhoods on hate
crime. The chapter aims to tests the first four hypotheses regarding the influence of demographic
indicators, including majority presence (i.e. white population levels), minority population growth
and the in-migration predictor, an interaction between majority presence and minority population
growth. Testing Hypothesis 4, this chapter also examines the influence of Jewish visibility via
the presence of Jewish buildings on anti-Jewish hate crime. This chapter’s goal is to determine
whether defended neighborhoods explains neighborhood level variation in hate crime in NYC.
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in White Defended Neighborhoods
Table 2.1 presents the results for the baseline models testing defended neighborhoods to
explain anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Nonwhite, and –
Arab) in white neighborhoods. All models in Table 2.1 are significant (p<.001).
Anti-Black Hate Crime
Model 1 shows a significant positive association between the percent non-Hispanic white
population and anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.018, p<.001). Evidencing defended
neighborhoods, the interaction between percent white and the change in Black population also
yields significant positive association with anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.002, p<.05).
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Model 2 shows the baseline similarly uncovers a significant positive association between
the percent non-Hispanic white population and anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.011, p<.001).
Increasing Hispanic populations over time is also significantly associated with a 21% increase in
anti-Hispanic hate crime. The interaction between percent White and the change in Hispanic

57

population also yields significant positive association with anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =
1.005, p<.05), supporting defended neighborhoods.
Anti-Asian Hate Crime
Model 3 demonstrates a significant positive association between the percent nonHispanic white population and anti-Asian hate crime (I.R.R. =1.015, p<.001). The in-migration
predictor is non-significant, providing no support for defended neighborhoods.
Table 2.1 Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime with White Defended
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
AntiAntiAntiAntiAntiAnti-Arab
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Nonwhite
/Muslim
/Muslim
Independent Variables
I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE)
I.R.R.(SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White 1.018***
1.011***
1.015***
1.015***
1.012***
1.013***
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
Change in Black Population
1.041
White*Change Black Pop.

0.028
1.002*
0.001

Change in Hispanic Pop.

1.213**
0.076

White*Change Hispanic
Pop.

1.005*
0.002

Change in Asian Population

1.071
0.096
1.002

White*Change Asian Pop.

0.003
Change in Nonwhite Pop.
White*Change Nonwhite
Pop.

1.042***
0.010

1.049***
0.014

1.055***
0.013

1.001⁺
0.000

0.999
0.001

0.999
0.001

Post-2000
Constant

2.142**
0.568

0.605
0.220

0.251***
0.088

5.149***
0.798

2.478***
0.468

1.432***
0.154
1.902***
0.369

Wald χ₂

72.890***

29.19***

37.97***

151.53***

88.46***

106.54***

-458.668

-235.274

-232.251

-583.501

-464.487

-459.093

Log pseudolikelihood
N=177
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⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime
Model 4 shows the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a significant
positive association between the percent non-Hispanic white population and anti-nonwhite hate
crime (I.R.R. =1.015, p<.001). Increasing nonwhite populations over time is also significantly
associated with a 4% increase in anti-nonwhite hate crime. The interaction between percent
White and the change in nonwhite population also yields significant positive association with
anti-nonwhite hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.001, p<.1), providing evidence for defended neighborhoods.
Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime
Turning to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, Models 1 and 2 present baseline defended
neighborhoods models, showing a significant positive association between the percent nonHispanic white population and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Nonwhite population growth is
also significantly associated with an approximately 5% increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.
Model 2 accounts for the effect of 9/11, showing a significant increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime in post-2000 period.
Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime in Defended Neighborhoods
Table 2.2 tests defended neighborhoods to explain anti-Jewish and –White hate crime.
These analyses explore a variety of defended neighborhoods contexts to determine which
contexts best account for such hate crimes. With the exception of Model 8, all models are
significant.
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Table 2.2: Negative Binomial Regressions for Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime with Defended Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Independent Variables
Percent Non-Hispanic White
Change in Nonwhite Population
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.

Anti-Jewish

Anti-Jewish

Anti-Jewish

Anti-Jewish

Anti-Jewish

Anti-Jewish

Anti-White

Anti-White

Anti-White

I.R.R.(SE)
1.031***
0.003
0.935***
0.017
1.002*
0.001

I.R.R. (SE)
1.019***
0.003
0.969*
0.014
1.002*
0.001

I.R.R. (SE)

I.R.R. (SE)

I.R.R. (SE)

I.R.R. (SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

0.980***
0.005
1.016
0.018
1.002*
0.001

0.986***
0.003
1.001
0.012
1.002***
0.001

Percent Non-Hispanic Black
Change in White Population
Black*Change White Pop.
Percent Nonwhite

1.014**
0.005
0.969
0.020
0.997*
0.001
0.969***
0.003
1.069***
0.019
1.002*
0.001

Change in White Population
Nonwhite*Change White Pop.

0.981***
0.003
1.032*
0.015
1.002*
0.001

0.997
0.004
1.005
0.028
0.999
0.001

Percent Hispanic

0.981***
0.005
1.013
0.023
1.000
0.002

Change in White Population
Hispanic*Change White Pop.
Jewish Buildings
Constant

Model 9

1.098***
0.012
2.194***
0.470
206.75***
-554.119

1.691*
0.453
Wald χ₂
97.99***
Log pseudolikelihood
-591.561
N=177; ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

10.861***
2.746
21.03***
-625.841

1.131***
0.014
6.286***
1.252
139.31***
-570.469

38.667***
8.485
97.99***
-591.561

1.098***
0.012
14.661***
3.031
206.72***
554.119

1.828⁺
0.637
13.03*
-310.835

2.757**
1.091
1.510
-315.382

4.011***
1.491
13.80**
-309.551

60

Anti-Jewish Hate Crime
Models 1 and 2 examine anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of white defended
neighborhoods. Model 1 shows the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a
significant positive association between the percent non-Hispanic white population and antiJewish hate crime (I.R.R. =1.023, p<.001). Growing nonwhite populations are also significantly
associated with an 8% reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime. Evidencing defended neighborhoods,
the interaction between percent White and the change in the nonwhite population also yields
significant positive association with anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.003, p<.05). These
findings persist in Model 2, which shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is associated with
a 10% increase in such hate crimes.
Models 3 and 4 explore anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of Black defended
neighborhoods. Model 3 presents the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a
significant negative association between the percent non-Hispanic Black population and antiJewish hate crime (I.R.R. =0.980, p<.001). Thus, anti-Jewish hate crime proves less prevalent in
Black neighborhoods. The interaction between percent Black and white population change
however yields significant positive association with anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.002,
p<.05). In addition to occurring in white defended neighborhoods, anti-Jewish hate crime also
manifests in the context of Black defended neighborhoods. These findings persist in Model 2,
which also shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is associated with a 13% increase in such
hate crimes.
Models 5 and 6 investigate anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of nonwhite defended
neighborhoods. Model 3 presents the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a
significant negative association between the percent nonwhite population and anti-Jewish hate
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crime (I.R.R. =0.969, p<.001). Thus, nonwhite neighborhoods experience less anti-Jewish hate
crime. The interaction between percent nonwhite and white population change however yields
significant positive association with anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. = 1.002, p<.05). Just as in
white and Black defended neighborhoods, nonwhite neighborhoods also react defensively to the
influx of a minority, which results in higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime. These findings
persist in Model 2, which also shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is associated with a
13% increase in such hate crimes.
Anti-White Hate Crime
Turning to anti-white hate crime, the last three models investigate three defended
neighborhoods contexts: Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods. First examining Black
neighborhoods, Model 7 shows the baseline defended neighborhoods model showing a
significant positive association between the percent non-Hispanic Black population and antiwhite hate crime (I.R.R. =1.015, p<.001). Thus, Black neighborhoods see higher levels of antiwhite hate crime. Model 7 also reveals that white population growth into Black neighborhoods
is associated with a significant decrease in anti-white hate crime. This contradicts defended
neighborhoods thesis since an influx of white residents into Black neighborhoods is shown to
results in less anti-white hate crime.
Model 8 tests nonwhite defended neighborhoods predictors, using the percent nonwhite,
white population growth, and an interaction between percent nonwhite and white population
change over time. Model 8 shows that defended neighborhoods predictors using percent
nonwhite fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime.
Lastly, Model 9 examines anti-white hate crime in Hispanic defended neighborhoods.
The results show that increases in the Hispanic population are associated with less anti-white

62

hate crime (I.R.R. =0.981, p<.001). The in-migration predictor fails to achieve significance,
providing no support for defended neighborhoods in Hispanic neighborhoods.
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite Defended Neighborhoods
Having examined hate crime against racial/ethnic minorities in the context of white
defended neighborhoods in Table 2.1, Table 2.3 investigates hate crime against racial/ethnic
minorities in nonwhite neighborhoods.
Anti-Black Hate Crime
Examining anti-Black hate crime in the context of Asian defended neighborhoods, Model
1 shows the baseline model, revealing that an increase Black population growth is associated
with a 10% increase in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.096, p<.1). Model 2 shows results for
anti-Black hate crime in the context of Hispanic neighborhoods. There is a significant
association between Hispanic population levels and anti-Black hate crime. Thus, anti-Black hate
crime proves less prevalent in Hispanic neighborhoods. It also demonstrates that Black
population growth is associated with a 7% increase in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.066,
p<.1). While both models show that Black population growth over time is associated with
increases in anti-Black hate crime, they provide no support for defended neighborhoods as the
influx of Black residents into Asian and Hispanic neighborhoods fails to account for higher
levels of such crimes.

63

Table 2.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite
Defended Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
AntiAntiAntiAntiAntiAntiBlack
Black
Hispanic
Hispanic
Asian
Asian
Independent Variables
I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic Asian
0.996
0.009
Change in Black Pop.
1.096⁺
0.061
Asian*Change Black Pop.
0.995
0.012
Percent Hispanic
0.973***
0.004
Change in Black Pop.
1.066⁺
0.037
Hispanic*Change Black Pop.
0.998
0.002
Percent Non-Hispanic Asian
0.979
0.016
Change in Hispanic Pop.
1.249***
0.073
Asian*Change Hispanic Pop.
0.984*
0.007
Percent Non-Hispanic Black
0.991*
0.004
Change in Hispanic Pop.
1.297***
0.078
Black*Change Hispanic Pop.
1.003
0.002
Percent Non-Hispanic Black
0.979**
0.008
Change in Asian Pop.
0.896
0.115
Black*Change Asian Pop.
0.989*
0.005
Percent Hispanic
0.978***
0.006
Change in Asian Pop.
1.185⁺
0.113
Hispanic*Change Asian Pop.
1.004
0.005
Constant
6.156*** 10.865***
0.820
0.925
0.876
0.865
1.616
2.813
0.286
0.341
0.310
0.261
Wald χ₂
20.27***
72.78***
21.66***
Log pseudolikelihood
-482.491
-459.973
-268.614
N=177; ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

24.56***
-270.024

33.14***
-234.706

30.15***
-231.005
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Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Model 3 first investigates anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Asian defended
neighborhoods. Model 1 shows the baseline model, revealing that an increase Hispanic
population growth is associated with a 25% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.249,
p<.001) and this finding persists across all of the models. Model 3 also shows a significant
negative association between Asian neighborhoods experiencing an influx of Hispanic
populations and anti-Hispanic hate crime. While Hispanic population growth is associated with
increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime, there is no evidence to support defended neighborhoods in
the context of Asian neighborhoods as Hispanic in-migration into Asian neighborhoods is
associated with less, not more, anti-Hispanic hate crime.
Model 4 shows results for anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Black
neighborhoods. This baseline defended neighborhoods model shows that increases in the Black
population are associated with decreases in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =.991; p<.05). Thus,
Black neighborhoods experience less anti-Hispanic hate crime. Hispanic population growth is
associated with a 30% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.297, p<.001). Though
Hispanic population growth leads to more anti-Hispanic hate crime, defended neighborhoods
fails to explain such crimes in Black neighborhoods.
Anti-Asian Hate Crime
Model 5 examines anti-Asian hate crime in Black defended neighborhoods. It reveals a
significant negative relationship between Black population levels and anti-Asian hate crime.
Thus, anti-Asian hate crime is less common in Black neighborhoods. Model 1 also shows a
significant negative association between Black neighborhoods experiencing Asian population
growth and anti-Asian hate crime, evidencing no support for defended neighborhoods.
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Model 6 looks at anti-Asian hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods. Results show that
increases in the Hispanic population are associated with less anti-Asian hate crime (I.R.R.
=0.978, p<.001). Asian population growth over time is associated with a significant increase in
anti-Asian hate crime. The model however fails to show a defensive response to Asian inmigration into Hispanic neighborhoods.
Summary
This chapter presents baseline models investigating the impact of defended
neighborhoods on hate crime. The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime
in the context of white defended neighborhoods. The results find support for defended
neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-nonwhite hate crime as white
neighborhoods experience influxes of these populations. The second section tests anti-Jewish
and –white hate crime as an outcome of defended neighborhoods in a variety of contexts. The
results demonstrate that defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-white hate crime in Black,
nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods. If anything, white in-migration is associated with less
anti-white hate crime. The results also show interesting patterns in explaining anti-Jewish hate
crime. The influx of nonwhite residents into white neighborhoods, as well as white in-migration
into Black and nonwhite neighborhoods, is significantly associated with higher levels of antiJewish hate crime. Lastly, the third section investigates anti-Black, -Hispanic, and –Asian hate
crime in the context of nonwhite defended neighborhoods. While the first section showed a
defensive response in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of minority groups, the last
section’s results reveal that there is no similar response in Asian, Hispanic, or Black
neighborhoods experiencing an influx of another minority group.
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CHAPTER SIX: DEFENDED AND DISORGANIZED NEIGHBORHOODS RESULTS
This chapter presents results testing combined defended neighborhoods and social
disorganization models. This chapter investigates whether defended neighborhoods persists in
explaining hate crime when social disorganization predictors are considered. In addition to
further examining the impact of defended neighborhoods, this chapter tests Hypothesis 7, which
asserts that socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime. These
models test whether neighborhoods with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage, residential
instability, and diversity experience more hate crime. The following section presents results by
bias type, including baseline and full models for each bias type. The tables also include the
baseline defended neighborhoods models per bias type for comparison purposes.
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in White Defended and Disorganized
Neighborhoods
The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime, specifically anti-Black,
-Hispanic, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime, in the context of white defended and disorganized
neighborhoods. 21
Anti-Black Hate Crime
Table 3.1 presents results testing anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of white defended
and disorganized neighborhoods. All models in Table 3.1 are significant (p<.001). As
established in the previous chapter, results show anti-Black hate crime occurs in white defended
neighborhoods. Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors. There are significant negative
associations between all three predictors, concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.084, p<.001),

21

Full models examining anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime are further discussed in the Terrorist Threat section.
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residential instability (I.R.R. =.944, p<.001), and diversity (I.R.R. =.369, p<.05), and anti-Black
hate crime.
The next three models (Models 3 to 5) combine defended neighborhoods and social
disorganization predictors. All three models show the persistent positive relationship between
percent white and the in-migration interaction term and anti-Black hate crime. When defended
neighborhoods predictors are introduced, concentrated disadvantage and diversity are no longer
significant, while residential instability remains significant and negatively associated with antiBlack hate crime. Thus, anti-Black hate crime occurs in more socially organized communities.
The results demonstrate the persistent effect of defended neighborhoods in explaining increases
in anti-Black hate crime.
Table 3.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White
1.018***
1.015**
1.013**
1.011⁺
0.003
0.006
0.005
0.006
Change in Black Population
1.041
1.040
1.028
1.033
0.028
0.028
0.024
0.025
White*Change Black Pop.
1.002*
1.003*
1.002*
1.002⁺
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.084***
0.603
0.402
0.321
0.026
0.394
0.262
0.240
Residential Instability
0.944***
0.949***
0.951***
0.012
0.012
0.011
Diversity Index
0.369*
0.662
0.158
0.361
Constant
2.142**
294.511***
3.083*
40.775***
58.454***
0.568
204.673
1.760
38.118
66.572
Wald χ₂
72.890***
85.73***
Log pseudolikelihood
-458.668
-456.019
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

73.000***
-458.409

148.72***
-449.467

151.80***
-449.109
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Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with White Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White
1.011***
1.021*
1.019*
1.024*
0.003
0.009
0.009
0.012
Change in Hispanic Population
1.213**
1.212**
1.204**
1.196**
0.076
0.075
0.073
0.068
White*Change Hispanic Pop.
1.005*
1.005*
1.003⁺
1.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.207**
4.086
2.565
4.452
0.107
4.399
2.940
6.226
Residential Instability
0.919**
.939*
.937*
0.029
0.028
0.028
Diversity Index
1.341
2.328
1.108
2.079
Constant
0.605
93.470*
0.206⁺
4.034
1.953
0.220
168.499
0.193
7.412
4.131
Wald χ₂
29.19***
14.13**
Log pseudolikelihood
-235.274
-273.018
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

30.09***
-264.444

56.91***
-259.722

59.76***
-259.149

Table 3.2 shows anti-Hispanic hate crime as an outcome in white defended and
disorganized neighborhoods. All models in Table 3.2 are significant (p<.001). The previous
chapter revealed support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Hispanic hate crime in
white neighborhoods. Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors. There are significant negative
associations between concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.207, p<.01) and residential instability
(I.R.R. =.919, p<.01) and anti- Hispanic hate crime. The next three models (Models 3 to 5)
combine defended neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors. All three models show
the persistent positive relationship between percent white, change in the Hispanic population,
and the in-migration interaction term and anti-Hispanic hate crime with the exception of the
interaction term losing significance in the full Model 5. Across all three models, concentrated
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disadvantage is no longer significant when defended neighborhoods predictors are introduced,
while residential instability remains significant and negatively associated with anti-Hispanic hate
crime with an approximately 6% reduction in hate crime. On the whole, the results evidence
support for defended and organized neighborhoods in explaining anti-Hispanic hate crime.
Anti-Asian Hate Crime
Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White
1.015***
0.999
0.997
0.990
0.003
0.009
0.009
0.009
Change in Asian Population
1.071
0.971
0.963
0.994
0.096
0.112
0.107
0.136
White*Change Asian Pop.
1.002
1.005
1.004
1.003
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.004
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.061***
0.065⁺
0.033*
0.018**
0.029
0.100
0.051
0.028
Residential Instability
0.949**
0.951**
0.951**
0.016
0.017
0.017
Diversity Index
0.459
0.333
0.344
0.327
Constant
0.251***
24.901***
1.470
21.067*
60.679**
0.088
20.580
1.431
30.155
91.435
Wald χ₂
37.97***
57.95***
Log pseudolikelihood
-232.251
-226.048
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

36.71***
-229.143

52.68***
-225.555

58.79***
-224.463

Table 3.3 investigates the impact of white defended and disorganized neighborhoods on
anti-Asian hate crime. All models in Table 3.3 are significant (p<.001). As demonstrated in the
previous chapter, defended neighborhoods fails to account for anti-Asian hate crime. Model 2 is
a baseline social disorganization model. There are significant negative associations between
concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.061, p<.001) and residential instability (I.R.R. =.949, p<.01)
and anti-Asian hate crime. The next three models (Models 3 to 5) combine defended
neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors. With the introduction of social
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disorganization variables, percent white loses significance. Across all models, concentrated
disadvantage and residential instability remain significant and negatively associated with antiAsian hate crime. Thus, socially organized communities see more anti-Asian hate crime. Just as
in the baseline model, defended neighborhoods fails to account for anti-Asian hate crime.
Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime
Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime with White Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White
1.015***
1.009**
1.009**
1.010*
0.002
0.004
0.003
0.004
Change in Nonwhite Population
1.042***
1.034**
1.023*
1.019⁺
0.010
0.011
0.011
0.011
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
1.001⁺
1.001*
1.001
1.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.101***
0.450⁺
0.324*
0.358*
0.019
0.217
0.155
0.182
Residential Instability
0.954***
0.965***
0.964***
0.008
0.009
0.008
Diversity Index
0.875
1.281
0.244
0.482
Constant
5.149***
261.189***
8.918***
58.235***
48.267***
0.798
127.819
3.225
36.717
36.510
Wald χ₂
151.53***
170.71***
Log pseudolikelihood
-583.501
-581.239
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

159.95***
-582.099

216.55***
-573.111

218.81***
-572.817

Table 3.4 examines anti-nonwhite hate crime in the context of white defended and
disorganized hate crime. All models in Table 3.4 are significant (p<.001). As established in the
previous chapter, evidence demonstrates that anti-nonwhite hate crime occurs in white defended
neighborhoods. Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors. There are significant negative
associations between concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.101, p<.001) and residential instability
(I.R.R. =.954, p<.001) and anti-nonwhite hate crime. The next three models (Models 3 to 5)
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combine defended neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors. All three models show
the persistent positive effect of percent white and the change in the nonwhite population on antinonwhite hate crime; however, the in-migration interaction term only remains significant in
Model 3 (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.05). Across all models, concentrated disadvantage and residential
instability remain significant and negatively associated with anti-nonwhite hate crime. While
defended neighborhoods does not explain anti-nonwhite hate crime as strongly as anti-Black or –
Hispanic hate crime, it still accounts for increases in such crimes when only concentrated
disadvantage is considered. The results also demonstrate that socially organized communities
experience higher levels of anti-nonwhite hate crime.
Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime in Defended and Disorganized Neighborhoods
The second section first examines anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of defended and
disorganized neighborhoods, specifically white, Black, and nonwhite neighborhoods. Models
further test the effect of Jewish visibility via the presence of Jewish buildings on anti-Jewish hate
crime. The section then presents analyses investigating anti-white hate crime as an outcome of
defended and disorganized neighborhoods in Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods.
Anti-Jewish Hate Crime
Table 3.5 first presents baseline social disorganization models, with and without the
presence of Jewish buildings. Both models in Table 3.5 are significant (p<.001). Model 1 is a
baseline model that examines all three social disorganization predictors apart from defended
neighborhoods predictors. There is a significant negative association between concentrated
disadvantage and anti-Jewish hate crime (I.R.R. =0.049, p<.001). Residential instability is also
associated with a 6% reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime. These findings hold in Model 2, which
also shows that the presence of Jewish buildings is also associated with increases in such crimes.
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Table 3.5: Negative Binomial Regressions for Anti-Jewish
Hate Crime with Social Disorganization
Model 1
Model 2
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.049***
0.130***
0.018
0.041
Residential Instability
0.937***
0.967***
0.012
0.009
Diversity Index
0.588
0.709
0.324
0.275
Jewish Buildings
1.109***
0.012
Constant
593.925*** 65.876***
459.678
36.269
Wald χ₂
103.13***
180.64***
Log pseudolikelihood
-603.547
-556.547
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

Table 3.6 presents the combined defended neighborhoods and social disorganization
predictors and all models are significant (p<.001). As discussed in the previous chapter, white
defended neighborhoods explains increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. Across the full defended
and disorganized models, percent white, the interaction term, and the presence of Jewish
buildings persist in accounting for increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. Thus, defended
neighborhoods continues to be a consistent predictor of higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in
white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite residents. Increases in nonwhite
populations over time also continue to explain reductions in such crimes. The presence of
Jewish buildings also continues to account for significant increases in anti-Jewish hate crime,
evidencing that greater Jewish visibility accounts for higher levels of such crimes. When the
Jewish property predictor is included (Models 6 and 8), concentrated disadvantage remains a
significant predictor of decreases in anti-Jewish hate crime. Residential instability also accounts
for significant reductions in such crimes. Lastly, the full models show that diversity becomes a
significant positive predictor of anti-Jewish hate crime.
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Table 3.6: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.031***
1.019***
1.031***
1.012*
1.029***
1.012**
1.034***
0.003
0.003
0.006
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.007
Change in Nonwhite Population
0.935***
0.969*
0.934***
0.960*
0.919***
0.947***
0.903***
0.017
0.014
0.019
0.015
0.019
0.016
0.020
1.002⁺
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
1.002*
1.002*
1.002*
1.002**
1.002*
1.002*
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.316⁺
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.853
0.421
0.221**
0.587
0.634
0.196
0.290
0.130
0.447
Residential Instability
0.932***
0.961***
0.929***
0.013
0.009
0.013
Diversity Index
3.680⁺
3.155
Jewish Buildings
1.098***
1.102***
1.091***
0.012
0.013
0.012
Constant
1.691*
2.194***
1.876
4.776***
78.462***
36.194***
32.486*
0.453
0.470
1.014
2.132
76.147
25.658
44.530
Wald χ₂
97.99***
206.75***
98.25***
216.30***
178.53***
233.14***
205.78***
Log pseudolikelihood
-591.561
-554.119
-591.538
-552.278
-577.876
-546.177
-574.273
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

Model 8
I.R.R. (SE)
1.017**
0.006
0.936***
0.016
1.002**
0.001
0.289⁺
0.187
0.959***
0.009
2.233⁺
1.067
1.087***
0.013
20.084***
18.131
264.17***
-544.189
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Table 3.7: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Black Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
0.980***
0.986***
1.001
0.999
0.999
0.998
0.999
0.005
0.003
0.006
0.004
0.006
0.004
0.006
Change in White Population
1.016
1.001
1.051*
1.021
1.075***
1.038*
1.076**
0.018
0.012
0.021
0.013
0.024
0.016
0.025
1.002⁺
Black*Change White Pop.
1.002*
1.002***
1.002***
1.001
1.002**
1.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.028***
0.105***
0.018***
0.075***
0.017***
0.015
0.042
0.008
0.029
0.008
Residential Instability
0.922***
0.959***
0.922***
0.013
0.009
0.013
Diversity Index
1.138
0.573
Jewish Buildings
1.131***
1.116***
1.105***
0.014
0.012
0.012
Constant
10.861***
6.286***
23.812***
11.251***
1386.525*** 94.368***
1330.513***
2.746
1.252
5.789
2.182
1061.342
55.975
1044.382
Wald χ₂
21.03***
139.31***
95.71***
201.37***
179.11***
213.45***
181.17***
Log pseudolikelihood
-625.841
-570.469
-607.831
-555.866
-593.459
-549.772
-593.430
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

Model 8
I.R.R. (SE)
0.999
0.003
1.040*
0.017
1.002**
0.001
0.069***
0.027
0.959***
0.009
1.238
0.459
1.105***
0.012
87.780***
53.751
217.30***
-549.626
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Table 3.7 investigates anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of Black defended and
disorganized neighborhoods and all models are significant (p<.001). As previously stated,
results show that higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime occur in Black defended neighborhoods.
Across the full models, percent Black is no longer a significant predictor of less anti-Jewish hate
crime while most models show that increases in the white population over time accounts for
significant increases in such hate crimes The presence of Jewish buildings also persists as a
significant predictor of increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. The white in-migration interaction
term remains significant in models including the Jewish buildings indicator. Thus, results show
the persistent effect of Black defended neighborhoods in explaining increases in anti-Jewish hate
crime. Furthermore, the baseline social disorganization models demonstrate that concentrated
disadvantage and residential instability account for decreases in hate crime. Models 3 to 8
combine defended neighborhoods and social disorganization predictors. Across all models,
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability continue to be associated with reductions in
anti-Jewish hate crime.
Table 3.8 examines anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of nonwhite defended and
disorganized neighborhoods. As shown in the previous chapter, nonwhite neighborhoods
experiencing an influx of white residents experience more anti-Jewish hate crime, supporting
defended neighborhoods. Models 3 to 8 combine defended neighborhoods and social
disorganization predictors. The significance and direction of the defended neighborhoods
predictors, as well as the presence of Jewish buildings indicator, similarly holds across the
models. Thus, the results show that defended neighborhoods proves to be a consistent predictor
of anti-Jewish hate crime in nonwhite neighborhoods. Further, Jewish visibility similarly
persists in account for higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.
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Table 3.8: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Nonwhite (%)
0.969***
0.981***
0.970***
0.989*
0.972***
0.988**
0.967***
0.003
0.003
0.005
0.017
0.005
0.004
0.006
Change in White Population
1.069***
1.032*
1.071***
1.041*
1.088***
1.056***
1.108***
0.019
0.015
0.022
0.017
0.023
0.018
0.025
Nonwhite*Change White Pop.
1.002*
1.002*
1.002*
1.002**
1.002⁺
1.002*
1.002*
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.853
0.316⁺
0.421
0.221**
0.587
0.634
0.196
0.290
0.130
0.447
Residential Instability
0.932***
0.961***
0.929***
0.013
0.009
0.013
Diversity Index
3.680⁺
3.155
Jewish Buildings
1.098***
1.102***
1.091***
0.012
0.013
0.012
Constant
38.667***
14.661***
38.987***
15.122***
1347.146*** 118.620*** 901.717***
8.485
3.031
8.564
3.061
1012.190
65.334
826.985
Wald χ₂
97.99***
206.72***
98.25***
216.30***
178.53***
233.14***
205.78***
Log pseudolikelihood
-591.561
554.119
-591.538
-552.278
-577.876
-546.177
-574.273
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

Model 8
I.R.R. (SE)
0.984**
0.006
1.069***
0.019
1.002**
0.001
0.289⁺
0.187
0.959***
0.009
2.233⁺
1.067
1.087***
0.013
99.441***
57.834
264.17***
-544.188
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As previously stated, the baseline social disorganization models show significant negative
associations between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and anti-Jewish hate
crime. When accounting for the presence of Jewish buildings, there is a significant negative
association between concentrated disadvantage and anti-Jewish hate crime. Across all models,
residential instability continues to be associated with reductions in anti-Jewish hate crime. As in
Table 3.6, diversity also explains higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime. On the whole, all four
tables show that anti-Jewish hate crime is more prevalent in socially organized communities.
Anti-White Hate Crime
Table 3.9: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Black Defended & Disorganized
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
1.014**
1.032***
1.028***
1.026***
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.006
Change in White Population
0.969
0.988
1.013
1.009
0.020
0.021
0.025
0.025
Black*Change White Pop.
0.997*
.997*
0.997**
0.996**
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.344**
0.067***
0.048***
0.063***
0.138
0.041
0.029
0.039
Residential Instability
0.933***
0.934***
0.934***
0.015
0.016
0.016
Diversity Index
.267*
0.477
0.157
0.301
Constant
1.828⁺
169.432***
4.106***
122.969***
166.187***
0.637
157.223
1.371
112.892
156.763
Wald χ₂
13.03*
26.41***
30.54***
44.32***
47.65***
Log pseudolikelihood
-310.835
-305.249
-302.191
-295.733
-295.087
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

Table 3.9 presents the results examining anti-white hate crime as an outcome of Black
defended and disorganized neighborhoods. The models in Table 3.9 are all significant. As
discussed in the previous chapter, Black neighborhoods seeing an influx of white residents
actually experience less anti-white hate crime, refuting defended neighborhoods in the context of
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Black neighborhoods. Across Table 3.9, the full models continue to show how white inmigration into Black neighborhoods accounts for less anti-white crime. The full models however
do continue to show that higher Black population levels are associated with higher levels of antiwhite hate crime. Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization
predictors apart from the defended neighborhoods predictors. There are significant negative
associations between all three social disorganization predictors and anti-white hate crime.
Table 3.10: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Nonwhite (%)
0.997
0.999
0.999
1.008
0.004
0.008
0.007
0.008
Change in White Population
1.005
1.009
1.026
0.999
0.028
0.029
0.034
0.035
Nonwhite*Change White Pop.
0.999
1.000
0.999
0.998
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.344**
0.687
0.351
0.159⁺
0.138
0.754
0.361
0.172
Residential Instability
0.933***
0.921***
0.927***
0.015
0.018
0.017
Diversity Index
.267*
0.179**
0.157
0.119
Constant
2.757**
169.432***
2.823**
169.105***
259.628***
1.091
157.223
1.118
178.260
267.338
Wald χ₂
1.510
26.41***
1.680
24.25***
30.06***
Log pseudolikelihood
-315.382
-305.249
-315.328
-306.803
-303.564
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

Table 3.10 presents results testing nonwhite defended and disorganized neighborhoods to
explain anti-white hate crime. Across all models, the defended neighborhoods predictors using
percent nonwhite fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime. In Models 3 to 5, residential
instability and diversity are both significantly and negatively associated with such hate crimes.
Table 3.11 investigates anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic defended and
disorganized neighborhoods. All models in the table are significant. As previously stated,
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defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic
neighborhoods. The full models in Table 3.11 continue to support the conclusion that Hispanic
neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of white residents into the neighborhood.
Results show that increases in the Hispanic population and in residential instability continue to
be associated with decreases in anti-white hate crime. Results across the three contexts thus
demonstrate that socially organized communities see higher levels of anti-white hate crime.
Table 3.11: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
Percent Hispanic (%)
Change in White Population
Hispanic*Change White Pop.

I.R.R. (SE)
0.981***
0.005
1.013
0.023
1.000
0.002

Concentrated Disadvantage

0.344**
0.138
0.933***
0.015

Residential Instability
Diversity Index
Constant
Wald χ₂

I.R.R. (SE)

4.011***
1.491
13.80**

.267*
0.157
169.432***
157.223
26.41***

Log pseudolikelihood
-309.551
-305.249
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

I.R.R. (SE)
0.979**
0.007
1.005
0.025

I.R.R. (SE)
0.984*
0.006
1.029
0.028

I.R.R. (SE)
0.986⁺
0.008
1.028
0.028

0.999
0.002
1.490
0.873

1.000
0.002
0.600
0.347
0.934***
0.017

1.000
0.002
0.539
0.328
0.934***
0.017

3.488***
1.349
14.04*

102.727***
98.327
31.98***

0.699
0.490
120.557***
126.058
32.61***

-309.239

-303.324

-303.214

Anti-Racial Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite Defended and Disorganized
Neighborhoods
Lastly, the third section examines anti-racial/ethnic hate crime, specifically anti-Black, Hispanic, and –Asian hate crime, in nonwhite defended and disorganized neighborhoods. Tables
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include the baseline models for defended neighborhoods and social disorganization presented
previously for comparison purposes.
Anti-Black Hate Crime
Table 3.12: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Asian Defended & Disorganized
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Asian (%)
0.996
0.962***
0.967**
0.975*
0.009
0.012
0.010
0.011
Change in Black Population
1.096⁺
1.074
1.016
1.006
0.061
0.053
0.047
0.046
Asian*Change Black Pop.
0.995
1.006
0.995
0.991
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.011
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.081***
0.074***
0.061***
0.072***
0.025
0.027
0.019
0.025
Residential Instability
0.943***
0.947***
0.948***
0.012
0.012
0.012
Diversity Index
0.411*
0.475
0.178
0.226
Constant
6.156***
294.758***
17.226***
218.582***
268.850***
1.616
207.706
4.443
149.662
185.427
Wald χ₂
20.27***
82.64***
Log pseudolikelihood
-482.491
-456.609
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

61.78***
-459.836

97.77***
-450.629

106.96***
-449.346

Table 3.12 investigates anti-Black hate crime in the context of Asian defended and
disorganized communities and all models are significant (p<.001). As stated in the previous
chapter, there is no support for defended neighborhoods in the baseline model. Across the rest of
the full model, this finding persists as Black in-migration into Asian neighborhoods fails to
account for anti-Black hate crime. Thus, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-Black
hate crime in Asian neighborhoods. Additionally, full models show that Asian population levels
are significantly associated with less anti-Black hate crime. As for social disorganization, results
for the full models show that both concentrated disadvantage and residential instability continue
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to be associated with less anti-Black hate crime. Diversity however loses significance when
defended neighborhoods predictors considered in the full model in Model 6.
Table 3.13: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Hispanic (%)
0.973***
0.979***
0.982***
0.983***
0.004
0.005
0.004
0.005
Change in Black Population
1.066⁺
1.035
1.02
1.021
0.037
0.036
0.034
0.033
Hispanic*Change Black Pop.
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.081***
0.331**
0.211***
0.205***
0.025
0.130
0.083
0.083
Residential Instability
0.943***
0.951***
0.952***
0.012
0.011
0.011
Diversity Index
0.411*
0.866
0.178
0.427
Constant
10.865***
294.758***
14.033***
148.778*** 156.766***
2.813
207.706
3.493
92.921
103.604
Wald χ₂
72.78***
82.64***
Log pseudolikelihood
-459.973
-456.609
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

94.77***
-455.526

131.14***
-447.323

133.13***
-447.284

Table 3.13 turns to anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of Hispanic defended and
disorganized communities. All models are significant (p<.001). As previously stated, results
provide no support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic
neighborhoods. Table 3.13 shows that Black in-migration into Hispanic neighborhood continues
to be an insignificant predictor of anti-Black hate crime. Therefore, defended neighborhoods
fails to account for anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods. The full models also
reveal that Hispanic population levels continue to be associated with less anti-Black hate crime.
Thus, Hispanic neighborhoods experience lower levels of such crimes. Table 3.13 also shows
that concentrated disadvantage and residential instability remain as significant predictors of less
anti-Black hate crime. Diversity however loses significance when defended neighborhoods
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predictors are considered in the full model in Model 6. Tables 3.12 and 3.13 both show that antiBlack hate crime is more prevalent in socially organized communities.

Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Table 3.14: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Asian Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Asian (%)
0.979
0.956*
0.964
0.960
0.016
0.022
0.022
0.024
Change in Hispanic Population
1.249***
1.219***
1.209**
1.203**
0.073
0.073
0.075
0.072
Asian*Change Hispanic Pop.
0.984*
0.982*
0.986
0.986
0.007
0.009
0.009
0.009
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.209**
0.176***
0.159***
0.150***
0.110
0.092
0.084
0.079
Residential Instability
0.919**
.945⁺
0.943*
0.029
0.028
0.027
Diversity Index
1.301
1.476
1.114
1.171
Constant
0.820
93.133*
2.149
26.703*
24.47*
0.286
171.128
0.929
37.693
35.170
Wald χ₂
21.66***
13.58**
Log pseudolikelihood
-268.614
-273.034
N=177; ⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

27.00***
-263.825

44.51***
-259.941

45.73***
-259.806

Table 3.14 presents results for anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Asian defended
and disorganized communities. As previously stated, defended neighborhoods fails to explain
anti-Hispanic hate crime in Asian neighborhoods. In fact, an influx of Hispanic residents into
Asian neighborhoods is associated with significantly less hate crime. The full models show this
finding persists when social disorganization predictors are considered. Thus, results demonstrate
that Asian neighborhoods do not respond defensively to Hispanic in-migration. Hispanic
population growth over time however continues to explain higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate
crime. As for social disorganization, full models evidence the persistent significantly negative
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relationship between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and anti-Hispanic hate
crime. Socially organized communities thus see higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime.
Table 3.15: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Black Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
0.991*
0.999
0.993
0.991
0.004
0.007
0.007
0.008
Change in Hispanic Population
1.297***
1.299***
1.269***
1.273***
0.078
0.079
0.086
0.086
Black*Change Hispanic Pop.
1.003
1.003
1.003
1.003
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.209**
0.353
0.426
0.478
0.110
0.282
0.348
0.409
Residential Instability
0.919**
0.925**
0.925**
0.029
0.028
0.028
Diversity Index
1.301
0.669
1.114
0.514
Constant
0.925
93.133*
1.249
40.344*
46.742*
0.341
171.128
0.496
59.309
75.158
Wald χ₂
24.56***
13.58**
Log pseudolikelihood
-270.024
-273.034
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

25.39***
-269.144

54.20***
-262.016

57.13***
-261.876

Table 3.15 investigates anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Black defended and
disorganized neighborhoods. As shown in the previous chapter, defended neighborhoods fails to
account for anti-Hispanic hate crime in Black neighborhoods. The full models show that Black
in-migration into Hispanic neighborhoods persists in failing to explain anti-Hispanic hate crime.
Thus, results fail to show that Black neighborhoods react defensively with hate crime in response
to an influx of Hispanic residents. The full models do demonstrate that Hispanic population
growth continues to be associated with significant increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime.
Regarding social disorganization, full models show that concentrated disadvantage is no longer a
significant predictor of anti-Hispanic hate crime. Residential instability however continues to
explain significant reductions in such crimes.
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Anti-Asian Hate Crime
Table 3.16: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Black Defended & Disorganized
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
0.979**
0.994
0.991
0.991
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.009
Change in Asian Population
0.896
0.793⁺
0.767*
0.770⁺
0.115
0.099
0.091
0.120
Black*Change Asian Pop.
0.989*
0.985**
0.985***
0.985**
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.005
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.059***
0.043***
0.036***
0.037***
0.028
0.029
0.025
0.029
Residential Instability
0.948***
0.948**
0.948**
0.016
0.017
0.018
Diversity Index
0.509
0.942
0.385
0.812
Constant
0.876
24.628***
2.291*
28.54***
28.754***
0.310
20.669
0.807
25.301
24.885
Wald χ₂
33.14***
56.02***
Log pseudolikelihood
-234.706
-226.277
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

56.72***
-225.957

67.77***
-221.862

68.34***
-221.858

Table 3.16 examines anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of Black defended and
disorganized communities. As previously stated, the baseline defended neighborhoods model
fails to explain anti-Asian hate crime as a result of Black defended neighborhoods and that Asian
in-migration into Black neighborhoods actually results in less anti-Asian hate crime. When
social disorganization predictors are considered, this finding persists across the full models.
Thus, Black neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of Asian residents and there is
less anti-Asian hate crime in these neighborhoods. The full models also show that Asian
population growth is a significant predictor of less anti-Asian hate crime. As for social
disorganization, the defended and disorganized models evidence the persistent significant
negative association between concentrated disadvantage and residential instability and anti-Asian
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hate crime. Thus, anti-Asian hate crime proves more prevalent in socially organized
communities.
Table 3.17: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended &
Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Hispanic (%)
.978***
.985⁺
0.988
0.992
0.006
0.008
0.008
0.009
Change in Asian Population
1.185⁺
1.103
1.093
1.103
0.113
0.117
0.113
0.136
Hispanic*Change Asian Pop.
1.004
1.003
1.004
1.004
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.006
Concentrated Disadvantage
.059***
.219*
.129**
.118***
0.028
0.156
0.091
0.072
Residential Instability
.948***
.953**
.953**
0.016
0.017
0.017
Diversity Index
0.509
0.646
0.385
0.712
Constant
0.865
24.628***
1.372
13.144**
15.318***
0.261
20.669
0.443
11.167
12.659
Wald χ₂
30.15***
56.02***
Log pseudolikelihood
-231.005
-226.277
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

40.02***
-227.646

47.33***
-224.462

50.71***
-224.306

Table 3.17 presents results for models testing anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of
Hispanic defended and disorganized communities. As shown in the previous chapter, defended
neighborhoods do not account for anti-Asian hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods. Accounting
for social disorganization, the full models show that Asian in-migration into Hispanic
neighborhoods persistently fails to explain anti-Asian hate crime. Therefore, results fail to
uncover a defended neighborhoods response in Hispanic neighborhoods when there is an influx
of Asian residents. The results also show that concentrated disadvantage and residential
instability continue to be significantly associated with lower levels of anti-Asian hate crime.
Socially organized communities thus experience lower levels of such crimes.
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Summary
This chapter aimed to investigate the impact of defended and disorganized neighborhoods
on hate crime. The first section examined anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the context of
defended and disorganized communities in white neighborhoods. The results show that
defended neighborhoods remains a consistent predictor of anti-Black, -Hispanic, and -nonwhite
hate crime when social disorganization indicators are considered, though this finding is strongest
when explaining anti-Black hate crime. The findings also consistently reveal that anti-Black, Hispanic, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime is more likely to occur in socially organized, rather
than disorganized, communities. Hate crimes against Black and Hispanic persons take place in
more residentially stable neighborhoods while those against Asian and nonwhite persons
generally manifest in stable and advantaged neighborhoods.
The second section scrutinized anti-Jewish and -white hate crime in a variety of defended
and disorganized contexts. The results show that defended neighborhoods proves consistently
able to predict higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in white, Black, and nonwhite
neighborhoods. This finding is strongest in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of
nonwhite residents and nonwhite neighborhoods undergoing white in-migration. White
population growth over time is also associated with increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. Jewish
visibility remains a consistent predictor of significantly greater levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.
The effect of defended neighborhoods persists even when accounting for the impact of social
disorganization. On the whole, anti-Jewish hate crime occurs in socially organized communities
that are generally more advantaged and more stable. Diversity however does result in higher
levels of anti-Jewish hate crime when examining white and nonwhite neighborhoods.
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As for anti-white hate crime, defended neighborhoods consistently fails to explain such
hate crimes in the context of Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods. The result reveal
that white in-migration into Black neighborhoods actually results in less anti-white hate crime.
While white neighborhoods react defensively to an influx of minorities, nonwhite neighborhoods
do not share this defensive reaction when experiencing white in-migration. Anti-white hate
crimes also prove more prevalent in socially organized communities, particularly those that are
residentially stable.
Finally, the third section examined anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the context of
Asian, Hispanic, and Black defended and disorganized communities. As the results demonstrate,
defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime when such
neighborhoods experience an influx of another racial/ethnic minority even when considering
social disorganization predictors. The results conform to the trend of hate crime occurring in
socially organized communities no matter bias type or neighborhood context.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DEFENDED AND STRAINED NEIGHBORHOODS RESULTS
This chapter aims to test hypotheses stemming from defended neighborhoods and strain
or economic threat models. This chapter investigates whether defended neighborhoods findings
persist when considering indicators of strain or economic threat. Further, the chapter presents
results testing Hypotheses 7 and 8, which assert that neighborhoods experiencing poor or
worsening economic conditions will experience increases in hate crime. The following section
presents results by bias type, including baseline and full models for each bias type.
Anti-Racial/Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in White Defended and Strained Neighborhoods
The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime, specifically anti-Black,
-Hispanic, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime, in the context of white defended and strained
neighborhoods.22 The tables also include the baseline defended neighborhoods models per bias
type for comparison purposes.
Anti-Black Hate Crime
Table 4.1 presents results testing anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of white defended
and strained neighborhoods. All models in Table 3.1 are significant (p<.001). As established in
the previous chapters, results show anti-Black hate crime occurs in white defended
neighborhoods. In Table 4.1, the full models show the persistent significant effect of Black inmigration into white neighborhoods on anti-Black hate crime. Thus, the results provide further
support to defended neighborhoods, demonstrating that white neighborhoods react defensively to
an influx of Black residents. Anti-Black hate crime also occurs in neighborhoods with higher
white population levels. Combined with defended neighborhoods predictors, the last four
models (Models 2 to 5) also examine the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Black hate
crime. While unemployment is not significant in Model 2, Model 3 shows that increases in
22

Full models examining anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime are further discussed in the Terrorist Threat section.
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unemployment are associated with less anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =.939, p<.05). In the last
two models, poverty proves negatively associated with anti-Black hate crime with Model 5
evidencing a 2% reduction in anti-Black hate crime. Model 5 also shows that increasing poverty
over time is associated with increases in anti-Black hate crime (I.R.R. =1.088, p<.1). With the
exception of worsening poverty over time, neighborhoods marked by poorer economic
conditions actually experience less anti-Black hate crime.
Table 4.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.018***
1.0125*
1.009⁺
1.009*
1.011**
0.003
0.005
0.005
0.004
0.004
Change in Black Population
1.041
1.033
1.038
1.019
1.005
0.028
0.026
0.027
0.024
0.025
White*Change Black Pop.
1.002*
1.003**
1.003**
1.003**
1.003**
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.956
0.939*
0.028
0.029
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.917
0.055
Poverty Rate (%)
0.971**
0.977*
0.009
0.009
Change in Poverty
1.088⁺
0.055
Constant
2.142**
4.762*
6.789**
6.335***
5.272***
0.568
3.051
4.619
2.979
2.468
Wald χ₂
72.890***
85.59***
Log pseudolikelihood
-458.668
-457.398
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

91.12***
-456.555

102.02***
-453.473

115.22***
-451.921

Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Table 4.2 shows anti-Hispanic hate crime as an outcome in white defended and strained
neighborhoods. All models in Table 3.2 are significant (p<.001). The previous chapters
revealed support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Hispanic hate crime in white
neighborhoods. In Table 4.2, the full models show the persistent significant effect of Hispanic
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in-migration into white neighborhoods on anti-Hispanic hate crime. Thus, the results evidence a
defended neighborhoods response in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of Hispanic
residents. Anti-Hispanic hate crime also occurs in neighborhoods with higher white population
levels as well as neighborhoods experiencing Hispanic population growth. Testing defended and
strained neighborhoods, the last four models (Models 2 to 5) examine the impact of poor
economic conditions on anti-Hispanic hate crime. The impact of unemployment and worsening
unemployment over time fail to significantly explain anti-Hispanic hate crime. Model 9
demonstrates a positive association between poverty and anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R.
=1.031, p<.1). The results evidence that worsening economic conditions weakly explains
increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime.
Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.011***
1.019**
1.016*
1.018**
1.019**
0.003
0.006
0.007
0.007
0.007
Change in Hispanic Population
1.213**
1.215**
1.229***
1.229***
1.208***
0.076
0.075
0.079
0.071
0.070
White*Change Hispanic Pop.
1.005*
1.005*
1.005*
1.005*
1.005*
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
Unemployment Rate (%)
1.055
1.036
0.039
0.043
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.899
0.09
Poverty Rate (%)
1.022
1.031⁺
0.017
0.019
Change in Poverty
1.119
0.093
Constant
0.605
0.213⁺
0.307
0.238⁺
0.203*
0.220
0.172
0.269
0.189
0.165
Wald χ₂
29.19***
29.85***
Log pseudolikelihood
-235.274
-264.602
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

32.42***
-264.159

31.43***
-264.372

32.40***
-263.567

Anti-Asian Hate Crime
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Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.015***
1.004
1.000
1.022*
1.012*
0.003
0.007
0.007
0.005
0.005
Change in Asian Population
1.071
0.997
0.977
1.048
1.054
0.096
0.105
0.105
0.095
0.101
White*Change Asian Pop.
1.002
1.004
1.005
1.002
1.002
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.899⁺
0.872*
0.052
0.059
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.846
0.104
Poverty Rate (%)
0.986
0.989
0.015
0.016
Change in Poverty
1.045
0.0918
Constant
0.251***
1.421
2.499
0.422
0.387
0.088
1.332
2.739
0.263
0.238
Wald χ₂
37.97***
35.33***
Log pseudolikelihood
-232.251
-229.932
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

35.27***
-228.811

36.57***
-231.745

37.00***
-231.563

Table 4.3 investigates the impact of white defended and disorganized neighborhoods on
anti-Asian hate crime. All models in Table 4.3 are significant (p<.001). As demonstrated in the
previous chapters, defended neighborhoods fails to account for anti-Asian hate crime. The rest
of the models in Table 4.3 consistently show that defended neighborhoods fails to explain antiAsian hate crime. Thus, white neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of Asian
residents. Examining defended and strained neighborhoods, the last four models (Models 2 to 5)
examine the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Asian hate crime. The first two models
show the significant negative association between unemployment and anti-Asian hate crime.
Model 3 demonstrates that increases in unemployment are associated with a 12% decrease in
anti-Asian hate crime. Thus, neighborhoods experiencing poorer economic conditions actually
experience less anti-Asian hate crime.
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Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime
Table 4.4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.015***
1.011***
1.008**
1.011***
1.012***
0.002
0.003
0.003
0.002
0.002
Change in Nonwhite Population
1.042***
1.034**
1.040***
1.029**
1.011
0.010
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.014
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
1.001⁺
1.001*
1.001⁺
1.001*
1.001*
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.967⁺
0.954*
0.019
0.02
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.904*
0.038
Poverty Rate (%)
0.986*
0.989⁺
0.006
0.006
Change in Poverty
1.079*
0.041
Constant
5.149***
9.326***
12.439***
8.705***
8.376***
0.798
3.603
4.985
2.395
2.279
Wald χ₂
151.53***
156.84***
Log pseudolikelihood
-583.501
-582.069
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

160.39***
-579.316

160.77***
-581.153

166.14***
-579.044

Table 4.4 examines anti-nonwhite hate crime in the context of white defended and
disorganized hate crime. All models in Table 4.4 are significant (p<.001). As established in the
previous chapters, evidence demonstrates that anti-nonwhite hate crime occurs in white defended
neighborhoods. In Table 4.4, the full models show the persistent significant effect of nonwhite
in-migration into white neighborhoods on anti-nonwhite hate crime. Thus, the results evidence a
defended neighborhoods response in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite
residents. Anti-nonwhite hate crime also occurs in neighborhoods with higher white population
levels as well as those neighborhoods experiencing nonwhite population growth. Investigating
defended and strained neighborhoods, the last four models (Models 2 to 5) examine the impact of
poor economic conditions on anti-nonwhite hate crime. The first two models show the
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significant negative association between unemployment and anti-nonwhite hate crime. In Model
3, unemployment and worsening unemployment are associated with a 5% and a 10% reduction
in anti-nonwhite hate crime respectively. In the last two models, poverty proves negatively
associated with anti-nonwhite hate crime. Model 9 shows that increasing poverty over time is
associated with an 8% increase in such crimes. With the exception of worsening poverty over
time, neighborhoods marked by poorer economic conditions actually experience less antinonwhite hate crime.
Anti-Jewish and Anti-White Hate Crime in Defended and Strained Neighborhoods
The second section first examines anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of defended and
strained neighborhoods, specifically white, Black, and nonwhite neighborhoods. Models further
test the effect of Jewish visibility via the presence of Jewish buildings on anti-Jewish hate crime.
The section then presents analyses investigating anti-white hate crime as an outcome of defended
and strained neighborhoods in Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods.
Anti-Jewish Hate Crime
Table 4.5 investigates white defended and strained neighborhoods and all models are
significant (p<.001). As discussed in the previous chapter, white defended neighborhoods
explains increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. Across the full models, percent white, the
interaction term, and the presence of Jewish buildings persist in accounting for increases in antiJewish hate crime. Thus, defended neighborhoods is a consistent predictor of higher levels of
anti-Jewish hate crime in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite residents.
Increases in nonwhite populations over time also continue to explain reductions in such crimes.
The presence of Jewish buildings further accounts for significant increases in anti-Jewish hate
crime, evidencing that greater Jewish visibility accounts for higher levels of such crimes.
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Table 4.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained Neighborhoods
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Independent Variables
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)

I.R.R. (SE)
1.023***
0.006

I.R.R. (SE)
1.013***
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
1.025***
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
1.013**
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
1.029***
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
1.017***
0.003

I.R.R. (SE)
1.033***
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
1.019***
0.003

Change in Nonwhite Population

0.921***
0.019
1.003**
0.001

0.959**
0.015
1.002**
0.001
0.949⁺

0.917***
0.019
1.003**
0.001
0.933⁺

0.961*
0.015
1.002**
0.001

0.927***
0.021
1.002*
0.001

0.962*
0.016
1.002*
0.001

0.892***
0.023
1.003**
0.001

0.944***
0.017
1.002**
0.001

0.026

0.034
1.064
0.072

0.989
0.012

0.991
0.008

1.000
0.009
1.225***
0.071

0.995
0.008
1.084
0.054

2.426⁺

1.912
0.857
151.89***

1.093***
0.011
2.794**
1.004
215.13***

-582.866

-551.805

White*Change Nonwhite Population
Unemployment Rate (%)

0.923*
0.035

Change in Unemployment Rate

0.946*
0.026
0.976
0.053

Poverty Rate (%)
Change in Poverty Rate
Jewish Buildings
Constant
Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

6.429*
4.733
134.88***

1.096***
0.011
5.314***
2.719
225.61***

5.038*
3.471
133.21***

5.777***
3.034
225.35***

1.297
110.73***

1.098***
0.012
3.045**
1.117
216.07***

-587.913

-551.817

-587.461

-551.712

-590.839

-553.378
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Combining defended and strained neighborhoods, Table 4.5 also shows results
demonstrating the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Jewish hate crime. Models 1 to 4
show that unemployment is associated with a reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime. Model 7
shows that worsening poverty over time accounts for a 23% increase in anti-Jewish hate crime;
however, its significance disappears when Model 8 accounts for the presence of Jewish
buildings. Thus, the results demonstrate weak support for strained neighborhoods, impacted by
worsening poverty, experiencing higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.
Table 4.6 examines anti-Jewish hate crime in the context of Black defended and strained
neighborhoods and all models are significant (p<.001). As previously stated, results show that
higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime occur in Black defended neighborhoods. Across the full
models, percent Black is generally a significant predictor of less anti-Jewish hate crime while
most models show that increases in the white population over time accounts for significant
increases in such hate crimes The presence of Jewish buildings also persists as a significant
predictor of increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. The white in-migration interaction term remains
significant in models including the Jewish buildings indicator. Therefore, the results generally
support defended neighborhoods even when considering economic threat predictors. Black
neighborhoods react defensively to an influx of white residents by targeting Jewish victims.
Combining defended and strained neighborhoods, Table 4.6 also shows the impact of poor
economic conditions on anti-Jewish hate crime. The first four models show that unemployment
is associated with a reduction in such hate crime. Model 7 shows that worsening poverty over
time accounts for a 17% increase in anti-Jewish hate crime; however, its significance disappears
when Model 8 accounts for the presence of Jewish buildings. With the exception of worsening
poverty, anti-Jewish hate crime occurs in neighborhoods with poorer economic conditions.

96

Table 4.6: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained Neighborhoods
Independent Variables
Percent Black (%)
Change in White Population
Black*Change White Population
Unemployment Rate (%)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

I.R.R. (SE)
0.993
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
0.993*
0.003
1.024⁺

I.R.R. (SE)
0.995
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
0.995
0.003

I.R.R. (SE)
0.985**
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
0.989***
0.003

I.R.R. (SE)
0.983***
0.005

1.049*
0.022
1.002⁺
0.001

1.018
0.013
1.002**
0.001

1.068**
0.024
1.002
0.001

1.031*
0.015
1.002***
0.001

1.095**
0.032
1.001
0.001

I.R.R. (SE)
0.989***
0.003
1.037⁺

0.841***
0.018
0.907
0.060

0.907***
0.016
0.911
0.053
0.955***
0.009

0.972***
0.006

0.960***
0.008
1.172*
0.076

0.973***
0.006
1.029
0.055

28.185***
8.317
73.76***

1.119***
0.012
12.138***
2.777
179.13***

31.214***
10.175
85.80***

1.118***
0.013
12.485***
2.965
180.51***

-612.669

-560.813

-608.681

-560.626

1.055**
0.022
1.002*
0.001
0.848***
0.018

0.014
1.002***
0.001
0.914***
0.017

Change in Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate (%)
Change in Poverty Rate
Jewish Buildings
Constant
Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

53.582***
16.179
117.07***

1.111***
0.012
16.368***
4.248
197.88***

57.925***
17.427
142.35***

1.110***
0.012
17.401***
4.571
206.95***

-602.203

-557.787

-601.194

-556.27

0.019
1.002**
0.001
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Table 4.7 examines anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of nonwhite defended and
strained neighborhoods. As shown in the previous chapters, nonwhite neighborhoods
experiencing an influx of white residents experience more anti-Jewish hate crime, supporting
defended neighborhoods. Across the full models, nonwhite population level significantly
predicts less anti-Jewish hate crime while models show that white population growth over time
accounts for significant increases in such hate crimes. The significance and direction of the white
in-migration predictor, as well as the presence of Jewish buildings indicator, similarly holds
across the models. Therefore, the results generally support defended neighborhoods even when
considering economic threat predictors. Nonwhite neighborhoods react defensively to an influx
of white residents by targeting Jewish victims. Thus, the results show that defended
neighborhoods proves to be a consistent predictor of anti-Jewish hate crime in nonwhite
neighborhoods. Further, Jewish visibility similarly persists in account for higher levels of antiJewish hate crime. Examining defended and strained neighborhoods, results also demonstrate
the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Jewish hate crime. The first four models show
that unemployment is associated with a reduction in anti-Jewish hate crime. Model 7 shows that
worsening poverty over time accounts for a 22.5% increase in anti-Jewish hate crime; however,
this predictor’s significance disappears when Model 8 accounts for the presence of Jewish
buildings. Despite the weak support for worsening poverty being associated with anti-Jewish
hate crime, the evidence more strongly refutes the hypothesis that neighborhoods with poorer
economic conditions would experience higher levels of such crime.
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Table 4.7: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Jewish Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & Strained Neighborhoods
Independent Variables
Percent Nonwhite (%)
Change in White Population
Nonwhite*Change White Population
Unemployment Rate (%)

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

I.R.R. (SE)
0.978***
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
0.987***
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
0.976***
0.005

I.R.R. (SE)
0.987**
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
0.971***
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
0.983***
0.003

I.R.R. (SE)
0.968***
0.004

I.R.R. (SE)
0.982***
0.003

1.086***
0.023
1.003**
0.001

1.043**
0.016
1.002**
0.001

1.090***
0.023
1.003**
0.001

1.04*
0.016
1.002**
0.001

1.079***
0.024
1.002*
0.001

1.039*
0.017
1.002*
0.001

1.121***
0.029
1.003**
0.001

1.059***
0.019
1.002**
0.001

0.923*
0.035

0.949⁺
0.026

0.933⁺
0.034
1.064
0.072

0.946*
0.026
0.976
0.053
0.989
0.012

0.991
0.008

1.000
0.009
1.225***
0.071

0.995
0.008
1.084
0.054

44.139***
11.980
110.73***

1.098***
0.012
16.298***
3.683
216.07***

49.515***
14.652
151.89***

1.093***
0.011
18.067***
4.202
215.13***

-590.839

-553.378

-582.866

-551.805

Change in Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate (%)
Change in Poverty Rate
Jewish Buildings
Constant
Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

61.900***
20.236
134.88***

1.096***
0.011
20.244***
5.369
225.61***

59.616***
18.714
133.21***

1.097***
0.011
20.358***
5.435
225.35***

-587.913

-551.817

-587.461

-551.712
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Anti-White Hate Crime23
Table 4.8: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
1.014**
1.023***
1.023***
1.019***
1.019***
0.005
0.006
0.006
0.005
0.005
Change in White Population
0.969
0.99
0.991
0.996
0.989
Black*Change White Pop.

0.020
0.997*
0.001

Unemployment Rate (%)

0.022
0.997*
0.001
0.913***
0.023

Change in Unemployment Rate

0.022
0.997*
0.001
0.913***
0.023

0.022
0.997*
0.001

0.026
0.997*
0.001

0.974**
0.009

0.973**
0.010
0.966

1.007
0.085

Poverty Rate (%)
Change in Poverty Rate
Constant
Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=177

1.828⁺
0.637
13.03*
-310.835

4.997***
2.088
24.27***
-305.674

4.976***
2.084
24.34***
-305.671

3.626**
1.512
19.42**
-307.539

0.078
3.559**
1.458
19.96**
-307.449

⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

Table 4.8 presents the results examining anti-white hate crime as an outcome of Black
defended and disorganized neighborhoods. The models in Table 4.8 are all significant. As
discussed in the previous chapter, Black neighborhoods seeing an influx of white residents
actually experience less anti-white hate crime, refuting defended neighborhoods in the context of
Black neighborhoods. Across Table 4.8, the full models continue to show how white inmigration into Black neighborhoods accounts for less anti-white crime. The full models however
do continue to show that higher Black population levels are associated with higher levels of anti-

23

The first model across the three tables includes the baseline defended neighborhoods model for comparison
purposes.
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white hate crime. Combing defended and strained neighborhoods, Models 2 to 5 examine the
impact of poor economic conditions on anti-white hate crime. The first two models show that
unemployment is associated with a 9% reduction in anti-white hate crime. The last two models
evidence a significant negative association between poverty and anti-white hate crime. Thus,
anti-white hate crime proves more prevalent in neighborhoods experiencing better economic
conditions.
Table 4.9: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Nonwhite Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
Percent Nonwhite(%)
Change in White Population
Nonwhite*Change White Pop.

I.R.R. (SE)
0.997
0.004
1.005
0.028

I.R.R. (SE)
1.002
0.006
1.015
0.029

I.R.R. (SE)
0.998
0.007
1.029
0.032

I.R.R. (SE)
1.001
0.005
1.019
0.031

I.R.R. (SE)
1.000
0.005
1.028
0.039

0.999
0.001

1.000
0.001
0.958
0.043

1.001
0.001
0.971
0.044
1.172⁺
0.096

1.000
0.001

1.000
0.001

0.984
0.014

Unemployment Rate (%)
Change in Unemployment Rate
Poverty Rate (%)

2.757**

3.642**

3.489**

3.510**

0.986
0.015
1.036
0.086
3.592**

1.091
1.510
-315.382

1.709
2.570
-314.969

1.623
5.71
-313.764

1.522
2.89
-314.777

1.588
2.910
-314.693

Change in Poverty Rate
Constant
Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

Table 4.9 presents results testing nonwhite defended and strained neighborhoods to
explain anti-white hate crime. Across all models, the defended neighborhoods predictors using
percent nonwhite fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime. All models fail to achieve
significance.
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Table 4.10: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-White Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Hispanic (%)
0.981***
0.978**
0.976***
0.975**
0.975**
0.005
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.008
Change in White Population
1.013
1.001
1.011
0.990
1.000
Hispanic*Change White Pop.

0.023
1.000
0.002

0.025
0.999
0.002
1.029
0.034

Unemployment Rate (%)
Change in Unemployment Rate

0.027
1.000
0.002
1.029
0.034

0.027
0.999
0.002

0.035
1.000
0.002

1.017
0.015

1.018
0.015
1.037

1.168⁺
0.093

Poverty Rate (%)
Change in Poverty Rate
Constant
Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=177

4.011***
1.491
13.80**
-309.551

2.937*
1.344
14.22*
-309.023

2.877*
1.302
17.26**
-307.556

2.783*
1.201
14.91*
-308.681

0.086
2.895*
1.278
15.26*
-308.586

⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

Table 4.10 investigates anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic defended and
strained neighborhoods. All models in the table are significant. As previously stated, defended
neighborhoods fails to explain anti-white hate crime in the context of Hispanic neighborhoods.
The full models in Table 4.10 continue to support the conclusion that Hispanic neighborhoods do
not react defensively to an influx of white residents into the neighborhood. Results show that
increases in the Hispanic population continue to be associated with decreases in anti-white hate
crime. In the combined Hispanic defended and strained neighborhoods models, economic threat
variables largely fail to significantly explain anti-white hate crime. Model 3 however shows that
worsening unemployment over time is associated with a 17% increase in anti-white hate crime
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(p<.1). Thus, there is weak evidence demonstrating that anti-white hate crime occurs in
neighborhoods undergoing worsening economic conditions.
Anti-Racial Ethnic Minority Hate Crime in Nonwhite Defended and Strained
Neighborhoods
Lastly, the third section examines anti-racial/ethnic hate crime, specifically anti-Black, Hispanic, and –Asian hate crime, in nonwhite defended and strained neighborhoods. Tables
include the baseline models for defended neighborhoods and strain presented previously for
comparison purposes.
Anti-Black Hate Crime
Table 4.11: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Asian Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Asian (%)
0.996
0.970**
0.968**
0.978⁺
0.978⁺
0.009
0.011
0.011
0.012
0.012
Change in Black Population
1.096⁺
1.052
1.057
1.049
1.049
0.061
0.054
0.053
0.053
0.054
Asian*Change Black Pop.
0.995
1.002
1.002
1.003
1.004
0.012
0.012
0.011
0.011
0.012
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.886***
0.879***
0.016
0.015
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.843**
0.047
Poverty Rate (%)
0.952***
0.954
0.007
0.007
Change in Poverty
1.036
0.051
Constant
6.156***
25.878***
29.311***
18.799***
18.357***
1.616
8.114
9.029
5.486
5.500
Wald χ₂
20.27***
54.96***
Log pseudolikelihood
-482.491
-461.865
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

75.91***
-457.949

63.96***
-458.547

64.02***
-458.282

Table 4.11 investigates anti-Black hate crime in the context of Asian defended and
strained communities and all models are significant (p<.001). As stated in the previous chapters,
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there is no support for defended neighborhoods in the baseline model. Across the rest of the full
model, this finding persists as Black in-migration into Asian neighborhoods fails to account for
anti-Black hate crime. Thus, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-Black hate crime in
Asian neighborhoods. Additionally, full models show that Asian population levels are
significantly associated with less anti-Black hate crime. Models 2 to 5 present results for the
combined defended and strained neighborhoods models. The first two models show that
unemployment and worsening unemployment over time are negatively associated with antiBlack hate crime. Model 4 shows a significant negative relationship between poverty and such
crimes; however, that finding loses significance when worsening poverty over time is added to
Model 5.
Table 4.12: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Hispanic (%)
0.973***
0.979***
0.981***
0.983**
0.983**
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.006
Change in Black Population
1.066⁺
1.035
1.039
1.023
1.008
0.037
0.037
0.038
0.037
0.036
Hispanic*Change Black Pop.
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.998
0.997
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.953*
0.946*
0.021
0.021
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.869*
0.048
Poverty Rate (%)
0.974**
0.978*
0.009
0.009
Change in Poverty
1.062
0.051
Constant
10.865***
16.021***
17.662***
15.223***
14.537***
2.813
4.593
5.120
4.062
4.045
Wald χ₂
72.78***
85.67***
Log pseudolikelihood
-459.973
-457.370
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

91.07***
-454.732

89.68***
-455.695

91.43***
-454.939
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Table 4.12 turns to anti-Black hate crime as an outcome of Hispanic defended and
strained communities. All models are significant (p<.001). As previously stated, results provide
no support for defended neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic
neighborhoods. Table 4.12 shows that Black in-migration into Hispanic neighborhood continues
to be an insignificant predictor of anti-Black hate crime. Therefore, defended neighborhoods
fails to account for anti-Black hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods. The full models also
reveal that Hispanic population levels continue to be associated with less anti-Black hate crime.
Thus, Hispanic neighborhoods experience lower levels of such crimes. When economic threat
variables are added to the models (Models 2 to 5), results show that poor and worsening
economic conditions lead to lower levels of anti-Black hate crime. In Models 2 and 3, results
show that higher unemployment and worsening unemployment over time account for reductions
in such crimes. The last two models evidence a significant negative association between poverty
and anti-Black hate crime. Thus, the results in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 both show that anti-Black
hate crime occurs in neighborhoods with better economic conditions.
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Table 4.13 presents results for anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Asian defended
and strained communities. As previously stated, defended neighborhoods fails to explain antiHispanic hate crime in Asian neighborhoods. In fact, an influx of Hispanic residents into Asian
neighborhoods is associated with significantly less hate crime. The full models show this finding
persists when economic threat predictors are considered. Thus, results demonstrate that Asian
neighborhoods do not respond defensively to Hispanic in-migration. Hispanic population growth
over time however continues to explain higher levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime. Models 2 to 5
present results for the combined defended and strained neighborhoods models. The first two
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models show that unemployment and worsening unemployment over time are negatively
associated with anti-Hispanic hate crime. Model 4 shows a significant negative relationship
between poverty and such crimes; however, that finding loses significance when worsening
poverty over time is added to Model 5. Model 5 also shows that worsening poverty over time is
associated with a 16% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.158, p<.1).
Table 4.13: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Asian Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Asian (%)
0.979
0.962⁺
0.957⁺
0.967⁺
0.964⁺
0.016
0.020
0.021
0.019
0.019
Change in Hispanic Population
1.249***
1.221***
1.246***
1.204**
1.170**
0.073
0.072
0.074
0.071
0.071
Asian*Change Hispanic Pop.
0.984*
0.982*
0.981*
0.981*
0.979*
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.009
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.927**
0.915***
0.024
0.023
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.769**
0.071
Poverty Rate (%)
0.973**
0.981
0.010
0.011
Change in Poverty
1.158⁺
Constant

0.820
0.286

2.611*
1.278

Wald χ₂
21.66***
25.56***
Log pseudolikelihood
-268.614
-264.584
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

3.124*
1.524

2.050
0.928

1.930
0.902

32.50***
-261.438

20.66***
-264.929

23.06***
-263.492

Table 4.14 investigates anti-Hispanic hate crime in the context of Black defended and
disorganized neighborhoods. As shown in the previous chapters, defended neighborhoods fails
to account for anti-Hispanic hate crime in Black neighborhoods. The full models show that
Black in-migration into Hispanic neighborhoods persists in failing to explain anti-Hispanic hate
crime. Thus, there is some evidence that Black neighborhoods do react defensively with hate
crime in response to an influx of Hispanic residents; however this is the weakest of the findings
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supporting defended neighborhoods as all findings are only significant at the 0.1 level. The full
models do demonstrate that Hispanic population growth continues to be associated with
significant increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime. When economic threat variables are added to
the models (Models 2 to 5), poor and worsening economic conditions are shown to lead to lower
levels of anti-Hispanic hate crime. Model 6 shows that higher unemployment and worsening
unemployment over time account for reductions in such crimes. Model 8 also shows that
worsening poverty over time is associated with an 18% increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime
(I.R.R. =1.184, p<.1). Despite weak evidence demonstrating that neighborhoods experiencing
worsening poverty see increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime, Tables 4.13 and 4.14 both show
that such hate crimes generally occur in neighborhoods with better economic conditions.
Table 4.14: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
0.991*
0.997
1.001
0.995
0.994
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.005
0.005
Change in Hispanic Population
1.297***
1.298***
1.330***
1.290***
1.271***
0.078
0.077
0.083
0.076
0.075
Black*Change in Hispanic Pop.
1.003
1.003
1.004⁺
1.004⁺
1.005⁺
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.002
0.003
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.955
.932*
0.030
0.029
Change in Unemployment Rate
.792*
0.083
Poverty Rate (%)
0.982
0.992
0.012
0.014
Change in Poverty
1.184⁺
0.112
Constant
0.925
1.518
1.817
1.389
1.252
0.341
0.677
0.787
0.579
0.549
Wald χ₂
24.56***
25.76***
Log pseudolikelihood
-270.024
-269.003
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

26.65***
-267.027

25.53***
-268.865

28.11***
-2667.295
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Anti-Asian Hate Crime
Table 4.15: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Black Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Black (%)
0.979**
0.986
0.988
0.981*
0.981*
0.008
0.009
0.009
0.008
0.009
Change in Asian Population
0.896
0.811⁺
0.785⁺
.817⁺
0.818⁺
0.115
0.099
0.099
0.098
0.099
Black*Change Asian Pop.
0.989*
0.986**
0.985**
0.986**
0.986**
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.889***
0.873***
0.025
0.026
Change in Unemployment Rate
.812*
0.080
Poverty Rate (%)
.969**
.969**
0.011
0.011
Change in Poverty
1.005
0.082
Constant
0.876
3.235**
4.045***
1.946⁺
1.932⁺
0.310
1.338
1.696
0.752
0.746
Wald χ₂
33.14***
46.63***
Log pseudolikelihood
-234.706
-227.894
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

49.57***
-226.038

35.38***
-229.992

38.72***
-229.989

Table 4.15 examines anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of Black defended and strained
communities. As previously stated, the baseline defended neighborhoods model fails to explain
anti-Asian hate crime as a result of Black defended neighborhoods and that Asian in-migration
into Black neighborhoods actually results in less anti-Asian hate crime. When social
disorganization predictors are considered, this finding persists across the full models. Thus,
Black neighborhoods do not react defensively to an influx of Asian residents and there is less
anti-Asian hate crime in these neighborhoods. The full models also show that Asian population
growth is a significant predictor of less anti-Asian hate crime (p<.1). Models 2 to 5 present
results for the combined defended and strained neighborhoods models. The first two models
show that unemployment and worsening unemployment over time are negatively associated with
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anti-Asian hate crime. The last two models reveals that increases in poverty levels are
significantly associated with a 3% reduction in anti-Asian hate crime (I.R.R. =0.969, p<.01).
Table 4.16: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Hispanic Defended & Strained
Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Hispanic (%)
.978***
.985⁺
.985⁺
.981*
.980*
0.006
0.009
0.009
0.009
0.008
Change in Asian Population
1.185⁺
1.121
1.103
1.164
1.164
0.113
0.119
0.119
0.111
0.110
Hispanic*Change Asian Pop.
1.004
1.003
1.002
1.004
1.004
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.938
.931⁺
0.038
0.039
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.867
0.087
Poverty Rate (%)
0.991
0.995
0.014
0.014
Change in Poverty
1.058
0.089
Constant
0.865
1.605
1.794
1.008
0.959
0.261
0.687
0.793
0.375
0.356
Wald χ₂
30.15***
39.12***
Log pseudolikelihood
-231.005
-229.127
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R. = Incident Rate Ratio; SE = Robust Standard Errors

37.26***
-228.179

31.13***
-230.746

33.13***
-230.434

Table 4.16 presents results for models testing anti-Asian hate crime as an outcome of
Hispanic defended and strained communities. As shown in the previous chapters, defended
neighborhoods does not account for anti-Asian hate crime in Hispanic neighborhoods.
Accounting for social disorganization, the full models show that Asian in-migration into
Hispanic neighborhoods persistently fails to explain anti-Asian hate crime. Therefore, results
fail to uncover a defended neighborhoods response in Hispanic neighborhoods when there is an
influx of Asian residents. When economic threat variables are added (Models 2 to 5), Model 3
shows the only significant finding demonstrating that higher unemployment is associated with
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less anti-Asian hate crime (p<.1). Both Tables 4.15 and 4.16 generally show that neighborhoods
experiencing better economic conditions witness higher levels of anti-Asian hate crime.
Summary
This chapter aimed to test hate crime as an outcome of defended and strained
neighborhoods models. The first section examines anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the
context of white defended and strained neighborhoods. The results show that defended
neighborhoods remains a consistent predictor of anti-Black, -Hispanic, and -nonwhite hate crime
when economic threat indicators are considered. The findings also consistently reveal that antiBlack, -Asian, and –nonwhite hate crime is generally more likely to occur in neighborhoods with
better economic conditions.
The second section investigates anti-Jewish and –white hate crime in the context of a
variety of defended and strained contexts. The results show that defended neighborhoods proves
consistently predict higher levels of anti-Jewish hate crime in white, Black, and nonwhite
neighborhoods. This finding is strongest in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of
nonwhite residents and nonwhite neighborhoods undergoing white in-migration. White
population growth over time is also associated with increases in anti-Jewish hate crime. Jewish
visibility remains a consistent predictor of significantly greater levels of anti-Jewish hate crime.
The effect of defended neighborhoods persists even when accounting for the impact of economic
threat. The results also generally show that anti-Jewish hate crime is more common in
neighborhoods experiencing better economic conditions.
As for anti-white hate crime, defended neighborhoods consistently fails to explain such
hate crimes in the context of Black, nonwhite, and Hispanic neighborhoods. The result reveal
that white in-migration into Black neighborhoods consistently results in less anti-white hate
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crime. While white neighborhoods react defensively to an influx of minorities, nonwhite
neighborhoods do not share this defensive reaction when experiencing white in-migration. As
for economic threat, there is stronger support refuting the hypothesis that neighborhoods with
poorer economic conditions will experience more anti-white hate crime.
The third section ends with analyses testing anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime as an
outcome of defended and strained neighborhoods in Asian, Hispanic, and Black neighborhoods.
As the results generally demonstrate, defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-racial/ethnic
minority hate crime when such neighborhoods experience an influx of another racial/ethnic
minority even when considering social disorganization predictors. The results conform to the
trend of hate crime generally occurring in communities with better economic conditions no
matter bias type or neighborhood context.

111

CHAPTER EIGHT: TERRORIST THREAT RESULTS: ANTI-ARAB MUSLIM HATE
CRIME IN DEFENDED, DISORGANIZED, AND STRAINED NEIGHBORHOODS
This chapter aims to test a variety of models to explain anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. 24
Testing Hypothesis 11, both sections investigate terrorist threat models by testing the impact of
the September 11th attacks in 2001 on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in the time period after. 25
Using anti-Arab/Muslim as the dependent variable, the first section tests hypotheses stemming
from defended neighborhoods and social disorganization theories. The second section examines
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in the context of defended and strained neighborhoods.
Defended and Disorganized Neighborhoods
Table 5.1: Negative Binomial Regressions for AntiArab/Muslim Hate Crime with Social Disorganization
Model 1
Model 2
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.113***
0.099***
0.027
0.023
Residential Instability
0.974**
0.961***
0.009
0.009
Diversity Index
2.043*
1.773⁺
0.668
0.579
Post-2000
1.466***
0.171
Constant
26.395***
42.940***
13.298
21.966
Wald χ₂
91.02***
110.79***
Log pseudolikelihood
-461.289
-455.721
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

Table 5.1 provides the baseline models that examine social disorganization predictors
apart from defended neighborhoods predictors. There are significant negative associations

As stated previously, this measure follows Disha et al.’s (2011) study, using a proxy measure for anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. This proxy
measure contains all crimes labelled by the NYPD as anti-Other, anti-Ethnic, anti-Religion, and anti-American Indian. Analyses were run with
and without the anti-American Indian hate crime and the results remained largely the same with the exception of the Post-2000 indicator failing to
reach significance in the analyses without anti-American Indian hate crime. See Limitations for a further discussion of this measure.
25
Models were run with the Islamic buildings indicator to test Hypothesis 11; however the predictor never achieved significance, so those models
are not presented.
24
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between concentrated disadvantage (I.R.R. =.113, p<.001) and residential instability (I.R.R.
=.974, p<.01) and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Diversity is also associated with large increases
in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =2.043, p<.05). Model 2 includes a Post-2000 indicator
to capture the effect of 9/11 and shows a 47% increase in anti-Arab/Muslim crime after 9/11.
Table 5.2 combines social disorganization and defended neighborhoods predictors,
examining white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of nonwhite residents. All models are
significant (p<.001). As discussed in the first chapter, the first two baseline defended
neighborhoods models provide no support for defended neighborhoods. The full models in
Table 5.2 continue to show no association between non-white in-migration into white
neighborhoods and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Thus, anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime does not
occur in white neighborhoods undergoing nonwhite in-migration. The models do show the
persistent positive effect of nonwhite population change on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, with
the exception of Model 9. The full models also continue to show significantly large increases in
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000. Across all models, concentrated disadvantage remains
significant and negatively associated with such crimes. The significant negative relationship
between residential instability and hate crime persists, but only in models accounting for the
post-2000 period. While diversity is shown to be associated with more anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime, such crimes are generally shown to occur in socially organized communities.
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Table 5.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with White Defended & Disorganized Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.012***
1.013***
1.004
1.005
1.004
1.005
1.009*
1.009*
0.002
0.002
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
0.004
Change in Nonwhite Population
1.049***
1.055***
1.035**
1.041***
1.030*
1.034**
1.016
1.021⁺
0.014
0.013
0.014
0.013
0.013
0.012
0.013
0.012
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
0.999
0.999
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.001
1.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.274*
0.304*
0.232**
0.229**
0.355*
0.334*
0.144
0.153
0.121
0.111
0.185
0.166
Residential Instability
0.985
0.972**
0.985
0.973**
0.009
0.009
0.009
0.009
Diversity Index
3.145**
2.702*
1.382
1.207
Post-2000
1.432***
1.412***
1.555***
1.507***
0.154
0.149
0.178
0.170
Constant
2.478***
1.902***
5.941***
4.292***
13.608***
18.348***
5.005*
7.469**
0.468
0.369
2.398
1.666***
8.800
11.055
3.919
5.758
Wald χ₂
88.46***
106.54***
97.59***
116.70***
101.86***
126.30***
101.55***
120.91***
Log pseudolikelihood
-464.487
-459.093
-461.714
-456.640
-460.608
-452.959
-456.668
-449.846
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error
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Table 5.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with White Defended & Strained Neighborhoods
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.009**
1.009**
1.006⁺
1.007*
1.010***
1.011***
1.011***
1.012***
0.003
0.003
0.004
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
0.003
Change in Nonwhite Population
1.042**
1.048***
1.050***
1.055***
1.042**
1.048***
1.023
1.022
0.014
0.014
0.013
0.013
0.0149
0.014
0.017
0.016
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
0.999
1.000
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999
1.000
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
Unemployment Rate (%)
0.973
0.975
0.957⁺
0.960⁺
0.022
0.022
0.023
0.023
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.869*
0.878*
0.05
0.049
Poverty Rate (%)
0.992
0.993
0.995
0.997
0.007
0.007
0.007
0.007
Change in Poverty Rate
1.083⁺
1.119**
0.045
0.045
Post-2000
1.428***
1.356**
1.428***
1.510***
0.152
0.148
0.153
0.157
Constant
3.981**
2.956*
5.636***
4.150**
3.276***
2.439**
3.308***
2.366**
1.738
1.280
2.578
1.916
1.046
0.800
1.056
0.769
Wald χ₂
88.87***
109.61***
92.06***
115.44***
89.33***
109.75***
96.19***
125.92***
Log pseudolikelihood
-463.812
-458.482
-459.801
-454.941
-463.980
-458.679
-462.307
-455.293
N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error
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Defended and Strained Neighborhoods
Table 5.3 examines the impact of poor economic conditions on anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime. Across all models, percent white continues to be significant and positively associated
with hate crime. Increasing nonwhite populations over time persists as a significant positive
predictor of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime across most models. Defended neighborhoods
however fails to explain to such crimes. Once again, the post-2000 indicator accounts for a large
increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime after 9/11 in all models. Models 3 and 4 show
significant negative associations between unemployment and hate crime. In Model 4,
unemployment and worsening unemployment are associated with a 4% and a 12% reduction in
such hate crimes respectively. In Models 7 and 8, worsening poverty over time proves
negatively associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Model 8 shows that increasing poverty
over time is associated with a 12% increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Thus, the impact of
poor and worsening economic conditions on anti-Arab/Muslim is decidedly mixed.
Summary
This chapter examined anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in defended, disorganized, and
strained neighborhoods in the larger terrorist threat context. Both sections show overwhelming
support for the terrorist threat model, evidencing a substantial increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime after 2000. Both sections further demonstrate no support for defended neighborhoods.
Examining defended and disorganized communities, the first section shows socially organized
communities experience more anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Testing defended and strained
neighborhoods, the second section provides more mixed evidence on the effect of economic
threat on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, though there is stronger evidence to suggest
neighborhoods with better economic conditions experience higher levels of such crimes.
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CHAPTER NINE: GAY THREAT RESULTS: ANTI-GAY HATE CRIME IN
DISORGANIZED AND STRAINED NEIGHBORHOODS
This chapter presents results testing hypotheses 13 to 16. First, results examine whether
gay population levels and gay population growth over time are associated with increases in antigay hate crime. The second section investigates gay threat in the context of social
disorganization. The third section presents results testing gay threat in the context of strained
neighborhoods. All results are shown in Table 6.1 and all models are significant.
Gay Threat
Model 1 shows the baseline “gay threat” model showing a significant positive association
between the percent gay population and anti-gay hate crime, demonstrating a 75% increase in
such crimes. Model 2 is a baseline model that examines all three social disorganization
predictors apart from the gay demographic variables. There is a significant negative association
between concentrated disadvantage and anti-gay hate crime (I.R.R. =.309, p<.001).
Gay Threat and Disorganized Neighborhoods
The next three models (Models 3 to 5) combine gay demographic and social
disorganization predictors. All three models show the persistent positive effect of percent gay.
Gay population change also becomes significant with an increase in the gay population over time
being associated with large increases in anti-gay hate crime. Across all models, concentrated
disadvantage is a significant predictor of anti-gay hate crime; however, it is now associated with
large increases in anti-gay hate crime. It bears noting that Model 2 has an N=177 while the other
models are limited to an N=59.
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Table 6.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Gay Hate Crime with Gay Threat, Disorganization, & Economic Threat
Model 1
Model 2ª
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Independent Variables
I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE) I.R.R. (SE)
Percent Gay (%)
1.753***
2.173***
2.159***
2.163***
2.098***
2.087***
2.024***
0.292
0.429
0.430
0.425
0.399
0.365
0.364
Change in Gay Population
2.903
4.633*
4.354*
4.075*
4.221*
3.571⁺
3.916*
1.909
3.138
2.741
2.418
2.692
2.509
2.301
Concentrated Disadvantage
0.309***
3.547***
3.676**
3.529**
0.112
1.387
1.608
1.576
Residential Instability
0.995
1.008
1.009
0.017
0.024
0.024
Diversity Index
0.747
0.777
0.433
0.471
Unemployment Rate (%)
1.059**
1.034
0.02
0.031
Change in Unemployment Rate
0.906
0.08
Poverty Rate (%)
1.025**
0.009
Change in Poverty Rate
Constant

1.792
0.679
50.22***
-142.262

Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=59
ª Model 2: N=177
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

19.735***
17.909
12.42*
-497.020

0.653
0.352
38.16***
-138.024

0.429
0.546
42.14***
-137.939

0.485
0.628
53.91***
-137.857

0.530
0.328
38.37***
-138.001

0.648
0.416
50.26***
-137.465

0.673
0.407
38.64***
-138.249

Model 9
I.R.R. (SE)
1.992***
0.353
3.516⁺
2.279

1.019⁺
0.010
0.936
0.083
0.739
0.445
39.18***
-137.962
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Gay Threat and Strained Neighborhoods
The last four models (Models 6 to 9) examine the impact of poor economic conditions on
anti-gay hate crime. Across all four models, both gay demographic predictors remain significant
and positively associated with anti-gay hate crime. Model 6 shows that unemployment
significantly explains a 5% increase in anti-gay hate crime; however, this effect loses
significance in Model 7. Models 8 and 9 demonstrate that poverty proves negatively associated
with anti-gay hate crime, with a 3% and 2% increase in anti-gay hate crime respectively. Thus
anti-gay hate crime is more prevalent in neighborhoods with poorer economic conditions.
Summary
This chapter aimed to investigate antigay hate crime in disorganized and strained
neighborhoods in the larger context of gay threat. Across all sections, gay demographics are
shown to consistently predict higher levels of anti-gay hate crime. The second section shows
that anti-gay hate crime occurs in more disadvantaged communities. While the previous chapters
demonstrate that most hate crime occurs in socially organized communities, results demonstrate
that social disorganization impacts anti-gay hate crime differently. The last section also shows
that anti-gay hate crime occurs in neighborhoods marked by poorer economic conditions. Thus,
economic conditions also influence anti-gay hate crime differently compared to other bias types.
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CHAPTER TEN: POLITICAL THREAT RESULTS
The final chapter presents analyses testing hypotheses 8 to 10, stemming from political
threat models while accounting for defended neighborhoods variables as well. The political
threat models examine the impact of the percent of registered Republicans (and other
conservative parties), the percent vote for a Democrat in a mayoral and a presidential election,
and the interaction terms between percent Republican and percent Democratic electoral vote. To
reiterate, the mayoral election resulted in a Republican candidate winning reelection, while the
presidential election resulted in a Democratic candidate winning reelection. Each of the
following sections discusses these models by hate crime outcomes by bias type.
Table 7.1: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Black Hate Crime with Political Threat
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
Change in Black Population
White*Change Black Pop.
Percent Republican (%)
Percent Democrat Mayoral Vote (%)
% Republican*Democrat Mayoral Vote

1.095*
0.051
1.021
0.018

% Republican*Democrat Presidential Vote

Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

1.012
0.009
1.099
0.104
1.005

1.028*
0.013
1.018
0.074
1.005

1.010
0.009
1.089
0.104
1.006⁺

0.003
0.982
0.033

0.003
1.099*
0.047
1.056*
0.023

0.004
1.033
0.049

1.003⁺
0.002

Percent Democrat Presidential Vote

Constant

1.054
0.047

I.R.R.(SE)

0.718
1.120
8.10⁺
-123.508

1.004**
0.001
1.005
0.019
1.001

1.014
0.019
1.001

0.001
1.907
4.109
4.150
-124.078

0.001
0.849
1.862
9.960
-122.224

4.352
2.969
8.650
-123.084

0.0436⁺
0.079
14.33*
-119.989

N=55
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error
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Anti-Black Hate Crime
Table 7.1 shows results for political threat models, along with defended neighborhoods
predictors, with anti-Black hate crime as the dependent variable. The only significant models
were Model 1 (p<.1) and Model 4 (p<.05). Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the
political threat variables related to the mayoral election. The results show that an increase in the
percent of registered Republicans is associated with approximately a 10% increase in anti-Black
hate crime. There is also a significant positive association between the interaction term between
percent Republican and the percent vote for a Democratic candidate and hate crime (I.R.R.
=1.003, p<.1). When defended neighborhoods variables are added, the results similarly persist;
however, the percent Democratic vote is now significant and positively associated with hate
crime as shown in Model 4 (I.R.R. =1.056, p<.05). Of the defended neighborhoods variables in
the political threat models, only percent non-Hispanic white maintains significance.
Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime
Table 7.2 shows results for political threat models, along with defended neighborhoods
predictors, with anti-Hispanic hate crime as the dependent variable. In Table 27, all models are
significant. Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the political threat variables related to
the mayoral election. The results show that an increase in the percent of registered Republicans
and the percent vote for the Democratic mayoral candidate is associated with a 45% and 15%
increase in anti-Hispanic hate crime respectively. There is also a significant positive association
between the interaction term between percent Republican and the percent vote for a Democratic
candidate and anti-Hispanic hate crime (I.R.R. =1.008, p<.001). When defended neighborhoods
variables are added to the models, the significance and direction of the predictors in the mayoral
political threat model remain the same as shown in Model 4. Of the defended neighborhoods
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variables in the political threat models, only Hispanic population change maintains significance,
accounting for large increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime in Models 3 and 5.
Table 7.2: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Hispanic Hate Crime with Political Threat
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)

% Republican*Democrat Mayoral Vote

0.025
1.451**
0.176
1.006
0.006
1.242

0.132
1.174***
0.053
1.007***
0.053

0.309

0.121
1.145***
0.043
1.008***
0.002

0.306

0.063

.000**

1.159
0.140
1.001
0.002
0.000

1.524

0.000***

1.137
0.166
0.999
0.001
0.000

0.000
25.66***
-58.149

0.000
9.60*
-61.863

1.994
15.85**
-60.809

0.000
35.65***
-56.954

0.000
22.64**
-59.106

% Republican*Democrat Presidential Vote

Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood

0.029
1.178
0.127
0.998
0.006
1.362***

1.409

Percent Democrat Presidential Vote

Constant

1.008

1.451***

White*Change Hispanic Pop.

Percent Democrat Mayoral Vote (%)

1.035

0.024
1.528**
0.211
1.006
0.006
1.025

Change in Hispanic Population

Percent Republican (%)

0.997

N=55
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

Anti-Asian Hate Crime
Table 7.3 shows the results for political threat models, along with defended
neighborhoods predictors, with anti-Asian hate crime as the dependent variable. In Table 29, all
models are significant. Model 1 and Model 2 are baseline models that include only the political
threat variables related to the mayoral and presidential election respectively. Model 1 shows
there is a significant positive association between the mayoral interaction term and anti-nonwhite
hate crime (I.R.R. =1.003, p<.1). In Model 2, the results show that an increase in the percent of
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registered Republicans is associated with an 11% increase in such hate crime. There is also a
significant positive relationship between the presidential interaction term and anti-Asian hate
crime (I.R.R. =1.002, p<.05). When defended neighborhoods variables are added to the models,
the significance and direction of the predictors in the baseline models similarly persist; however,
percent Republican is now a significant predictor of increases in anti-nonwhite hate crime in the
full presidential political threat model as shown in Model 5. Of the defended neighborhoods
variables in the political threat models, only the in-migration interaction term is significant
(I.R.R. =1.013, p<.1) in Model 4.
Table 7.3: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Asian Hate Crime with Political Threat
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
1.013
0.978
1.003
Change in Asian Population
White*Change Asian Pop.
Percent Republican (%)
Percent Democrat Mayoral Vote (%)
Republican*Democrat Mayoral Vote

1.083
0.069
0.991
0.020
1.003⁺
0.002

Percent Democrat Presidential Vote

Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood
N=55
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001

0.028
0.755
0.212
1.013⁺
0.007

0.014
0.835
0.194
1.009
0.007

1.019
0.028

1.13*
0.065
0.963
0.050
1.004*
0.002

1.154*
0.069

0.107

1.009
0.023
1.002*
0.001
0.018

0.048***

0.526

1.019
0.025
1.003⁺
0.001
0.004*

0.185
11.05*
-58.233

0.047
14.97**
-59.103

0.045
14.24***
-59.135

1.899
15.10*
-56.401

0.010
20.51**
-57.993

Republican*Democrat Presidential Vote
Constant

1.112⁺
0.068

0.012
0.923
0.188
1.007
0.007

Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime

123

Table 7.4: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Nonwhite Hate Crime with Political Threat
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables
I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE) I.R.R.(SE)
Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
Change in Nonwhite Population
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
Percent Republican (%)
Percent Democrat Mayoral Vote (%)
% Republican*Democrat Mayoral Vote

1.091*
0.040
1.016
0.013

1.008
0.009
0.948
0.036
1.001

0.002
0.996
0.032

0.001
1.117**
0.043
1.047***
0.015

0.001
1.085
0.059

1.004***
1.010
0.017
1.001*
0.001

% Republican*Democrat Presidential Vote

Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood

1.022*
0.009
0.951
0.033
1.002

1.003**
0.001

Percent Democrat Presidential Vote

Constant

1.076⁺
0.043

1.013
0.008
0.997
0.035
1.001

2.039
2.413
15.46***
-169.158

0.000
3.510
9.39⁺
-170.255

1.019
0.017
1.002*
0.001
5.735***
2.561
9.160
-171.039

.118⁺
0.137
26.84***
-164.140

0.458
0.919
12.26⁺
-168.138

N=55
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

Table 7.4 shows the results for political threat models, along with defended
neighborhoods predictors, with anti-nonwhite hate crime as the dependent variable. In Table 28,
all models, with the exception of Model 3, are significant. Model 1 is a baseline model that
includes only the political threat variables related to the mayoral election, while Model 2 is a
baseline model that includes only the political threat variables related to the presidential election.
Both models show that an increase in the percent of registered Republicans is associated with
significant increases in anti-nonwhite hate crime. There is also a significant positive association
between the mayoral interaction term and anti-nonwhite hate crime (I.R.R. =1.003, p<.01). In
Model 2, there is a significant positive association between the presidential interaction term and
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anti-nonwhite hate crime (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.05). When defended neighborhoods variables are
added to the models, the results similarly persist; however, the percent vote for a Democratic
candidate is now significant and positively associated with anti-nonwhite hate crime as shown in
Model 4 (I.R.R. =1.047, p<.001). In Model 5, only the presidential interaction term maintains
significance as a positive predictor of anti-nonwhite hate crime. Of the defended neighborhoods
variables in the political threat models, only percent white remains significant in Model 4.
Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime
Table 7.5: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Arab/Muslim Hate Crime with Political Threat
Independent Variables

Model 1
I.R.R.(SE)

Model 2
I.R.R.(SE)

Percent Non-Hispanic White (%)
Change in Nonwhite Population
White*Change Nonwhite Pop.
Percent Republican (%)

1.027
0.034

Percent Democrat Mayoral Vote (%)

0.994
0.012
1.002⁺
0.000

% Republican*Democrat Mayoral Vote
Percent Democrat Presidential Vote
% Republican*Democrat Presidential Vote

1.048
0.039

Model 3
I.R.R.(SE)

Model 4
I.R.R.(SE)

Model 5
I.R.R.(SE)

1.016*
0.007
0.982

1.021*
0.009
0.954

1.012
0.009
0.948

0.030
0.998
0.001
0.985
0.023

0.030
0.999
0.001
1.059⁺
0.037

0.032
0.999
0.001
1.047
0.052

1.027⁺
0.014
1.003**
0.001
1.000
0.017

1.011
0.018

3.008**

0.315

1.001
0.001
0.638

Constant

4.979

1.001**
0.001
0.000

Wald χ₂

5.689
14.19**

4.436
10.56*

1.289
13.90*

0.361
25.96***

1.226
18.69**

Log pseudolikelihood

-132.239

-133.226

-130.135

-127.685

-128.713

N=55
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error

Table 7.5 shows the results for political threat models, along with defended
neighborhoods predictors, with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime as the dependent variable. In Table
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30, all models are significant. Model 1 is a baseline model that includes only the political threat
variables related to the mayoral election, while Model 2 is a baseline model that includes only
the political threat variables related to the presidential election. In Model 1, the mayoral
interaction term is positively associated with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =1.002, p<.1).
Model 2 shows a significant positive association between the presidential interaction term and
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.01). There is also a significant positive
association between the mayoral interaction term and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R.
=1.003, p<.01). In Model 2, there is a significant positive association between the presidential
interaction term and anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime (I.R.R. =1.001, p<.05). When defended
neighborhoods variables are added to the models, change. While the presidential interaction
term loses significance in Model 5, the mayoral interaction term remains a significant positive
predictor of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime in Model 4. Model 4 also shows that increases in
percent Republican and percent Democratic mayoral vote now account for a 6% and a 3%
increase in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime respectively. In Model 5, only the presidential
interaction term maintains significance as a positive predictor of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.
Of the defended neighborhoods variables in the political threat models, only percent white
remains significant in Models 3 and 4. 26
Anti-Gay Hate Crime
Table 7.6 shows the results for political threat models, along with gay demographic
predictors, with anti-gay hate crime as the dependent variable. In Table 31, all models are
significant, except Model 1. Model 2 is a baseline models that only includes the political threat
variables related to the presidential election. In Model 2, the results show that increases in the

For the models for anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Nonwhite, and –Arab/Muslim hate crime, the inclusion of defended neighborhoods
predictors led to higher VIF/lower Tolerance scores, which might indicate issues with multicollinearity.
26
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percent of registered Republicans and the percent vote for the Democratic presidential candidate
are associated with a 9% and a 6% increase in anti-gay hate crime respectively. When gay
demographic variables are added to the models (and mayoral and presidential indicators are not
included), the direction of the percent Republican changes and is now negatively associated with
anti-gay hate crime in Model 3 (I.R.R. =0.969, p<.1). The percent vote for the Democratic
mayoral candidate is also now significant, accounting for a 3% increase in such hate crime. In
the presidential political threat model, percent Republican and percent presidential vote are no
longer significant as they were in the baseline Model 2. Of the gay demographic variables in the
political threat models, only percent gay maintains significance and direction across the models.
Table 7.6: Negative Binomial Regressions of Anti-Gay Hate Crime with Political Threat
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Independent Variables

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

I.R.R. (SE)

I.R.R.(SE)

0.958

1.094⁺

2.279***
0.404
2.229
1.354
0.969⁺

3.031***
0.508
2.419
1.622
1.039

2.366***
0.475
2.140
1.339
1.009

0.044
0.992
0.017
1.000
0.001

0.056

0.016

0.038
1.032*
0.013
1.000
0.001

0.039

Percent Gay (%)
Change in Gay Population
Percent Republican (%)
Percent Democrat Mayoral Vote (%)
Republican*Democrat Mayoral Vote
Percent Democrat Presidential Vote

Constant

14.021⁺

1.059**
0.022
1.001
0.001
0.014

Wald χ₂
Log pseudolikelihood

22.253
4.230
-146.921

.029*
13.77**
-143.201

Republican*Democrat Presidential Vote

2.230⁺

0.109*

1.028
0.018
0.999
0.001
0.099

0.916
49.11***
-131.279

0.123
142.90***
-126.273

0.187
61.35***
-128.429

N=55
⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
I.R.R.=Incident Rate Ratio; SE= Standard Error
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Summary
This chapter aimed to test political threat models. The first hypothesis asserts that hate
crime would be more prevalent in neighborhoods with higher Republican enrollments. Analyses
support this hypothesis showing that higher Republican Party enrollment is associated with
increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate crime, though this
finding is weakest when it comes to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Results also provide mixed
support when studying anti-gay hate crime with Republican enrollment weakly significant with
both higher and lower levels of such crimes.
The second political threat hypothesis claims that communities with greater Republican
enrollment that experience higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the
Republican wins will experience lower levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime. Results
refute this hypothesis, finding that higher Democratic electoral support in Republican
communities is associated with increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –
nonwhite hate crime. Results indicate a backlash against threatening groups even when the
conservatives triumph.
The last political threat hypothesis holds that communities with greater Republican
enrollment that witness higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the Republican
loses will experience higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime. Results support this
hypothesis, showing that Democratic electoral support in Republican communities is associated
with increases in anti-Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate crime. Communities thus also
experience a backlash against threatening groups when conservatives lose.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: DISCUSSION
This section presents a detailed discussion of the study’s results and how they contribute
to the literature on hate crime. The current study’s most obvious implication is that there is no
“one size fits all” explanation of hate crime. Rather, this study demonstrates the importance of
work that disaggregates hate crime by bias type as different types of hate crime occur in varying
contexts. Limitations and policy implications are also addressed toward the end of the
discussion.
Defended Neighborhoods
Perhaps the most noteworthy finding, this study provides further support for defended
neighborhoods in explaining anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-nonwhite, and interestingly, antiJewish hate crime. Prior work (Grattet, 2009, Green et al., 1998; Lyons, 2008) consistently
shows that hate crimes against Black and Hispanic victims are associated with the influx of
minority residents into white neighborhoods. The current study similarly finds that such crimes,
including hate crime against nonwhites generally, occur in response to a growing minority threat
in white areas. Contrary to Green et al.’s (1998) study, analyses demonstrate that anti-Asian hate
crime is not associated with defended neighborhoods. As discussed in later sections, defended
neighborhoods is the most consistent predictor of anti-Black, anti-Hispanic, anti-nonwhite, and
anti-Jewish hate crime even when considering social disorganization and economic threat.
Unlike previous studies, this study also investigates anti-white hate crime as an outcome
of defended neighborhoods. Given the use of NYPD data, the current study examines whether
demographic change related to New York City’s increasing gentrification over the time period of
the study can account for anti-white hate crime. While the rest of the significant defended
neighborhoods models in other contexts provided support for defended neighborhoods, models
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examining anti-white hate crime contradict that thesis. Analyses yield no significant results
when examining defended neighborhoods in the context of Hispanic and nonwhite
neighborhoods experiencing white in-migration. Thus such neighborhoods do not react
defensively as white neighborhoods do to the influx of an “Other” group. Interesting patterns
emerge when examining anti-white hate crime in Black neighborhoods. Though anti-white hate
crime occur in areas with higher levels of Black populations, Black neighborhoods experiencing
an influx of white populations actually experience less anti-white hate crime. Such findings can
be interpreted in a number of ways.
Regarding the reduced likelihood of anti-white victimization in Black neighborhoods
experiencing white in-migration, the benefits of gentrification may protect “invading” white
residents from victimization. Gentrification brings increasing access to improved neighborhoods
accommodations via renovated or new housing and chain retailers, but also increased safety
through security and policing services, (Anderson, 2012; Gould & Lewis, 2012; Trekson, 2012).
Areas undergoing gentrification may be viewed as “better” and thus receive more policing. In
addition to whites possibly making greater use of the police in these neighborhoods, the police
may be more likely to respond to white concerns. Further, increasing wealth may lead to greater
utilization of private security, providing greater guardianship in these changing neighborhoods.
At the same time, the forces of gentrification may also neutralize a defensive response in Black
neighborhoods by effectively pushing them out of the neighborhood. Skyrocketing housing
costs are a hallmark of gentrifying neighborhoods, where lower socioeconomic ethno-racial
minorities are either pushed out of their homes that are sold to new owners or they are unable to
afford exorbitant rents or home prices (DeSena, 2012; Gould & Louis, 2012; Mason, Morlock, &
Pisano, 2012; Trekson, 2012). Such adverse effects do not accompany the influx of nonwhites
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into white neighborhoods thus preserving the ability of white residents to “stand their ground”
and react defensively against invading minorities. While white residents may eventually give up
on their neighborhood and make the choice to flee to the suburbs, white in-migration and
gentrification in Black neighborhoods forcibly displaces Black residents, rendering a defensive
reaction impossible.
In addition to the impact of gentrification accompanying white in-migration, Black
neighborhoods may not be as motivated to react defensively to the influx of white residents.
White neighborhoods may perceive more acutely the influx of minorities as threatening. Perry
(2001) explains how whites are “doing difference” when they commit hate crime. Not only do
white residents perceive threats to their interests (i.e. economic interests), white neighborhoods
also perceive a threat to white dominance in racial hierarchies when nonwhites move into “their”
neighborhoods. In this sense, white neighborhoods have “more to lose” when there is nonwhite
in-migration whereas Black neighborhoods do not perceive white in-migration as a threat to their
place in racial hierarchies. Using hate crime to “do difference,” whites thus reaffirm white
dominance, of which they benefit, as well as “[coconstruct] the nonwhiteness of the victims, who
are perceived to be worthy of violent repression either because they correspond to a demonized
identity, or, paradoxically because they threaten the racialized boundaries that are meant to
separate “us” from “them” (Perry, 2001, p.58).
While the results provide no support for anti-white hate crime as an outcome of Black
defended neighborhoods, there is consistent evidence that anti-white hate crime is associated
with neighborhoods with higher Black population levels. One such explanation for this finding
may be due to white perception and reporting of such victimizations. Though research has not
tested this explanation, white victims may be more likely to report perceived racially-motivated
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victimization compared to minority victims, who are known to underreport such victimizations
as well as to trust law enforcement less (Lyons, 2007; 2008; Perry, 2002). Perry (2002) argues
that whites may perceive their victimization at the hands of Black offenders as “a serious affront
to their status and authority,” which motivates them to report such victimization (p.73). Lyons
(2007) adds that reporting such crimes may similarly act as a defense of the color line by
soliciting formal social control mechanisms, via law enforcement, in reaction to a perceived
threat to white dominance.
Anti-white hate crime also may not operate in a defensive manner. Lyons (2007; 2008)
argues that anti-white hate crime may be committed in a retaliatory manner. McDevitt et al.
(2002) describe the retaliatory hate crime as those crimes committed in response to an actual or
perceived hate crime against the offender’s ingroup. Previous studies (Green, Glaser, & Rich,
1998; Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998; Lyons, 2007; 2008) finding significant positive
correlations between anti-white and anti-Black hate crime theorize that such a correlation could
be attributable to retaliatory patterns of hate crime. The current study similarly finds a
significant positive correlation between anti-white and anti-Black hate crime (0.46, p<.001).
Given the established nature of white defended neighborhoods, news of anti-Black hate crime in
such neighborhoods could induce a retaliatory response against white victims in Black
neighborhoods. If this retaliatory situation is true, anti-minority hate crime could lead to a series
of negative consequences. Anti-minority hate crime not only harms the immediate victim, but
the larger community to which the victim belongs, thus eliciting the retaliatory response and
leading to harm of another victim. Such retaliatory violence could escalate into a feud in which
more attacks occur, undermining community relations.
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While the literature largely examines hate crimes against racial/ethnic minorities when
testing defended neighborhoods thesis, the current study also investigates anti-Arab/Muslim,
anti-Jewish, and anti-white hate crime as an outcome of defended neighborhoods. Although
defended neighborhoods fails to explain anti-Arab/Muslim hate, results reveal several interesting
patterns in anti-Jewish hate crime. No prior study of American neighborhoods examines antiJewish hate crime. Thus, the current study fills this gap in the literature by investigating the
neighborhood-level determinants of such crimes. In exploring the nature of anti-Jewish hate
crime, analyses examine three different defended neighborhoods scenarios: the influx of
nonwhite populations into white neighborhoods, growing white populations in Black
neighborhoods, and increasing white populations in nonwhite neighborhoods. Results provide
support in all three scenarios.
Throughout history, people across all races, ethnicities, and religions have blamed Jewish
people for a host of social problems, including poor economic conditions (Gerstenfeld, 2011;
Levin & McDevitt, 2002; Rosenfeld, 1995). Indeed, recent events demonstrate the persistent
phenomenon of anti-Jewish hate crime. As news coverage in the past year shows a trend of hate
crimes against racial and ethnic minorities and Islamophobic hate crime, anti-Jewish hate crime
also features prominently in such coverage (Hatewatch Staff, 2017; NBC News, 2017; Paybarah
& Cheney, 2017). Thus, it follows that anti-Jewish hate crime could reasonably occur in a
variety of contexts. Regarding the first scenario, results show that such crimes occur in areas
with higher levels of white populations, but are less prevalent in areas experiencing increases in
nonwhite populations over time. When considering the influx of nonwhite populations into
white neighborhoods however, anti-Jewish hate crime increases. Results for the latter two
scenarios also reveal that anti-Jewish hate crime occurs in areas with lower levels of Black and
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nonwhite populations and those experiencing increases in the white population over time. Just as
anti-Jewish hate crime is more prevalent in white neighborhoods with growing nonwhite
populations, such crimes also occur where there is a migration of white populations into Black
and nonwhite areas. The results however are less strong for the white migration into Black
neighborhoods compared to the other two scenarios.
All in all, these findings reveal Jewish victims to be a catch-all target when a minority
increasingly moves into a majority area. Indeed, Deutsch (1962) captures this phenomenon in
his interviews of lower class whites who lashed out against Jewish people even though they were
largely preoccupied with prejudice against African-Americans. In an ethnographic study of farright extremists, Ezekiel (1995) similarly shows how far-right leaders stress that Jews constitute
the most dangerous “threat” to the white race, but most far-rightists are driven by their hatred of
racial and ethnic minorities with less concern for Jewish persons. The current study evidences a
reaction against the influx of nonwhites into white neighborhoods that manifests in anti-Semitic
hate crime. Such a reaction may be likewise indicative of a frustration with other minorities that
manifests in targeting Jewish persons further supporting the interchangeability of minority
targets. Anti-Semitic hate crime in white neighborhoods may also be a defensive response to the
influx of nonwhites as both groups signify a threat to the cultural homogeny of the
neighborhood, i.e. Italian Catholic or White Protestant neighborhoods.
As for anti-Semitic hate crime in Black and nonwhite neighborhoods experiencing an
influx of white residents, there could be similar competing explanations. First, victimization of
Jewish persons may actually symbolize a frustration with the influx of white residents into Black
and nonwhite neighborhoods. Given the results show either a negative or nonsignificant
association between white in-migration into minority neighborhoods and anti-white hate crime,
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this explanation may not be sufficient. Rather, such crimes are more likely purposefully biasmotivated against Jewish persons. Research demonstrates anti-Semitism among Black and other
nonwhite populations, some of which evidences greater anti-Semitic attitudes in nonwhites
compared to whites (Gerstenfeld, 2011; King & Weiner, 2007). Anti-Semitic hate crime in these
contexts may be a reaction of resentment against a group perceived to pose an economic threat as
well as group taking advantage of Black and nonwhite persons (King & Weiner, 2007; Levin &
McDevitt, 2002; Levin & Nolan, 2011). Thus, Black and nonwhite neighborhoods perceive
more of a threat from Jewish populations, rather than white populations, which manifests in a
defended neighborhoods response.
On a final note, the study’s findings revealing a positive association between the presence
of Jewish buildings, indicative of larger Jewish populations, and anti-Semitic hate crime also
corroborates Stein and Martin’s (1962) study showing that perpetrators of anti-Semitic crime
often lived in neighborhoods with larger Jewish populations. This is similar to Green et al.’s
(2001) study demonstrating that areas with higher gay populations, and therefore greater gay
visibility, experience more anti-gay hate crime. Thus, the static Jewish presence proves key in
explaining anti-Jewish hate crime. As shown across a variety of bias types, demographics prove
very important to explaining hate crime with dynamic in-migration processes accounting for
patterns of such crimes. On the other hand, some bias types, specifically anti-Jewish and antigay hate crime, are also explained by static indicators with a large visible presence attracts
victimization. This further demonstrates the need for nuance in hate crime research. While
static visibility explains anti-Jewish (and anti-gay) hate crime, dynamic processes with
increasing racial/ethnic minority populations explain anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime.
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This study also makes another contribution by investigating defended neighborhoods
dynamics when it comes to anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime in the context of Black,
Hispanic, and Asian neighborhoods. The results generally show that nonwhite neighborhoods do
not experience the same defended neighborhoods reaction to the influx of outgroups that white
neighborhoods experience. When it comes to Asian neighborhoods, Black and Hispanic inmigration is met with lower levels of anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime respectively. Analyses
reveal no significant association between Hispanic neighborhoods experiencing an influx of
Black and Asian populations and hate crime against either group. When it comes to Black
neighborhoods, the results are slightly more mixed. Analyses provide no support for the
hypothesis that Black neighborhoods would experience higher levels of anti-Asian hate crime in
response to Asian in-migration. When it comes to the influx of Hispanic populations, analyses
show weak support for defended neighborhoods, but only when economic conditions are
considered.
Given the widespread impact of gang activity on hate crime in Los Angeles (Bell, 2013,
Mock, 2007; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2008; 2009; Terry, 2013), the question arises as to
whether such an effect is relevant in New York City. Green and colleagues make no mention of
gang activity and its impact on hate crime in NYC. In fact, neighborhood-level studies have yet
to control for gang activity in their hate crime studies (see NYC in Green, Strolovitch, and
Wong, 1998; Sacramento in Grattet, 2009; Chicago in Lyons, 2007; 2008). The lack of other
evidence suggests that hate crime stemming from gang activity may not be a major issue in NYC
and is possibly a phenomenon specific to Los Angeles. Further, the New York State Division of
Criminal Justice Services (2015) goes as far to provide this question and answer: "Q1: Do
incidents which involve rival gangs count as hate crimes? A1: Only if race, color or other
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protected class is the motivation for the incident. Gang rivalry alone does not constitute a hate
crime" (p. 1). While this study does not account for gang activity in analyses, future studies may
want to consider if gang activity may influence hate crime in other research sites (i.e. Los
Angeles) and how they can handle the impact of such activity on hate crime.
Taken together, the study provides strong support for defended neighborhoods thesis for
two broad trends: anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime as an outcome of the influx of people of
color into white neighborhoods and anti-Jewish hate crime as an outcome of in-migration of an
“other” group into another group’s neighborhood (i.e. nonwhite population growth in white
neighborhoods and vice versa). Defended neighborhoods receives little to no support when
examining anti-racial/ethnic minority and anti-white hate crime in nonwhite neighborhoods.
Thus, the defended neighborhoods reaction appears to be a largely white reaction to a perceived
threat to their “territory.” Just as major world conflicts have often occurred over a competition
for territory, so too do neighborhood-level ethnic conflicts. Previous literature (Green et al.,
1998; Horowitz, 2000) describes the importance of holding onto territory in the face of an
encroaching “other” threat, so as to preserve the neighborhood’s identity. This response
however most strongly occurs in white neighborhoods, evidencing that it is not merely a natural
reaction by any ethno-racial group, but a reaction largely specific to white communities. This
reaction thus acts as an effort to reassert white hegemony at a time when the neighborhood, and
the city and country at large, are becoming increasingly nonwhite.
Previous ethnographic work in New York City (Pinderhughes, 1993; Rieder, 1985) also
highlights white communal efforts to preserve the identity of their neighborhoods through the
use of violence against those perceived to not belong. In his case study of Brooklyn youth,
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Pinderhughes (1993) relates the shared perspectives by the youth who see themselves as
defending their neighborhood:
You prove you're a real Bensonhurst Italian who don't take no shit, who don't let
the wrong kind of people into the neighborhood.
…
I did what I had to do. I have a reputation as a tough guy who defends the
neighborhood and I want to keep it. People know when you've taken care of
people who don't belong in the neighborhood. You get respect. Especially if it is
some of the blacks from Marlboro projects.
When you're hanging out with your partners and you see somebody who don't
belong on your block, like a black guy or a Dominican, and you do him [beat him
up], you feel real together. Every- body's together doing what we have to do (p.
488).
Such reactions capture a general antipathy against nonwhites being in the neighborhood at all,
even if they are just walking through the area. The very presence, however fleeting, rallies the
white youth, with the approval from the larger community, to “protect” the neighborhood.
Rieder (1985) similarly captures white aggression in response to Blacks moving into Brooklyn’s
Canarsie, detailing the firebombing of a home recently sold by a white owner to Black buyers.
Resident reactions to the firebombing, and similar move-in violence, demonstrate that such
violence accomplished two things: sending a warning to both white homeowners and nonwhite
buyers that nonwhites are not welcome in the neighborhood as well as punishing the white owner
for betraying the segregationist norms of the community and threatening the community’s
homogenous identity (p. 199-202). Such violence highlights Tolnay and Beck’s (1995)
discussion of a popular justice model of anti-Black violence that accomplishes in punishing
social violations (i.e. Black buyers daring to move into a white neighborhood) and sending a
message to the larger Black community that such violence awaits them if they attempt the same
actions.
Indeed, patterns of move-in violence exemplify this effort within white neighborhoods to
use violence in the face of nonwhite in-migration (see Bell, 2013; Levin & McDevitt, 2002;
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Meyer, 2000; Sibbitt, 1997; Surgue, 1996). In a study of hate crime in London, Sibbitt (1997)
explains how neighborhood residents often banded together to intimidate new minority residents.
She also shows that many perpetrators and bystanders perceive nonwhite victims as exploiting
the resources of “their” country, often asserting that nonwhites should “go back to their country.”
Such sentiments highlight how white residents claim ownership of neighborhood by virtue of
their white identity. White residents not only fear a threat to the homogenous character of their
neighborhoods; they also fear nonwhites “taking over” the neighborhood and making it their
own. Ray et al.’s (2004) interviews with racist offenders in Manchester in the U.K. support this
view. One interviewee’s response justifies move-in violence, arguing:
“[Someone might say] Let's go and get some Pakis out of a house they are moving
into. And I can understand why. […] what they'll [the Pakistanis] do is they move
into a bit of an area and they slowly enforce with government help their own way
of running the thing, and they try and take over our community. So white people
in that area who are referred to as the majority, are totally oppressed and unable to
carry on in what they would call their normal life, their normal routine, and enjoy
their culture. […] And so these people are saying 'Right, there's no point going to
the Government because they've already stuck the shit on us, we're going to have
to deal with it ourselves'. So he goes out and stops them moving in. And that's his
commitment to his community” (p. 360).
Such an account reveals white paranoia that nonwhites not only plan to take over the
neighborhood, but that they have the support of the “Government” in doing so. This casts whites
as being victimized by the threat of nonwhites moving into their neighborhoods. Further,
perpetrators of move-in violence also see themselves as acting on behalf of their community.
Discussing the evolution of move-in violence since the postbellum era, Bell (2013) argues that
move-in violence transitioned from being the work of mobs to “small groups of terrorists
working to keep their neighborhood white, or a barrage of small acts of violence committed
alone” (p. 57). She further highlights that contemporary campaigns of individual action often
have the support of the community that often blames the targets of such violence. The use of
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such violence has been highly effective as move-in violence has been repeatedly successful in
deterring minorities from moving into white neighborhoods and pushing out those who dare to
do so.
Beyond the threat to white racial purity, such communities perceive nonwhite inmigration as a threat to the stability and value of their home and neighborhoods. Rieder (1985)
shares the view of one Canarsian: “Those niggers are the marauders of Brownsville. They ruined
Brownsville, but I won’t let them ruin Canarsie. I’ll join a terror squad to keep them out” (p.
200). He also recounts how another resident justified the firebombing of prospective home of a
Black family by proclaiming that the family was a threat to his home and children (p. 199).
Thus, white neighborhoods view nonwhites threaten not only their white communal identity, but
their existence via their home and offspring. Such ethnographic accounts add further insight into
the current study’s findings by unpacking how white residents interpret the threat of nonwhite inmigration into their neighborhoods. Thus for these neighborhoods, hate crime exists as a
mechanism to express frustration and aggression at the offending minority and reinforce control
of the minority group through sending a message to the larger community to which the victim
belongs and instilling fear and thus, keep them out of their neighborhoods.
Defended and Disorganized Neighborhoods
In addition to investigating the role of defended neighborhoods, the current study also
examines the influence of social disorganization on hate crime. Based on the analyses, the main
finding is that hate crime for the most part occurs in socially organized communities across bias
type, which contradicts the hypotheses that socially disorganized communities would experience
higher levels of hate crime. As proposed in the theoretical framework, social disorganization
dictates that socially disorganized communities lack the capacity to control strained individuals
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from engaging in hate crime, with such strain resulting from patterns of demographic change or
poor or worsening economic conditions. In the current study however, baseline and full models
all generally find that higher levels of hate crime occur in socially organized communities.
Across all racial, ethnic, and religious bias types, increases in concentrated disadvantage and
residential instability consistently account for reductions in hate crime. Thus, communities are
largely organized in favor of hate crime across a variety of contexts. These findings corroborate
Lyons’ (2007) work examining anti-Black hate crime in Chicago; however, they are at odds with
Grattet’s (2009) investigation in Sacramento, which revealed that higher levels of both
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were associated with increases in hate
crime. They also contradict Gladfelter et al.’s (2017) findings on the effect of residential
instability, which showed that instability was associated with higher levels of anti-Black, Hispanic, and –white bias-motivated incidents. Further, defended neighborhoods also proves a
consistent predictor of anti-minority hate crime when also considering social disorganization
indicators. When defended neighborhoods predictors are included in models however,
concentrated disadvantage remains negatively, albeit no longer significantly, associated with
anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime. For models examining anti-nonwhite hate crime, the
nonwhite in-migration interaction also loses significance when multiple social disorganization
predictors are included. Thus, the conclusion that hate crime occurs in defended and socially
organized communities is strongest when the outcome is anti-Jewish hate crime.
The current study generally shows that neighborhoods experiencing increases in hate
crime are better described as defended and organized, rather than defended and disorganized. In
particular, white neighborhoods most often are organized in defense of their neighborhoods
through the use of bias-motivated violence to keep out “invading” minorities. As Lyons (2008)
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states, “under conditions of change, hate crimes against blacks [or other minorities] are a strategy
for reasserting "order" and maintaining racial division” (p. 378). Such findings also have
implications for social disorganization theories as predictors of social disorganization, though
determinants of higher levels of regular crime, act differently when it comes to hate crime across
bias types in most cases. This supports Lyons’ (2007) suggestion that such theories be revised to
consider the different impact of social disorganization on hate crime.
Regarding anti-white hate crime, the current study also conflicts with the prior work
finding that such incidents occur in socially disorganized communities (Gladfelter et al., 2017;
Lyons, 2007; 2008). As previously discussed, defended neighborhoods thesis fails to explain
anti-white hate crime in nonwhite neighborhoods, whether Black, Hispanic, or nonwhite. While
anti-white hate crime occurs in socially organized neighborhoods with higher Black population
levels, white in-migration into Black neighborhoods actually leads to a reduction in anti-white
hate crime. Thus, the argument that neighborhoods are organized to defend the community from
an influx of an “unwanted” group does not extend to the context of Black neighborhoods. As
previously stated, anti-white hate crime may be more retaliatory rather than defensive. Or if they
are defensive, such crimes may be prevalent in Black neighborhoods in an effort to protect the
area from whites even though there is no white in-migration. As mentioned in the initial
discussion, white residents also may have more resources to thwart anti-white hate crime. If so,
this should be investigated in future research. If it is true that the availability and use of
community resources can thwart hate crime, it shows that increasing demographic change need
not lead to hate crime.
There are a couple caveats to this conclusion, highlighting the importance of
disaggregating hate crime by bias type. First, there are mixed findings regarding the role of

142

diversity when considered in social disorganization models. In the baseline models for antiBlack hate crime, greater diversity accounts for less anti-Black hate crime; however, this finding
also disappears when defended neighborhoods is considered. Diversity also similarly accounts
for reductions in anti-white hate crime, though this finding disappears when considering
white/black and white/Hispanic, rather than white/nonwhite, in-migration interactions). When
considering anti-Arab/Muslim and –Jewish hate crime however, diversity proves to be a
significant predictor of higher levels of such crimes. Prior work (Grattet, 2009; Lyons, 2007)
usually excludes diversity when testing defended neighborhoods and social disorganization, so
there is not much consensus on the role of general diversity on hate crime. Gladfelter et al.
(2017) however similarly find a negative association between diversity and anti-Black and –
Hispanic bias-motivated incidents. Second, social disorganization operates differently when
anti-gay hate crime is considered. Though the baseline model reveals a similar negative and
significant association between concentrated disadvantage and anti-gay crime, concentrated
disadvantage becomes a significant predictor of higher levels of such crimes when gay
demographic variables are considered. This finding is further discussed in the section entitled
“Gay Threat.”
Defended and Strained Neighborhoods
Turning to economic threat, the current study tests whether minority group threat
explains hate crime when there are poor or worsening economic conditions. Minority group
threat holds that anti-minority violence is a reaction on the part of disadvantaged persons in
response to the competition for limited economic resources. Thus, economically-strained
neighborhoods are expected to experience higher levels of hate crime. The current study
however generally contradicts hypothesized association between poor economic conditions and
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hate crime. Across all racial, ethnic, and religious bias types, higher rates of unemployment and
poverty, when significant, generally account for lower levels of hate crime. When examining
anti-Hispanic hate crime however, higher poverty proves to be the only (weakly) significant
predictor of increases in such crimes when white/Hispanic defended neighborhood predictors are
considered. Nevertheless, neighborhoods experiencing poorer economic conditions largely see
reductions in the majority of racial, ethnic, and religious hate crime.
While poor economic conditions are generally associated with lower levels of hate crime,
there are mixed results when it comes to worsening economic conditions over time. Though
many models show no significant relationship between worsening economic conditions, some
interesting findings emerge. Worsening unemployment over time is significantly associated with
lower levels of anti-nonwhite and –Arab/Muslim hate crime in white defended neighborhoods
models. When considering Hispanic defended neighborhoods predictors, worsening
unemployment over time is shown to lead to increases in anti-white hate crime; however this
finding is weakly significant and there is no significant evidence supporting defended
neighborhoods in Hispanic communities experiencing influxes of white populations. When
considering nonwhite defended neighborhoods, worsening unemployment is associated with
lower levels of anti-Black, -Hispanic, and –Asian hate crime. Worsening poverty over time also
proves to impact hate crime differently. When examining white defended neighborhoods,
analyses show that worsening poverty over time leads to higher levels of anti-Black, -nonwhite, Arab/Muslim, and –Jewish hate crime. The significant effect on anti-Semitic hate crime
however disappears when the presence of Jewish buildings is considered. When considering
Asian and Black defended neighborhoods, worsening poverty is associated with weakly
significant increases in anti-Hispanic hate crime.
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As previously stated, there exists no consensus on the role of poor economic conditions
on hate crime. Much of the quantitative work either finds no relationship between the two
phenomena or the results are consistently mixed. While much qualitative work (Gadd & Dixon,
2009; Maxwell & Maxwell, 1995; Pinderhughes, 1993; Ray et al., 2004) reveals white
resentment of minorities is often attributed to economic conditions, anti-racial/ethnic hate crime
generally does not occur in neighborhoods actually marked by poor economic conditions. There
could be a number of explanations for these findings.
As previous quantitative work uses indicators of real economic conditions, prior
qualitative work focuses on perceptions of economic conditions. Perhaps it is perceptions rather
than the reality of economic conditions that matters when explaining incidences of hate crime.
Relevant to a discussion of bias-motivated behaviors, examining white support for presidential
candidate Donald Trump reveals the similar discrepancy between perceptions of economic
conditions and reality. Throughout his campaign, Trump’s rhetoric fed into white resentment of
people of color and immigrants, often scapegoating these populations as responsible for poor
economic conditions (i.e. immigrants stealing jobs from deserving whites). Indeed, a preelection Gallup poll shows that Trump supporters, even affluent supporters, expressed higher
levels of perceived financial insecurity with Rothwell (2016) commenting that “Donald Trump
has a more positive image among people who worry about their finances, no matter how
grounded those concerns are in the apparent reality of their circumstances.” Analyses of
electoral primary exit poll data also reveal that Trump voters had higher median incomes than
the average American as well as the average Democratic candidate voter; Trump voters also had
higher median incomes than their state’s median income (Silver, 2016). In an analysis by the
Urban Institute, Elliott and Kalish (2016) demonstrate that counties won by Trump were more
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financially secure (as measured by credit scores) than counties won by Democratic candidate
Hillary Rodham Clinton. 27 It must be noted that voting is a legal behavior exercised by a large
proportion of the population while hate crime offending is an illegal behavior committed by a
much smaller segment of the population. At the same time, minority group threat literature often
discusses both informal and formal modes of social control in response to minority group threat.
Support for a presidential candidate promising the use of formal modes of social control in
response to minority group threat is an endorsement of such formal modes of social control. The
utility of the comparison here is in discussing this disconnect between perceptions of and real
economic conditions and its implications for the application of formal or informal social control
against threatening minorities.
This scenario proves relevant to a discussion of hate crime research as it highlights the
similar disconnect between perceptions of and real economic conditions. The common thread in
prior qualitative work illustrates white anger against people of color, who are blamed for white
economic misfortune. Such work also reveals whites casting their bias-motivated actions as
“protecting,” “defending,” or “saving” the white community. As previously stated, the majority
white group views itself as the hardworking victim of a system that they perceive as privileging
minority groups at their expense even though this is at odds with the reality that the white
population is generally better off economically compared to people of color. The qualitative
work directly appears, and the quantitative work indirectly, to support an evident disconnect
between perceptions of and the reality of economic conditions.
The current study’s findings similarly bear out this indirect support as it shows that
higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime occur in neighborhoods that are better off
27

The authors note however that the effect of financial insecurity loses significance when controlling for other economic and demographic
characteristics as “higher credit scores are located in counties with higher percentages of white residents, and race was an important predictor in
this election: a 10 percentage point increase in a county’s white residents is associated with an 8 percentage point increase in voting for Trump.”
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economically. The results could also speak to the idea that whites see themselves having “more
to lose” (Freilich et al., 2015). They may be better off economically speaking, but anxiety about
their financial security may drive them to lash out violently against a perceived “threat.”
Previous quantitative work has probably neglected examining the effect of perceptions of
economic conditions due to the unavailability of data. Future quantitative research should
consider the feasibility of investigating the impact of perceptions of economic conditions on hate
crime. Survey research could prove useful in addressing this gap in the research.
There also exists another explanation of the current study’s findings regarding the impact
of economic conditions, in that there may be a set of other economic considerations that induce
white anxiety and subsequent hate crime against nonwhites. In his ethnographic work in
Canarsie, Rieder (1985) highlights one resident’s justification for the firebombing of a black
family’s newly purchased home:
The practitioners of firebombing relied on that passive tolerance of violence. ‘You
heard about the firebombing of the black family the other day?’ a Jewish member
of a backlash group asked me. ‘Well, I’m against violence, but they’re
jeopardizing my home and children, and I will bomb to protect them’ (p. 199).
Minority group threat often holds that minority presence poses a threat to whites in a competition
for limited economic resources and much research often focuses the economic resource of
employment. The current study however reveals higher unemployment, when significant, to be
associated with less hate crime. Perhaps white perceive an influx of minorities into their
neighborhoods as a threat not to their livelihood, but a threat to their home values and their
children. Indeed, the one Canarsian, who said he would join a “terror squad” to keep out the
Black people who “ruined” Brownsville from ruining Canarsie, follows up that sentiment by
saying that “we’ve invested everything we have in this house and neighborhood” (p. 200).
Examining move-in violence, Bell (2013) similarly highlights whites’ perceptions that home

147

values would suffer if Black people starting moving into their neighborhoods. Bell (2013)
presents one resident’s reaction to the arson committed after a Jamaican immigrant moved his
family into an almost all-white Chicago suburb: “I feel bad their house got burned…but real
estate people should have told him that this is an all-white neighborhood, and they should’ve
expected it. I want them to leave. I don’t want my property value to go down” (p. 69). Again,
this highlights the importance of white perceptions of economic misfortune for themselves.
White anxiety about economic conditions also extends to concern about their children’s
economic prospects as well. Rieder (1985) cites Canarsian attitudes toward busing and school
integration. Such views highlight white anxiety that the quality of neighborhood schools will
decline if nonwhites attend the school and vice versa, with their children attending
predominantly nonwhite schools. Aside from white perceptions associating nonwhites with
criminality (Eitle, D'Alessio, and Stolzenberg, 2002; Tolnay and Beck, 1995) and thus a threat to
their children, white concerns with school quality reflect anxiety about the economic prospects of
their children (i.e. children attending lower quality schools will fare worse employment- and
income-wise). Even when considering economic conditions, the current study shows the
persistent significant impact of in-migration into white neighborhoods. The motivations behind
“defending” neighborhoods from “invading” minorities may be varied from a defense of the
neighborhood’s homogenous identity to anxieties about the perceived impact of nonwhite inmigration on home values, crime rates, neighborhood schools, and any other economic
considerations. Thus, perceptions of the impact of nonwhite in-migration on other economic
considerations, rather than indicators of real economic conditions, may be more important in
explaining hate crime. As the current study shows, neighborhood experiencing higher levels of
hate crime have better economic conditions when it comes to unemployment and poverty levels.
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This finding also applies to anti-Semitic and anti-white hate crime, which occur in
neighborhoods with higher white population levels.
Once again, there are a couple qualifications to the current study’s overarching findings
on economic conditions. As discussed, the study reveals more mixed findings on the impact of
worsening economic conditions over time. Analyses show that worsening unemployment, when
significant, is generally associated with lower levels of anti-minority hate crime. On the other
hand, worsening poverty over time leads to significantly higher levels of antiracial/ethnoreligious hate crime. It may be that residents view impoverishment as more dire than
unemployment, accounting for a different response. While poor economic conditions are
overwhelmingly shown to be associated with less hate crime, worsening poverty generally leads
to higher hate crime. Even though the results are weakly significant and unemployment is in the
other direction in most cases, the study reveals a common thread across defended neighborhoods
scenario in that worsening poverty leads to a reaction against nonwhites generally, but also
groups more often perceived as immigrants, namely Arab/Muslim and Hispanic populations. It
may be that “things are getting worse” triggers a backlash against perceived immigrants, the
usual scapegoats, when economic conditions decline. Lastly, anti-gay hate crime once again
proves unique when considering the impact of neighborhood-level conditions, specifically
regarding the effect of poor economic conditions compared to other bias types. Analyses reveal
that higher levels of unemployment and poverty are associated with increased incidences of antigay hate crime. These findings are discussed below under the “Gay Threat” section.
Political Threat
The current study makes another contribution by providing the first insights into impact
of political threat on hate crime on the neighborhood level. The first political threat hypothesis
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asserted that communities with higher levels of Republican Party enrollment would experience
higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime. Analyses support this hypothesis showing
that higher Republican Party enrollment is associated with increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate crime, though this finding is weakest when it comes
to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Results also provide mixed support when studying anti-gay
hate crime with Republican enrollment weakly significant with both higher and lower levels of
such crimes. On the whole however, the findings reveal that neighborhoods with higher
Republican enrollment are more likely to experience higher levels of hate crime. This is in line
with the premise that conservative neighborhoods would see more hate crime given their
diminished support for progressive policies that are perceived as benefiting people of color over
whites. Such findings add to the mixed results on discriminatory violence as an outcome of
political threat.
The second political threat hypothesis claims that communities with greater Republican
enrollment but also with higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the
Republican wins will experience lower levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime. Using
the mayoral election in which conservative Mayor Michael Bloomberg won re-election in 2009,
this study finds evidence refuting this hypothesis, finding that higher Democratic electoral
support in Republican communities is associated with increases in anti-Black, -Hispanic, -Asian,
-Arab/Muslim, and –nonwhite hate crime. Thus more Republican communities still react with a
backlash against racial and ethnic minorities even when political threat is overcome with a
Republican political victory. In light of this, anti-minority hate crime may act as an expression
of reasserting conservative political power in areas that faced more of a threatening political
threat via increased Democratic electoral support. Indeed, recent events demonstrate the
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occurrence of surges in anti-minority hate crime in the wake of Republican electoral victory.
Various sources cite reported increases in such hate crime in the wake of Republican candidate
Donald Trump’s presidential election victory in November 2016, in which he was projected to
win the Electoral College yet lost the popular vote by over two million votes (Goldman, 2017;
Hatewatch Staff, 2016; Hatewatch Staff, 2017; La Porte, 2016; Levin, 2017; Miller & WernerWinslow, 2016; Toure, 2017). Such sources attribute the surges in hate crime specifically to
Trump’s electoral victory.
The last political threat hypothesis claims that communities with greater Republican
enrollment but also with higher Democrat electoral support in an election in which the
Republican loses will experience higher levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime. This
analysis uses the 2012 Presidential election in which Democrat President Barack Obama won reelection as a proxy for 2008. This study finds evidence supporting this hypothesis, using the
2012 Presidential election in which Democrat President Barack Obama won re-election as a
proxy for 2008. The results show that Democratic electoral support in more Republican
communities is associated with increases in anti-Asian, -Arab/Muslim, and –Nonwhite hate
crime. Thus, there does appear to be a backlash against certain groups in the wake of a
Republican loss when there is an increasing political threat, via Democratic electoral support, in
Republican communities. Such results highlight political competition theories that find that
political environments where political opponents are more balanced leads to increasing
mobilization on both sides including violent fringe groups. Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich
(2015) find that far-right extremist groups thrive in “purple states” with greater political
competition, where there may be greater tolerance of more fringe ideologies. Therefore, more
“purple” neighborhoods with more Republicans but also greater Democratic support create more
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of a political threat environment. Beyond leftist political success, the Democratic victory also
highlights Black political success with the election of Barack Obama. Such a victory feeds into
fears that minorities will “political leverage that threatens existing power balances” that favor
whites (King & Brustein, 2006, p. 871). This fear would also be more prevalent among
conservatives given their lack of support for progressive policies that aim to remedy such
prevailing power structures. Surprisingly, this model fails to account for significant increases in
anti-Black hate crime. The results prove strongest in explaining anti-nonwhite hate crime.
Perhaps nonwhites are interchangeable victims when it comes to the expression of conservative
grievances in response to electoral losses.
Terrorist Threat
The current study further contributes to the literature by providing further evidence of the
impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks on anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. Indeed, the
results show that the post-2000 period accounts for estimates as high as a 50% percent increase
in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. This finding strengthens the consensus shown in the research,
demonstrating the effect of the “terrorist threat” on hate crime (see Byers & Jones, 2007;
Deloughery et al., 2012; Disha et al., 2011; King & Sutton, 2013). As for defended
neighborhoods, the influx of nonwhites into white neighborhoods fails to significantly impact
levels of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime; however, nonwhite population growth over time predicts
increases in such crimes. Though not presented in this study’s results, additional analyses,
investigating the impact of Muslim visibility via the presence of Muslim buildings, failed to
significantly explain variation in anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. This evidence contradicts the
hypothesis of “terrorist threat;” however, analyses with that indicator have only limited power to
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detect smaller than large effects as they were limited by data availability to only examine the
third time period (2006-2010) of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime.
On the whole however, the large and significant effect of the September 11 th attacks
provides substantial support for the “terrorist threat” model. Using UCR data, Byers and Jones
(2007) show that the 9/11 attacks led to a significant increase in anti-Islamic hate crime in the
weeks that followed, but no such immediate increases occurred in New York City or Washington
D.C.28 The current study however shows that the years following the 9/11 attacks saw
demonstrably higher levels of anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, evidencing a long-term reaction to
the so-called “terrorist threat.” Further, it evidences the persistent vicarious retaliation against
the Arab/Muslim community in response to the 9/11 attacks and throughout a time period
marked by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq which kept the attacks in the forefront of national
consciousness. Such a trend exemplifies McDevitt et al.’s (2002) “retaliatory” offender type
with anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime presenting as an ongoing exercise in revenge in response to
the triggering event of the 9/11 attacks.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the presence of less dramatic triggering events (i.e. anthrax
letters, the kidnapping and murdering of Americans in Iraq, including the highly publicized
beheading of Nicholas Berg, etc) ensures the continued retaliatory reaction to the attacks on
September 11th. Disha et al. (2011) note that “9/11 created a climate in which many Americans
felt united against a ‘new enemy’ and in which acts of hatred against Arabs and Muslims became
‘normalized’ behaviors” (p. 40). Lickel et al. (2006) highlights the tendency of ingroup
members to respond attacks against other ingroup members with a process of dehumanization
that facilitates vicarious retribution against the perceived offending outgroup. In viewing Arabs
28

Byers and Jones note that New York City reported zero anti-Islamic hate crime in the three and a half months after September 11, 2001. This
could be attributed to a reporting error or to the classification of anti-Islamic hate crime as some other category, i.e. anti-Arab, or more broadly,
anti-Ethnic or -Religion).
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and Muslims as representatives of a larger enemy responsible for the death and destruction on
September 11th, hate crime perpetrators dehumanize such groups as they find all members
equally responsible and thus interchangeable targets worthy of retaliation. At the same time,
ingroup members view themselves in a positive light when they more strongly identify with their
ingroup and when they perceive their ingroup more favorably than other outgroups; this
facilitates greater conformity to their norms of their ingroup (Cohrs & Kessler, 2013; Federico,
2013; Louis & Taylor, 2002; Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). In the aftermath of 9/11, the
United States government framed itself as leading a “crusade” in a “war on terrorism” that
Americans would win (Office of the White House Press Secretary, September 16, 2001). In
addition to assuming American superiority, such sentiments occurred in a historical moment
when Americans associated the Muslim world with terrorism, leading to an “us against them” or
rather, “U.S. versus Arab/Muslim world” mentality. Indeed, Lyons et al.’s (2010) study uses a
sample of U.S. citizens and finds that the interaction of ingroup identification and mean and
high-level group narcissism is associated with increases in negative attitudes and behaviors
toward Arab immigrants. Seeing themselves as protecting their neighborhoods, perpetrators of
anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime thus cast themselves as “true Americans,” reinforcing their ingroup
identity as superior to the terrorist enemy, which they perceive as all Arab and Muslim persons.
While the terrorist threat research mainly addresses the effect of 9/11 or completed terrorist acts,
future studies may want to look to the impact of foiled and failed terrorist plots. Plots could also
serve as triggering events that induce perpetrators to suspect and attack those they perceive to be
associated with Islamic extremism to both retaliate for these potential attacks and to defend
themselves from a perceived threat of plotting minorities.
Gay Threat
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The current study also adds to the literature by further scrutinizing the neighborhoodlevel determinants of anti-gay hate crime as well as extending previous work by using improved
gay demographic measures. Regarding demographics, analyses reveal that an increase in the gay
population is associated with more than twice as much anti-gay hate crime. This finding
corroborates Green et al.'s (2001) work finding a positive association between gay presence and
anti-gay hate crime. Capturing changes over time, gay population growth is also shown to be
associated with large increases in such crimes as well. Though the percent of same-sex partner
households is not a perfect measure for capturing gay populations, the results still support the
notion that visibility acts as an important predictor of anti-gay hate crime. Perpetrators of antigay hate crime often do so in pursuit of thrills, traveling to known gay areas or “gayborhoods,”
where there is greater opportunity to victimize a gay person (Franklin, 2000; Levin & McDevitt,
2002). Areas with higher gay populations, and thus greater visibility, not only provide greater
opportunity to victimize gay persons, but also amplify the perceived “threat” to heterosexist
social norms.
The threat to such heterosexist social norms can also be exacerbated by other threats.
Aside from gay demographics, concentrated disadvantage and poor economic conditions
influence levels of anti-gay hate crime differently compared to anti-racial and –ethnoreligious
hate crime. While all other bias types occur in neighborhoods that are generally more socially
organized and with better economic conditions, anti-gay hate crime proves more prevalent in
neighborhoods experiencing greater concentrated disadvantage as well as higher levels of
unemployment and poverty. This contradicts Green et al.’s (2001) previous work showing no
association between economic conditions, via white unemployment specifically, and anti-gay
hate crime. Such results are also at odds with Alden and Parker’s (2005) study which found a
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negative relationship between poverty and anti-gay hate crime. These differences could be
attributable to Green et al. solely testing the effect of economic conditions while not accounting
for gay population indicators. Alden and Parker’s study also uses a different unit of analysis,
conducting a city-level analysis. As demonstrated in the lit review, research on the effect of
economic conditions is decidedly mixed.
The results however are in line with Ryan and Leeson’s (2011) national-level study,
which found weak support for the positive relationship between unemployment and hate crime.
As previously discussed, anti-gay hate crime serves as an avenue to respond to the perceived
threat to masculinity and heterosexist norms given the relationship between gay population levels
and anti-gay hate crime. Poor economic conditions compound the threat to masculinity as men
perceive their personal economic failures to extend to failures to uphold “hegemonic
masculinity” in providing for themselves and their families (Goffman, 1963 as cited in Perry,
2001). The findings thus evidence this context where gay visibility and poor economic
conditions aggravate threats to masculinity, leading to efforts to reassert masculinity which
translates into higher levels of anti-gay hate crime.

Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice in the United States
The current study’s results add to the current body of research on hate crime, contributing
valuable insight into the determinants of hate crime offending. Such insights offer an
opportunity to inform policy and practice in the United States in several ways. First, the results
can help inform the NYPD’s HCTF in their efforts to prevent and respond to hate crime. As the
HCTF is one of the oldest and most influential bias units in the nation, any influence on their
strategies could serve as a model for other bias crime units in the country, especially as cities
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across the country are grappling with their response to surges in hate crime in recent months
(Goldman, 2017; Hatewatch Staff, 2016; Hatewatch Staff, 2017; La Porte, 2016; Levin, 2017;
Miller & Werner-Winslow, 2016; Toure, 2017). Clearly, efforts should focus on those
neighborhoods experiencing an influx of minorities into white neighborhoods. Law enforcement
should be careful to look for anti-Jewish crimes when any neighborhood experiences changing
demographics. Attention should also be paid to those neighborhoods with a greater presence of
Jewish buildings in combination with changing neighborhood demographics. When it comes to
white neighborhoods seeing increasing racial/ethnic minority populations, the evidence shows
that law enforcement should be prepared to respond to a variety of bias types. Such
neighborhoods may experience more anti-Jewish hate crime, but also anti-Black or –Hispanic
hate crime as well. Additionally, the findings on anti-white hate crime have interesting
implications. If the availability and use of community resources can thwart anti-white hate
crime, then the same efforts could similarly stop other types of hate crime. The findings show
that increasing demographic change need not lead to hate crime. Anti-gay crime prevention
strategies and responses should also focus on neighborhoods with greater and growing gay
populations as well as focusing on those neighborhoods with poorer economic conditions. On
the whole, the study emphasizes the need to track hate crime trends and community-level traits,
particularly change over time in such indicators.
Beyond law enforcement responses, the evidence reinforces the need for policymakers
and practitioners to grapple with the effects of entrenched segregation in the United States. Bell
(2013) highlights how the average white or Black person lives in majority white or Black
neighborhoods respectively. She further adds that evidence demonstrates that AfricanAmericans would prefer to live in more racially integrated neighborhoods, yet they are the
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nation’s most segregated demographic (p. 2). The current study demonstrates the pervasive
nature of anti-integrationist violence, particularly in white neighborhoods. Persistent segregation
ensures that such neighborhoods will continue to experience such responses. Thus policies
should focus on promoting housing integration. As for the escalation in anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime in the post-9/11 era, government officials and policymakers should avoid using rhetoric
and enacting policies that perpetuate the stigmatization of Arab and Muslim communities. For
example, travel bans designated against certain Arab countries only serves to not only portray
such targets as “Other,” but also as potential threats to national security, further contributing to
the “racing” of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists. Further, government officials and policymakers
should desist in crafting legislation that discriminates against LGBTQI persons and in rolling
back protections against discrimination for such persons. Such efforts further “institutionalize
difference” (see Perry, 2001) by maintaining power structures across the contexts of sexuality
and gender. Institutionalization of difference thus reinforces hierarchies that allow for the
continued oppression of the LGBTQI community. Thus the government’s continued
discrimination of such groups sends a message that makes anti-gay hate crime permissible.
Given the greater understanding of neighborhood dynamics effect on group conflict as
expressed through hate crime, this study’s findings may aid community relations groups in
developing strategies that best remedy neighborhood conflicts. The study could aid the
Community Relations Service (CRS) of the U.S. Department of Justice, which handles
"community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, national origin,
gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, and disability" (U.S. Department of Justice,
Community Relations Service). Other community stakeholders, such as schools, victims’
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services, and other community and mediating services stand to benefit from the study given their
investment in better understanding, and thus more ably respond, to hate crime.
Importantly, the current study demonstrates need for nuance when dealing with hate
crime. The current study shows that there is no “one size fits all” explanation of hate crime.
Rather, this study demonstrates the importance of work that disaggregates hate crime by bias
type as different types of hate crime occur in varying contexts. For example, static visibility
explains anti-Jewish and anti-gay hate crime, but dynamic processes (i.e., increasing racial/ethnic
minority populations) prove significant in accounting for anti-Black and –Hispanic hate crime.
If there are different explanations for different types of hate crime, policymakers and
practitioners should also investigate different responses to different types of hate crime.

Limitations
Given the study’s focus on one American city, questions of generalizability arise
concerning whether the findings will hold in other national and international settings. The
reporting and recording of hate crimes in the United States continues to be inadequate given that
the criminalization of hate crimes remains a relatively new phenomenon, resulting in underreported and under-prosecuted crime, as well as differential compliance with investigating,
recording, and reporting hate crimes (King, 2007; King et al., 2009). The NYPD, however,
possesses one of the longest-standing Bias Crimes Units demonstrating vastly superior reporting
of hate crimes (Freilich & Chermak, 2013; Levin & Amster, 2007; Martin, 1996). Therefore,
New York serves as one of the best possible avenues to study hate crime offending in the United
States.
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While the NYPD HCTF is one of the best hate crime units in the country, underreporting
remains an important issue with hate crime data. There may exist differential reporting across
victims targeted for different bias crimes. Victims of hate crime may similarly refrain from
reporting their victimization to law enforcement due to fear or a lack of trust of law enforcement.
For example, victims of anti-gay hate crime often fear reporting their victimization to law
enforcement, fearing being “outed” by their victimization or fearing how the police will respond
to their reports (Herek & Berrill, 1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1992; Swank et al., 2013).
Undocumented immigrants who are the victim of bias-motivated crimes may similarly fear
reporting their victimization to law enforcement over fears of arrest and deportation. There are
also documented concerns over underreporting of victimization among Asian-Americans
(Donachie, 2016; Fuchs, 2016).
Other limitations also include a few of the analyses' statistical power. A power analysis
shows that analyses with a sample size of 55 or 59 have enough power to detect large effects, but
not medium or small effects. To address this, most analyses use a long form dataset to increase
the sample size to 177 with each community district’s hate crime divided into three separate time
periods (1995-2000, 2001-2005, and 2006-2010); however, a long form dataset could not be used
for all models. All but one of the anti-gay models use a sample size of 59 community districts
for the 2006 to 2010 time period due to the limited availability of gay demographic measures.
Though the models only have enough power to detect large effects, this did not pose a problem
as the models were still capable of uncovering strongly significant results. All of the political
threat models also only include a small sample size (n=55 PUMAs) for the 2006 to 2010 time
period due to earlier electoral data being unavailable at this time. While these models could only
detect large effects, analyses still find significant results.
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As noted previously, the NYPD did not specify anti-Arab or anti-Muslim hate crime in
the data they provided. Thus, the study follows Disha et al. (2011) in developing a proxy
measure using anti-Ethnicity and anti-Religion hate crime as these categories are expected to
largely include anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime. This measure also includes those offenses labeled
as anti-American Indian due to the sudden and dramatic appearance of such crimes in 2001,
presumably after the September 11th attacks in 2001. The NYPD notes that it was possible that
they were not recording anti-American Indian hate crimes as such before 9/11. It remains
possible however that those crimes labelled as anti-American Indian may actually be capturing
crimes that were committed against perceived Arab and/or Muslim persons and property. Thus,
the anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime counts also include anti-American Indian hate crime. Analyses
were run with and without the anti-American Indian hate crime and the results remained largely
the same with the exception of the post-2000 indicator failing to reach significance in the
analyses without anti-American Indian hate crime. In an effort to be as inclusive as possible and
not miss any potential anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes, the study presents analyses including the
anti-American Indian hate crimes in the anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime counts.
While the models generally rely on race-specific population data to match to the outcome
hate crime variable (i.e. Non-Hispanic Black population data in models with anti-Black hate
crime), analyses are limited to use of the general non-Hispanic white (and nonwhite) population
data for anti-Jewish hate crime models and nonwhite population data for anti-Arab/Muslim hate
crime models. Though the analyses include no similar demographic-specific indicators for
Jewish and Arab/Muslim populations, the use of the current demographic indicators proves
suitable. The analyses also account for Jewish visibility by including data on the presence of
Jewish buildings, which the study shows is consistently associated with higher levels of anti-
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Jewish hate crime. Another measurement limitation also includes the conceptual overlap
between variables in some models, specifically models containing race/ethnicity measures with
the diversity index and as well as models with percent non-Hispanic Black, concentrated
disadvantage, and the diversity index. This study’s concentrated disadvantage index measure
includes the percent non-Hispanic Black. The diversity index also includes either the same or
similar racial population measures in computing the index as well. While Grattet (2009) uses the
similar concentrated disadvantage and diversity measures in his models, he does not include
diversity in his full models or use percent non-Hispanic Black as a separate measure as he was
not interested in nonwhite defended neighborhoods. The current study however investigates
nonwhite defended neighborhoods and opts to use a consistent measure of concentrated
disadvantage across all models. Using a different measure of concentrated disadvantage, Lyons
(2007) notes that he does not incorporate racial measures into the measure in an effort to separate
race from economic conditions. This illustrates the conceptual overlap in the current study’s use
of percent non-Hispanic Black as both a part of the concentrated disadvantage measure and as a
separate group presence indicator in using race as part of an indicator of economic conditions.
Though there is conceptual overlap in these measures, it is not expected that the measures would
change much if percent non-Hispanic Black were removed from the concentrated disadvantage
index. Furthermore, this issue is isolated to only some models.
Limitations also exist with the Political Threat models, largely due to possible temporal
issues with the political threat indicators. Given the limited availability of data, the analyses are
limited to last time period of 2006 to 2010 using the 55 Public Use Microdata Areas. Though
limited to the last “stack” of data, the political threat indicators are either at the tail end of the
time period or after due to the unavailability of earlier voting data. The data on registered
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Republicans (and other conservatives) comes 2012 registration data; however, it is assumed that
political party affiliation would be fairly stable throughout the time period. The mayoral election
data also comes from the 2009 mayoral election toward the end of the 2006 to 2010 time period.
The mayoral election results however prove somewhat similar to the 2005 mayoral election data,
although the Democratic candidate, William Thompson, fared a little better than the 2005
candidate with six percent more of the vote and winning the majority of the Brooklyn vote
(Bloch, Fessenden, Tse, 2016; Chen & Barbaro, 2009). Lastly, it has already been noted that the
2012 presidential election data is a proxy for the 2008 presidential election, but the same
temporal issue remains.
Lastly, this study’s analyses do not account for situational characteristics (i.e. the race of
the perpetrator). Thus, it is not clear what interracial dynamics are at play during the hate crime
incidents (i.e. anti-Black hate crimes could be committed by Hispanic, and not white, offenders).
Regarding other studies using neighborhood data on known offender-victim races, the data
however either show majorities or greater percentages of anti-minority hate crimes being
committed by white perpetrators (see Lyons, 2007, where approximately 75 percent of known
anti-Black offenders were white and vice versa for Black-on-white hate crime in Chicago; see
also Green, Strolovitch, & Wong, 1998, where the race of the offender was unknown in the
majority of hate crimes, but white perpetrators were made up the largest percentage of known
offenders across anti-minority victims in New York City in the period directly preceding the
current study's time period). Nevertheless, this study’s analyses do determine what types of
neighborhoods where certain bias-motivated offenses occur, such as anti-Black hate crimes
occurring more often in white neighborhoods experiencing an influx of Black populations.
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Conclusion
Examining the neighborhood-level determinants of hate crime, the current study
subsequent neighborhood analysis presents a fresh look at hate crime in New York City over an
extended period marked by demographic change. Hate crime presents a unique threat to society
by damaging intergroup relations and challenging the equality of citizens in American society
across lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and class. This work provides an
important portrait of New York City’s hate crimes that contributes substantially to the
scholarship on hate crimes and hopefully proves useful in assisting policymakers and
practitioners in the future.
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APPENDIX ONE: HYPOTHESES
Defended Neighborhoods
H1: Communities with higher levels of majority presence will be associated with higher levels of
hate crime (static).
H1(a): Communities with a higher white population will be associated with increases
in anti-minority hate crime.
H1(b): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in
anti-white hate crime.
H1(c): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in
anti-Jewish hate crime.
H1(d): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in
anti-Asian hate crime.
H1(e): Communities with a higher Black population will be associated with increases in
anti-Hispanic hate crime.
H1(f): Communities with a higher nonwhite population will be associated with increases
in anti-white hate crime.
H1(g): Communities with a higher nonwhite population will be associated with increases
in anti-Jewish hate crime.
H1(h): Communities with a higher nonwhite population will be associated with increases
in anti-Asian hate crime.
H1(i): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases
in anti-white hate crime.
H1(j): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases
in anti-Jewish hate crime.
H1(k): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases
in anti-Asian hate crime.
H1(l): Communities with a higher Hispanic population will be associated with increases
in anti-Black hate crime.
H1(m): Communities with a higher Asian population will be associated with increases in
anti-Hispanic hate crime.
H1(n): Communities with a higher Asian population will be associated with increases in
anti-Black hate crime.
H2: Communities with increasing levels of minority presence will be associated with higher
levels of hate crime (dynamic).
H2(a): Communities with an increasing nonwhite population over time will be associated
with increases in hate crime.
H2(b): Communities with an increasing Black population over time will be associated
with increases in hate crime.
H2(c): Communities with an increasing Hispanic population over time will be associated
with increases in hate crime.
H2(d): Communities with an increasing Asian population over time will be associated
with increases in hate crime.
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H2(e): Communities with an increasing white population over time will be associated
with increases in hate crime.
H3: Predominantly majority communities seeing an influx of minority residents will experience
increases in hate crime (dynamic).
H3(a): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of nonwhite residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(b): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of Black residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(c): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of Hispanic residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(d): Predominantly white communities seeing an influx of Asian residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(e): Predominantly Black communities seeing an influx of white residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(g): Predominantly Black communities seeing an influx of Hispanic residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(i): Predominantly Black communities seeing an influx of Asian residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(j): Predominantly Hispanic communities seeing an influx of Black residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(l): Predominantly Hispanic communities seeing an influx of Jewish residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(m): Predominantly Hispanic communities seeing an influx of Asian residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(m): Predominantly Asian communities seeing an influx of Hispanic residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H3(m): Predominantly Asian communities seeing an influx of Black residents will
experience increases in hate crime.
H4: Communities with more synagogues will experience more anti-Jewish hate crime (static).
Economic Threat, Social Disorganization, and Strain
H5: Poor economic conditions will be associated with higher levels of hate crime (static).
H5(a): Higher levels of unemployment will be associated with increases in hate crime
(across all bias motivations separately).
H5(b): Higher levels of poverty will be associated with increases in hate crime (across all
bias motivations separately).
H6: Communities experiencing worsening economic conditions will be associated with higher
levels of hate crime (dynamic).
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H6(a): Growing unemployment over time will be associated with increases in hate crime
(across all bias motivations separately).
H6(b): Growing poverty over time will be associated with increases in hate crime (across
all bias motivations separately).
H7: Socially disorganized communities will experience higher levels of hate crime (static).
H7(a): Concentrated disadvantage will be positively associated with hate crime (across
all bias motivations separately).
H7(b): Residential instability will be positively associated with associated hate crime
(across all bias motivations separately).
H7(c): Diversity will be positively associated with hate crime (across all bias motivations
separately).
Political Threat
H8: Communities with higher levels of Republican Party enrollment will experience higher
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
H9: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Republican wins will experience lower
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
H10: Communities with higher levels of Republican enrollment, yet higher Democratic electoral
votes, in their voting district in an election in which the Democrat wins wills experience higher
levels of anti-racial/ethnic minority hate crime (static).
"Other" Terrorist Threat
H11: Communities with higher numbers of Islam-associated buildings will see increases in antiArab/Muslim hate crime (static).
H12: There should be an increase in anti- Arab/Muslim hate crime after 2000.
"Gay Threat"
H13: Communities with higher gay populations are associated with increases in anti-gay hate
crime (static).
H14: Communities experiencing an increase in gay populations are associated with increases in
anti-gay hate crime (dynamic).
H15: Communities with poor economic conditions will experience higher levels of anti-gay hate
crime (static).
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H16: Communities with worsening economic conditions will experience higher levels of antigay hate crime (dynamic).
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APPENDIX TWO: POWER ANALYSES
Figure 1: Power Analysis for n=59
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Figure 2: Power Analysis for n=177 and n=55
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APPENDIX THREE: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS
Table 8.1: Bivariate Correlations for Predictor Variables
% NonHispanic
White
% Non-Hispanic White
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Non-Hispanic Asian
% Nonwhite
Change Nonwhite Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic Black
Pop.
Change Hispanic Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic Asian
Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic White Pop.
% Gay
Change Gay Pop.
Concentrated Disadvantage
Residential Instability
Diversity Index
Unemployment Rate
Change in Unemployment
Poverty Rate
Change in Poverty
Synagogues
Post-2000
Total Population

% NonHispanic
Black

% Hispanic

% NonHispanic
Asian

% Nonwhite

0.206**

-0.278***

0.4115***

0.724***
-0.256***
-0.335***
0.556***
0.082
0.409***
-0.131⁺
-0.321***

0.563***
0.113
0.444***
0.665***
-0.075
0.715***
-0.334***

-0.544***
0.137⁺
0.366***
-0.493***
0.016
-0.399***
0.187*

0.888***
-0.096
0.137⁺
0.820***
0.026
0.751***
-0.308***
-0.541***

-0.046⁺

-0.141

0.210**

-0.071

Change
Nonwhite
Pop.

Change NonHispanic Black
Pop.

-0.456***
-0.226**
0.169*
-0.460***
0.171*
-0.532***
0.651***
0.112
-0.183*
0.151*

-0.312***
-0.103
0.101
-0.348***
0.114
-0.375***
0.383***

0.412***
0.321***
-0.030***
0.435***

-0.888***
0.096
-0.137⁺
-0.820***
-0.026
-0.751***
0.308***
0.541***
-0.095
0.071

-0.047
-0.448***
0.379***

0.225**

⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
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Table 8.1: Bivariate Correlations for Predictor Variables (continued)

Change
Hispanic Pop.

Change NonHispanic
Asian Pop.

Change NonHispanic
White Pop.

0.020
-0.091
0.113
0.033
0.197**
-0.067
0.285***

-0.528***
-0.049
0.121
-0.491***
-0.051
-0.459***
0.226**

0.456***
0.226**
-0.169*
0.460***
-0.171*
0.532***
-0.651***
-0.112

% Non-Hispanic White
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Non-Hispanic Asian
% Nonwhite
Change Nonwhite Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic Black
Pop.
Change Hispanic Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic Asian Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic White Pop.
% Gay
Change Gay Pop.
Concentrated Disadvantage
Residential Instability
Diversity Index
Unemployment Rate
Change in Unemployment
Poverty Rate
Change in Poverty
Synagogues
Post-2000
Total Population

-0.056

0.140⁺

-0.151

% Gay

Change
Gay

0.636***
-0.393**
0.486***
-0.003
-0.259*
0.053
-0.243⁺
-0.061

-0.401**
0.407**
-0.159
-0.291*
0.019
-0.253⁺
-0.107

-0.301*

-0.194

Concentrated
Disadvantage

Residential
Instability

-0.132⁺
-0.077

0.095

-0.444***
0.050
-0.196**

-0.169*
0.327***
-0.285***

⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
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Table 8.1: Bivariate Correlations for Predictor Variables (continued)

Diversity Index

Unemployment
Rate

Change in
Unemployment

Poverty Rate

Change in
Poverty

Synagogues

Post2000

0.245***
-0.222**
0.293***

0.265***

0.094

% Non-Hispanic White
% Non-Hispanic Black
% Hispanic
% Non-Hispanic Asian
% Nonwhite
Change Nonwhite Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic Black Pop.
Change Hispanic Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic Asian Pop.
Change Non-Hispanic White Pop.
% Gay
Change Gay Pop.
Concentrated Disadvantage
Residential Instability
Diversity Index
Unemployment Rate
Change in Unemployment
Poverty Rate
Change in Poverty
Synagogues
Post-2000
Total Population

-0.179*
-0.530***
-0.014
0.139⁺
0.061

-0.484***
0.061
-0.323***

0.028
-0.118
0.042

-0.382***
0.045
-0.296***

⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
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Table 8.2: Bivariate Correlations for Predictor Variables for Political Threat Models

Change
Nonwhite
Pop.

Change
NonHispanic
Black Pop.

Change
Hispanic
Pop.

Change NonHispanic
Asian Pop.

% Gay

Change
Gay

0.829***

0.555***

0.384**

0.223

0.344*

0.614***
-0.121

0.071

-0.918***

-0.513***

-0.42**

-0.032

-0.439***

-0.126

-0.196

-0.826***

-0.839***
0.097

-0.481***
0.215

-0.365**
0.333*

-0.129
-0.082

-0.372**
0.124

0.171
-0.427

-0.003
-0.397

-0.906***
0.078

% NonHispanic
White
% Non-Hispanic
White
Change
Nonwhite Pop.
Change NonHispanic Black
Pop.
Change Hispanic
Pop.
Change NonHispanic Asian
Pop.
% Gay
Change Gay
Pop.
% Republican
% Democrat
Mayoral Vote
% Democrat
Presidential
Vote
Total Population

%
Republican

%
Democrat
Mayoral
Vote

% Democrat
Presidential
Vote

0.866***
-0.154

-0.127

0.388**

0.365**
0.013

0.257⁺

⁺p≤0.1 *p≤0.05 **p≤0.01 ***p≤0.001
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APPENDIX FOUR: STATEMENT ON DATA ATTRIBUTION
This data was provided by and belongs to the New York Police Department. Any further use of
this data must be approved by the New York City Police Department. Points of view or opinions
contained within this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the
official position or policies of the New York City Police Department.
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